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 ABSTRACT 
Iranian Encounters in Azerbaijan: The Case of Nardaran 
Isa Kagan Karasioglu 
 
 This dissertation is based on the study that has been conducted in the form of an 
ethnographic field research in Nardaran, an ancient Azeri village of Absheron peninsula, Baku, 
Azerbaijan. As a result of many historical and political reasons it can be argued that the two 
nation states, Azerbaijan and Iran, have not been overly friendly throughout the history. However, 
interestingly enough, Nardarani villagers, unlike the broader Azeri society, are tightly linked to 
Iran. Therefore, the primary goal of this dissertation is to investigate the prominent reasons, 
which rendered these villagers Iranian proponents. By adopting the concept of ‘hegemony’ as 
primary theoretical approach, the dissertation primarily investigates the hegemonic efforts of Iran 
upon Nardaran to account for the current situation and the future of the village. After looking at 
the broader Azerbaijan and the rural communities of the region and providing a selective 
historical sketch, it is the aim of the study to provide the reader with the opportunity to make 
comparisons and to locate Nardaran within the broader picture. In what follows, it presents the 
Iranian hegemonic consequences upon the village and seeks to identify the implications of the 
concept of change over Nardaran. Finally, the study investigates the underlying reasons and the 
processes that led to the aferomentioned situation under the title of  ‘hegemony and peaceful 
mechanisms of change’. Since the study is the only anthropological one that specifically handles 
Nardaran, the researcher tried to conduct the research in the form of an anthropological 
community study. Accordingly, the dissertation attempts to take an overall picture of the village. 
This manner, namely adopting a holistic approach, was not only useful but also necessary in 
terms of answering the research questions. In other words, looking at the history, geography, 
economy, material culture, environmental design and so forth, seem to be essential in terms of 
understanding the case of Nardaran. 	
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  1. Statement of problem 
 
I know three extremely unique places in the world: Kosovo, Sicily and Nardaran. 
These three are my favorites because they do not recognize the legal codes of the 
countries of which they are part. (Ambassador of Norway in Baku, from an 
informal speech made during a visit to Nardaran)  
 
The above quote is drawn from an interview I conducted in Nardaran, Azerbaijan. The 
informant cited the ambassador’s comment in the course of describing his village in an extremely 
passionate way. Uniqueness, being different was a source of pride for him, as it is for most of 
Nardaranis. Almost all of my informants made similar comments about their village: “Here is 
Nardaran. It does not resemble any other place in this country, if not in the world!” 
On November 26th 2015, the date that put Nardaran on the world’s agenda again, Azeri 
security forces conducted an operation in Nardaran, against a radical Shii leader, founder of a 
movement called Muslim Unity. Taleh Bagirov (Bagirzadeh), an Iranian-educated man, in his 
early thirties had been preaching in the neighboring village of Nardaran, Bilgah. After he had 
gained his college degree at Azerbaijan State University of Economics, he went to the city of 
Qom, Iran, for a religious education. He stayed in Iran for five years and returned to Azerbaijan, 
where he led anti-government protests and became famous for his preaching that came into 
prominence due more to its political than its faith-based context. Bagirov was jailed for 
pioneering the protests against the ban on women’s wearing the hijab in early 2013. After being 
in prison for almost two and a half years, he was released at the end of July 2015.  
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And yet the theologian continued to indulge in radical and anti-government rhetoric upon 
his release. Indeed, he did so even on the very night he was released by talking to press 
representatives as his family welcomed him home. On November 26, 2015, the Azeri security 
forces raided a house in Nardaran in order to detain Bagirov once again but this time they 
encountered armed resistance during which two police officers and three civilians were killed. 
The host family was the son of one of my informants. Accordingly, my informant and his other 
sons were arrested during the clash. After the deadly incident, the Azeri security forces began to 
conduct sweeping operations in Nardaran and arrested nearly 35 villagers including the most 
prominent mullahs, the head of the council of elders, and many others. They were charged with 
violating the following articles of the Azerbaijan criminal code:  
120 (murder), 214 (terrorism), 220 (rioting), 228 (illegal possession of firearms 
and ammunition), 233 (organization of actions aimed at disturbing the public 
order or participation therein), 279 (creation of illegal armed formations or 
groups), 281 (public appeals against the state), 283 (incitement to religious 
hatred), 315 (resistance with application of violence concerning a representative 
of authority), 278 (attempt to seize power.) It is noteworthy that the last article, 
demands the penalty of lifelong imprisonment. (hrf.report).  
 
My key informant who was in charge of the village newspaper (Islam Haqiqatleri Gazeti) was 
among the detainees. The police also banned publication of the newspaper. Moreover a police 
station, absent in Nardaran for almost 13 years, was reestablished, along with a unit of riot police 
in Nardaran.  The police force set up security checkpoints at several spots and for several days no 
one was allowed to enter the village except for the legal residents. A police squad also was 
placed on guard in the old cemetery where the deceased were subsequently buried. The squad did 
not allow families to bury the deceased within the main cemetery that became a symbol of the 
2002 incidents after the martyr had been buried.   
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Thanks to visual-communication tools, I was able to keep in touch with my contacts after 
I left the site.  Shortly after the incidents I tried to reach some of my informants but failed 
because they all were arrested. I did however manage to reach other friends, from whom I 
gathered information about the incident as well as about the detainees. Besides the mullahs, the 
head of the council of elders, and some other Iranian-educated villagers, the majority of the 
detainees were the villagers I mentally assigned to the outer core of the socio-political structure 
of the village. The household heads of the extended family that had hosted the theologian also 
were arrested.  Although the investigation was still in progress while these lines were being 
written, and there was an ongoing debate both within the village and on the Azeri media, it is 
worthy of consideration because it can provide us with an overview of my research site.  
Soon after the incident occurred, the comments on the Azerbaijani media focused on the 
allegations directed toward Iran and its actions within Azerbaijan and specifically in Nardaran. 
The Iranian embassy in Baku made a statement and denied the allegations directed toward 
Tehran. According to that embassy statement, Iranian officials believe that the allegations were 
based on the image –in fact, nonexistent– depicting Taleh Bagirov kissing Ayatollah Nuri 
Hamadani’s hand during his visit to Baku. In addition to this, the deputy chairman of the 
Commission on Security and Foreign Policy of the Iranian parliament, Mansur Hakikatpur, made 
another statement on the case and urged the Azerbaijani authorities to heed the lessons taught by 
the fate of dictators in the region. He also condemned the brutal force used by the Azeri police 
and offered condolences to the families of the deceased. Among Hakikatpur’s remarks, 
according to some websites, was a comment about Azerbaijan’s tolerance toward homosexuals, 
an allusion to the gay-parade that occurred in Baku during the International Song Contest in 
2012, and violent steps taken by the Azeri government against religious Shia communities.  
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At the end of the first semester of my Applied Anthropology studies at Teachers College, 
Columbia University, I began to think about summer field research, a requirement of the 
program. In the old days of the program, I was informed, the research sites were chosen by its 
administrators and the students sent to a variety of countries all over the world. Even though we 
now were free to make our own choices, I decided, because of this old tradition, that it would be 
better idea to pick a research site outside of the United States. As an international student I 
decided not to go to my homeland, but rather to a different country. Then, all of a sudden, the 
idea of picking Azerbaijan popped into my head. Most probably, my current connections and the 
language aspect drove me toward this post-Soviet republic. At any rate, I not only began to read 
about Azerbaijan but also took a course entitled Readings in Anthropology and taught by a 
professor who specializes in the region.  
During this time period, I noticed the incidents taking place in an Azeri village, located 
on the Absheron peninsula, called Nardaran. The village placed its name on the world’s agenda 
when some people there incited anti-government uprisings, especially after the year 2000 it has 
recently been seen as a stronghold of Islamic activism. Nardaran also is famous for its 
monumental mosque-and-shrine combination, known as one of the most significant holy places 
of the country. Angry villagers sometimes demonstrate outside this huge mosque, which 
dominates the village and chant radical Islamic slogans. In the year 2002, this rural discontent 
evolved into an immense clash between the Azeri Police force and the Nardarani. The end-result 
was several deaths, and injuries, and demolished police vehicles. The villagers on the main 
square, of the village dug symbolic graves and the demonstrations lasted for months. The reason 
for the uprisings was said to be the low living standards, yet the underlying reason soon emerged: 
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Nardaranis were not feeling satisfied with the policies, especially the secular ones, of the 
government.   
In the course of my initial investigation I discovered several interesting facts that 
captured my attention and heightened my enthusiasm. For instance, the village was referred to as 
the “Azerbaijani Palermo” by one of the native journalists, Usnia Babayeva, writing for The 
Current Digest of the Russian Press in 2002. Likewise, Nardaran was being accused, in both the 
scholarly and journal articles of the time, either of having secret relationships with Azerbaijan’s 
northern neighbor, Iran, or of being a site for Islamic radicalism. Both contentions are worth 
considering because regarding the former, Azerbaijan scarcely had friendly relations with Iran 
throughout its history. What is more Iran publicly supported Armenia, which became the greatest 
enemy of Azerbaijan after it occupied some of its lands in the early 1990s. The latter is another 
interesting point, since the institution of religion is not a strong one in Azerbaijan for two reasons. 
First, as a post-Soviet country, Azerbaijan suffered greatly in terms of developing religious 
practices because of the 70 years of oppressive rule. And second, the Azeri government adopted 
a secular styled government and emulated both Stalin- and Turkish-style secularism in the course 
of gaining its independence.  
Therefore, my primary concern was to ascertain whether Nardaran was or was not closely 
connected to Iran. If I were to arrive at “yes” as an answer, the next question would be “why did 
this happen?”  As will be explained in detail, my findings compelled me to entitle my short paper, 
which I wrote upon returning from the short-term summer research, “The Little Iran within 
Azerbaijan: Nardaran.” Furthermore, what I found during the initial research period was that 
Nardaran is not only inclined toward Iran but also has become quite different, in several ways, 
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from the rest of Azerbaijan. So much, indeed, that upon entering the village one could not 
observe anything it had in common with the greater Azeri society, other than language.  
For instance, young women often wear Western-style fashions such as short skirts in 
downtown Baku, but seeing a woman with her head uncovered is rare in Nardaran. The covers 
are not ordinary veils but black chadors, called the hijab. The hijab not only covers the women’s 
bodies, but also finds its place on the walls of Nardaran as these are full of murals and graffiti 
comprised of religious figures and words. Entering Nardaran gives you the feeling of being in a 
radical Shia location. Moreover, there are six masjids in Nardaran. When the Pir, the 
monumental mosque-shrine combination, is taken into consideration, Nardaran projects an image 
that strikes me as unique in all of Azerbaijan. That is to say, Nardaran’s heavy dose of religious 
imagery attracts attention precisely because the rest of this post-Soviet nation is utterly lacking in 
religious institutions, especially as compared to the neighboring Muslim countries. Furthermore, 
while drinking alcohol and toasting have long been perceived as an honorable tradition in 
Azerbaijan, one virtually never sees a shop that sells alcoholic beverages in Nardaran.   
Unlike the average Azerbaijani, the Nardarani native often receives a religious education 
in Iran, in part because a madrasah (a university mosque) in Nardaran was shut down by the 
government in 2001. In fact, the construction of the madrasah was supported by Iran, a country 
which historically has very rarely had good relations with Azerbaijan but to which Nardaranis 
are tightly linked. In addition to their shared but also conflicted historical background, Iran and 
Azerbaijan have encountered some recent problems as well. As stated earlier, the Islamic 
Republic openly supports Christian Armenia, even at the expense of negatively influencing its 
relationship with predominantly Shia Azerbaijanis. Accordingly, accusations voiced by the Azeri 
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governmental against Nardaran have been based not only on the ground that Nardaran inclines 
toward Iran but also on more serious allegations such as spying, manipulation, and exploitation. 
The embodiment of those allegations has been seen as being The Islamic Party of 
Azerbaijan, or the IPA. The party was born in Nardaran immediately after independence. As it 
propagated anti-Turkic, anti-nationalist, and anti-secular ideas, and adopted radical Islamism, it 
laid the foundations of the abovementioned discontent over time. First, the IPA denounced the 
secular and pro-Western attitudes of the Azeri government as being at variance with the Islamic 
doctrine. Second, its anti-Turkic and radical Islamic rhetoric widened the gap between the 
already pious Nardaran community and the non-religious sector. In response to all this, two 
significant consequences arose. On the one hand, radicalism did what it usually does: it resulted 
in the polarization of the society. On the other hand, the secular regime of Azerbaijan perceived 
the IPA as a threat, and thus the party’s administrators were detained in 1996. The accusations 
included spying for Iran, and most of the detainees were sentenced to ten years in prison. While 
the IPA leaders were serving their prison sentences, the political agenda in Nardaran was being 
influenced by their imprisonment. The victimization of the IPA administration made it that much 
easier for radicalism to gain supporters. Although some of the detainees were released on 
probation toward the end of 1999, they were arrested prior to the 2001 elections. The level of 
anger reaching a new high, a contest erupted in Nardaran that became known as Etiraz Aksiyaları 
Yarandı in their words. The purported cause of the uprising was the low living standards, but the 
actual reason soon emerged. One of the most significant indicators of the cause was the slogan 
chanted during the uprisings. The majority of the slogans focused on the issue of the hijab, rather 
than on the so-called low living standards. Angry villagers were chanting, “We would rather die 
rather than give up the hijab!” 
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Taking all this into account, it would be fair to state that Nardaran is more religious, at 
least in terms of practices and external appearances, than are many other places in Azerbaijan, if 
not the whole of the country. Moreover, the Nardaranis have quite strong ties attaching them to 
Iran, the southern neighboring country, which most in Azerbaijan place on the enemy list. This 
study therefore adopts the abovementioned situation as the main problem of interest and seeks to 
determine why and how Nardaran came to stand out the broader context of Azerbaijan. More 
specifically, the main purpose of this study is to answer the following questions. First, why does 
Nardaran exhibit a more religious condition within largely secular Azerbaijan. And second, why 
does Nardaran have such close relations with Iran?  
 
  2. Methodology 
	
Since there is no academic study that specifically focuses on Nardaran, to obtain the data 
I required to answer my questions I conducted field research in the form of a traditional 
community study. Starting with its geographic and demographic characteristics, Nardaran has 
been investigated in detail: its history, economy, education system, religion, familial structure, 
marriage and residence patterns, material culture, handicrafts, and so on. If random “hanging out” 
activities do not count, I had 33 informants and 25 families hosting me in their homes for several 
days. Throughout the research I conducted semi-structured and unstructured interviews, direct 
observations, and participant observations. I recorded all of the interviews and had them 
transcribed by an Azeri secondary-school teacher. I preferred to spend most of my time in the 
village except for the off days I took once a week. In this way I had the opportunity to participate 
in almost all kinds of activities, essential aspects of the Nardarani way of life. In some of the 
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interviews I tried to use the “free list technique,” saying only one word such as “Iran” or showing 
a photograph such as one of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution. At other 
times I asked open-ended questions such as “who does the term ‘leader’ remind you of?”   
I compulsorily adopted the snowball sampling method because any other kind, such as 
purposive or systematic, simply would not have worked. It would be no exaggeration if I were to 
assert that no anthropologist doing fieldwork in Nardaran can make advance plans. This is so 
because, as a result of many unique characteristics such as its social and political structure that 
contribute to its internal solidarity, strangers are easily recognized and deterred from taking any 
independent action within the village. You simply must have some sort of approval before you 
conduct any research, and you must always be accompanied by a relatively well-known insider. 
After I had met my first informant, he took me to other informants of his own choosing. Of 
course all of this occurred only after I had shortly and implicitly described to him what my 
research objectives were and which kinds of persons I was looking for. Thereafter, according to 
the outcomes of the interviews and the observations I had made, I asked him to find me this or 
that person possessing the desired characteristics. For instance, as soon as I realized that the 
villagers’ primary source of income is rose-cultivation, I immediately tried to arrange interviews 
with several of these individuals.  
In general, I began with elderly villagers, because I wanted to become well versed in the 
villagers’ past. Here I wish to elaborate on my recruitment of informants through the 
snowballing technique. While I was interviewing an old man and asking him questions about the 
Rahima Khanum shrine and the monumental mosque, I became curious about the decisions that 
had been made regarding the administration of these buildings. As all the answers cited “the 
council of elders,” I asked my guide to introduce me to its members. In this way I was able to 
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form my focus groups, comprised of community members ranging from clergy, council-of-elders 
members, agriculturists, Iranian-educated persons, and so on. 
Soon, I realized that the Nardaran community had many distinguishing patterns. In order 
to uncover those, I drew up some genealogies. Following Barnes (1967), I asked, with respect to 
almost all households, about names, occupations, education levels, participation in religious 
practices, marriage patterns, and the residence preferences after marriage.  
During my research period, I had the opportunity to travel to four cities of Azerbaijan and 
to make observations both there and in the neighboring villages of Nardaran. Accordingly, my 
analyses and statements of “difference” are chiefly based on those observations and on the 
comparisons I drew between places, persons, and ways of life.   
 
  3. Limitations 
	
As might be expected, conducting research in bounded societies is constrained by many 
limitations. First of all you cannot act freely, but have to obey many rules. You cannot ask every 
question that comes to mind. You must even pay attention to your style of dress. Second, 
because of the longlasting conflict between Nardaran and the Azeri government, even the 
outsider Azeri nationals normally are not welcomed but rather taken with a grain of salt. The 
most significant reason for that appears to be the widespread accusation that some Nardarani are 
spying on Iran’s behalf. Then too, the proposed penalty is extremely high for that felony, deemed 
a crime committed against the state according to Azeri codes. Since the pro-government media 
as well as the government officials voice the accusation, and since several arrests based on the 
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cited accusations occurred within the course of the conflict, the villagers rarely let their guards 
down when they encounter outsiders.  
On the plus side, I was able to take advantage of being from Turkey, a country that shares 
a language and many cultural traits with Azerbaijan. Then again, my nationality could be 
considered a disadvantage given the prevalent anti-Turkic attitude and rhetoric of the village’s 
leading figures. An even more fundamental disadvantage for me was Nardaran’s largely Shii 
status and its adoption of the most radical version. At the outset I made no effort to obscure the 
fact that I am a Sunni Muslim. Yet, later on I became aware via very inappropriate rhetoric that 
within that radical Shia realm killing a Sunni is perceived as a legitimate act. None of the 
villagers said as much when I was present but one of the informants, whose characteristics will 
not be revealed here for anonymity purposes, told me that even the 12-year-old children availed 
themselves of such rhetoric. 
Given these trying circumstances, the reader will realize how difficult it was for me to 
conduct field research in Nardaran. Although my aim was to conduct a traditional community 
study, I was unable to do a complete one. For instance, I had no opportunity to contact the 
women of Nardaran. In most of the houses where I was hosted I did not even see the women, 
even though it was they who prepared food or other refreshments for me. If a house’s structure 
was not conducive to the rule that men and women must sit separately, a curtain usually divided 
the room. It was only after I had established some relationships with villagers that I was able to 
talk to two women via Skype after I had left the site. Likewise, I could not act freely when it 
came to gathering political information. The informants ended some of the interviews as soon as 
they felt uncomfortable with the direction the conversation was heading in. Therefore, the whole 
research period was a protracted struggle for me as I sought out stealthy ways of asking 
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questions and gathering information. I had to show great deal of patience, because in many 
instances the interlocutors either tried to provide me with misleading information or adopted a 
diversionary tactic and a scoffing manner.  
 
  4. Ethical Issues 
	
All field anthropologists—both applied and theoretical— find themselves in social 
situations that are varied and complex because they work with people in many different role-
relationships. Under socially complex conditions it is likely that the anthropologist, having to 
choose between conflicting values, will be faced with a number of ethical dilemmas. For 
example, how do they make their findings public without jeopardizing the anonymity of their 
informants? Can one ever be certain that the data that informants provide will not eventually be 
used to harm them? To what extent should one become personally involved in the lives of the 
people one is studying? Should one intervene to stop an illegal activity? These are just a few of 
the ethical questions that arise in the course of doing anthropological research.  
In order to provide professional standards regarding such issues, the AAA adopted its 
“Principles of Professional Responsibility” and established its Committee on Ethics in 1971, and 
the SFAA published its “Statement on Professional and Ethical Responsibilities” in 1975. The 
codes of professional ethics published by these two organizations are not appreciably different. 
Both codes cover the major areas of responsibility for practicing anthropologists: responsibility 
to the people studied, to the discipline, to the sponsors, and to one’s own and the host 
governments. The most significant concern of the present is responsibility to the people studied. 
It is detailed by the cited codes as follows:  Every effort must be made to protect the physical, 
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psychological, and social well-being of the people under study. The aims and anticipated 
consequences of the research must be clearly communicated to the research subjects so they can 
decide for themselves whether they wish to participate. Participation is to be voluntary and based 
on the principle of informed consent. Informants should in no way be exploited, and their right to 
confidentiality must be protected. 
Keeping all of the foregoing considerations in mind, I tried to be sensitive in terms of 
protecting the privacy of the informants, especially those who had revealed anti-government 
thoughts. Although there are many written documents that voice the anti-governmental attitude 
of the villagers and their pro-Iranian inclination, the ethnographic data, comprised of recorded 
interviews, can be deemed hard evidence. This condition therefore was considered sensitive, and 
names have not been specified within the study. In some cases, however, it seemed to be possible 
to trace individuals based on individuals’ aberrations from usual characteristics. Given the 
purposes of the study, I felt I had to spotlight those. This is not to say that such steps were taken 
without my informants’ consent. Luckily, most of them exhibited comfortable moods and 
approved the voice recordings after I had explained the anticipated consequences of the study. 
Many of them conveyed that they had nothing to hide, and it was certainly not a secret that the 
villagers were having some fundamental problems with the government. Furthermore, some of 
the informants who noticed my oversensitivity tried to relieve me of it by implying that the 
intelligence agency already knew everything! 
Another issue that I would like to point out with regard to these ethical considerations is 
the problem of objectivity. In this respect, Comitas (2000) reminds us of the Weberian 
distinction between normative and factual statements; that is, the difference between what is and 
what ought to be. According to Weber, Comitas argues, we should be aware of the distinction 
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between the two, but no account of empirical knowledge can validate the pursuit of one ethic 
rather than the other. On the other hand, as Arensberg (1958) stated, “the ends to which we apply 
science is our own business, and our own free choices…by being anthropologists we do not stop 
being members of a cultural, political or economic class, or being religious, etc.”   
Accordingly, I have deemed it necessary to make the following statements regarding the 
problem of objectivity in the context of Iran, Nardaran, and Azerbaijan. Given that I am a citizen 
of the Turkish Republic I have felt obligated to pay a great deal of attention to the issue of 
objectivity throughout the study. True, Turkey has usually had unfriendly relations with Iran. Yet 
when it comes to the solitary example of conducting an ethnographic study in which three 
different countries are involved, the following clarification seems to be necessary regarding the 
issue of objectivity. First of all, I would contend that as a social scientist I acknowledge and 
highly appreciate the ethical concerns briefly outlined above. Second, I did not conduct the study 
in my own country, and I think that this condition itself allows me to better maintain awareness 
of my subjectivity. Third, I strove to support my arguments not only by providing related key 
informant statements, but also by utilizing some concrete visual tools such as photography. 
Fourth and last, a great many reputable accounts have been cited to support the validity of the 
forthcoming arguments. 
 
  5. Organization of the study 
	
The logical premise of this study is that Nardaran can be regarded as a more or less 
typical Azeri village, albeit with some historical and religious differences. There are many 
similarities between the village and the other rural communities of the region, in terms of both 
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social and political organization and material culture. The turning point for Nardaran after 
Azerbaijan gained its independence, however, appears to be the intervention of an external 
element that intensified the differences by suppressing some of the similarities. This factor not 
only fortified the differentiation of the community but also paved the way for the alienation and 
isolation of Nardaran within the context of Azerbaijan.  
In this regard religious intensification efforts, kindled by Iran soon after the independence 
of Azerbaijan, appear to be essential, but history and some other factors played their roles as well. 
In brief, what will be asserted in this study is that, first and foremost, Nardaran was selected and 
targeted by Iranian missionaries because of the advantageous aspects that the village possessed 
in their eyes. Second, a great deal of religious intensification took place in Nardaran. A result of 
this process and its highly political nature was the radicalization of the village’s image, which in 
turn attracted both the Azeri government’s and the greater society’s attention.  Thanks to the 
well-known characteristics of radicalization, which was supported by the dissident-media 
apparatuses, an inevitable isolation of Nardaran fell into place. The process that followed can be 
seen as possessing the properties of a chicken-or-egg question, given the near-impossibility of 
determining whether the accusations and measures from the governmental side prompted a 
rebellious response from Nardarani, or the “response” preexisted. All that matters is that the 
mutual discontent exploded in 2002 and another essential incident occurred in November 2015 
after thirteen years of tension.  
In an attempt to contextualize all of this, this dissertation has been organized as follows. 
In the second chapter, the etymology and a selective historical sketch of Azerbaijan is presented, 
in order to provide the reader with an overview of the current situation in the country. Included 
in the first section is a treatment of the relations, antagonisms and perceptions among Azerbaijan 
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and its prominent neighboring countries, Iran and Turkey. Next, contemporary Azeri society is 
depicted by looking at the issues of religion and politics in general. In other words, I have there 
tried to draw a portrait of the current politico-religious picture of the country. Finally, since the 
research site is a rural one, the characteristics of the rural communities of the region are 
summarized for the purpose of facilitating a comparison between the average Azerbaijani 
community and Nardaran. 
In the third chapter, the social organization of Nardaran is described. Another selective 
overview, focusing on the historical and religious context of the village, is first presented.  Then 
the research setting and the demographics are investigated. The third section provides an 
overview of the village’s economy and material culture. The final section of the third chapter 
covers the social structure of Nardaran. Besides the kinship system and the marriage customs of 
the area, additional themes such as the concept of domestic authority, division of labor, and the 
social stratification are elaborated upon.  
The fourth chapter examines the political organization of Nardaran. I first present the 
nature of the village-level political organization of Nardaran primarily by examining the roles 
played by state and local government organizations and the prominent elements unique to the 
village, but also by exploring political factions. Since this study deals with two nation-states, 
Azerbaijan and Iran, and their relationship to Nardaran, two significant aspects are evident. First, 
regarding the former-nation state, the recent battle of Karabaqh, bitter memories of which still 
linger, is mentioned in terms of its likely influence in fostering nationalistic instincts among 
Azeris. With regard to the latter, the concept of religious unity, namely Shiism, takes pride of 
place. Thus, Nardaran’s position could be described as that of being caught on the horns of a 
dilemma. In one of my informants’ words, “We, the Nardarani people are Turks in terms of race, 
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but are Iranians when it comes to religion.” I am compelled to deem that informant’s statement 
reasonable, since neither my literature review nor the interview that I conducted with an Azeri 
historian concerning this issue significantly contradicted it. In other words, no source known to 
me alludes to the migration of a different ethnic or racial group into Nardaran throughout its long 
history. I am mindful, however, of the anthropological approaches to the aforementioned 
concepts, and thus I have come to see a possible trend toward the creation of a new ethnic group 
in Azerbaijan. Hence the vital importance of Chapter Four’s examination of Nardaran through 
the lenses of both nationalism and ethnicity.  
It can be argued that religious as well as sectarian compatibility are advantageous for an 
external power seeking to build constituencies beyond its borders.  However, this study 
comprises a further analysis of the “Iranian effect” that has proved so successful in the context of 
Nardaran, and central to it is the concept of hegemony. In other words, Iran not only has taken 
advantage of religious similarities but also has successfully created a hegemonic atmosphere by 
utilizing several peaceful mechanisms to secure its domination over Nardaran. Accordingly, the 
Iranian hegemonic consequences are overviewed in Chapter Five. More specifically, I have 
categorized these consequences by using the following four titles: The Growth of a Radical Shia 
Constituency; The Process of Religious Intensification; The Expansion of Political Power; and 
The Development of Economic Resources. Finally, key issues concerning the Nardaran identity, 
which this study argues has been created and/or shaped as a result of the aforementioned 
hegemonic consequences, are presented in this chapter.  
The Iranian hegemonic consequences having been introduced in Chapter Five, Chapter 
Six is devoted to describing the concepts of hegemony and peaceful mechanisms of change. 
There the hegemonic processes that Nardaran has been exposed to are analyzed in a comparative 
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manner. That is to say, Azerbaijan’s Soviet period and the period after independence of are 
reported on and contrasted.  
Finally, Chapter Seven covers Nardaran’s relations with the Azeri state then moves on to 
offer some speculations as to the future of the Iranian hegemonic momentum in Azerbaijan and 

















             1. Etymology and A Diachronic Overview  
 
There are two prominent narratives regarding the origins of the name Azerbaijan. 
According to the first the name comes from Aturpatakan, the satrap of Alexander the Great who 
ruled the region at the time. The second narrative claims that it is a hybrid of Azer (“fire” in 
Persian) and Payegan (“guardian” in Persian,) both words pointing to the fire-worshippers of 
Zoroastrianism, a religion pervasive in the region in the old days. The Absheron peninsula, 
located on the west cost of the Caspian Sea, is a region that resembles an eagle’s head. We know 
it today as Azerbaijan.  The etymology of the word Absheron breaks down as follows: “Ab” 
means water, “shour” means salty, and “an” is the suffix making the word plural in Persian. 
Thus the name Abshouran, which emerges from these words, means "place of salty water.”1  The 
origins of these names are important, as they all come from Persia. I have preferred to begin this 
section with the very origin of the places and their names because, as was well put by King 
(2008), “the political environment in the Caucasus was shaped by the struggle for influence 
among three Eurasian empires–the Russian, Ottoman and Persian” (p. 15), and the names 
themselves can be counted among the evidences of this influence.   
According to De Waal (2010), “the Turkic presence in the Caucasus dates back at least to 
the seventh century and became stronger with the arrival of Oghuz Turks, who first settled in the 
present-day Azerbaijan in around the ninth century and are probably the ancestors of the modern-
day Azerbaijanis” (De Waal, 2010, p. 26). Although the Turkic tribes and their historical 
																																								 																					
1These etymological reflections were assisted by the website of the Turkish Language Institution. 
www.tdk.gov.tr. 12.09.2015	
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background are of great importance when it comes to drawing a comprehensive picture of 
Azerbaijan and its neighboring territories, which they ruled for about a thousand years, the last 
Turkic dynasty prior to Pahlavi That is the Qajar Dynasty that ruled the region for about 135 
years. is the one most relevant one to our understanding of the current situation. Yet the 
territories now falling within the Azerbaijan Republic had caught the eye of those within both 
Tsarist and Soviet Russia. After the Qajar dynasty came to power and was able to unite the 
Turkic tribes and the Khanates, struggles between the Qajar Dynasty and the tsarist Russia 
erupted toward the end of the 18th century. After longlasting battles between the two powers, the 
Gulistan (1813) and Turkmençayı (1828) treaties were signed and Azerbaijan was divided into 
two sections, known as south and north Azerbaijan. Back then, the northern part went under 
Russian rule, while the south owed fealty to what we today call Iran. “At the turn of the century, 
after almost 70 years of Russian rule, Baku was representing a cosmopolite structure which 
consisted of Azeris (36%), Russians and Ukranians (35%), Armenians (17%), and other mixed 
Caucasian peoples” (Altstadt, 1983, p. 199).  Altstadt goes on to outline the first steps 
Azerbaijanis took toward creating their own nation. In her formulation, as a result of urban 
reform the elites of Baku came to dominate a newly constructed city, Duma, but ironically they 
were subjected to discrimination based upon their religious difference despite their dominance. 
When the mercantile competition between Muslim Azeris and Christian Armenians is taken into 
account, the rise of nationalism and of the type of solidarity that is based on ethno-religious ideas 
become clear.  Altstadt drives this point home by saying that the marketplace was the first school 
where the bourgeoisie became immersed in nationalism. 
Yet another point effectively made by Altstadt is that the Azerbaijani elite’s ties to the 
west through education brought the idea of the importance of education back to their own 
	 21	
community. Predictably, that was comprised of the key aspects of religion and language. Several 
education organizations were founded in which notable members of elite families such as 
Mehmet Emin Resulzade, who would become a national hero, taught literature and history in 
their native language. This recruitment and education of the masses, and the ultimate 
identification of one group as part of the same nation, Altstadt states, can be seen as the first 
steps taken toward nationalism and toward the emergence of the Azeri Nation. 
Regarding the ensuing period of 1905-1920, Swietochowski (1983) argues that if we 
were to gain an understanding of nationalistic developments in Azerbaijan, several social and 
political developments transpiring within the surrounding countries, namely in Iran, Russia, and 
the Ottoman Empire, have to be considered. As noted by Swietochowski (1983), those 
developments are, first, the constitutional revolution against Qajar dynasty in Persia. Second, the 
Young Turkish revolution within the Ottoman Empire (rise of Pan Turkism); and third, the 
partisan Tsarist policies that favored Armenians over Azerbaijanis. Both the first and the second 
developments paved the way toward Pan-Turkism and Pan-Azerbaijanism. In other words, 
turmoil in Iran fueled Pan-Turkism in the sense of a longed-for unity of the Azeris divided 
between Iran and Russia. When the biased policies of Tsarist Russia in favor of Armenians are 
taken into account, at least one way in which national sentiments were aroused in Azerbaijanis 
becomes clear.  At any rate, the political processes comprised of struggles, exiles, and the like 
culminated in the declaration of independence made by Rasulzade in 1918, soon after the 
downfall of the Russian Empire.  
As things turned out, however, this first Muslim parliamentary republic of the world did 
not survive for long owing to the Russian declaration of war against it 1920. Yes, the Ottoman 
Empire was able to help Azerbaijanis defeat Russians and plant the Ottoman flag in Baku, but 
	 22	
the independence did not last long because of the number of fronts on which the Ottomans had to 
fight. After Azerbaijan had enjoyed just two years of independence, Russia established control 
over first Baku and then the rest of north Azerbaijan.   
As for the era of the Soviet Union, which was established by Stalin in 1922, Rogers 
Brubaker (1994) points to the Soviet policy for fostering multi-nationality. He tells us that the 
Soviet state not only passively tolerated but actively institutionalized multiple nations and 
ethnicities as constitutive elements of the state and its citizenry. It codified nationhood and 
ethnicity as fundamental social categories sharply distinct from statehood and citizenship. The 
Soviet state designated a broad range of territorial and ethno-cultural identities, even going so far 
as to place the various nationality names on identity cards, and by doing so paved the way for the 
creation and maintenance of such national identities as Azeri, Kyrgyz, and the like.  Thus it is 
possible for us to argue that to some extent the national ideas of Azerbaijanism and Turkism that 
emerged at the beginning of the 20th century were attained as an outcome of the abovementioned 
circumstances.  
After the second declaration of independence in 1991, which coincided with the downfall 
of the Soviet Union, one of the most significant events fostering the formation of the modern 
Azeri nation was the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Nora Dudwick (1994), who writes 
on the Karabakh and the politics of sovereignty, asserts that the Karabakh conflict and the 
consequent war not only allowed Azerbaijanis to unite around a common purpose but also forced 
them to produce a generally accepted narrative that essentially mythologized the ancient origins 
of an Azerbaijani nation or state.  Even though the newly independent state suffered grievously 
because of the war, the latter at least served to fortify the idea of nationhood in the minds of the 
citizens. Although Turkishness does has no need of any newly produced narrative because Turks 
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possess one of the most ancient national histories in the world, one can understand the need for a 
story embracing the particular Azeri “nationality” and its origins. Notably in this connection 
Dudwick points to the influential neighbors and the multi-traditional structure upon which Azeri 
culture and society have been erected. Especially important is that even as the Shia Islam of Iran 
drew them culturally and politically toward the Persian State, the 19th-century intellectuals 
looked toward secular and modernizing Turkey. Somewhat faded reflections of this split are 
visible even today, as we shall see when we look at the concept of religion in Azerbaijan. 
According to the OSCE’s Baku office report (2006), the most significant religious perspectives 
in the nation are those held by Iranian influenced-Shiites and Turkish-influenced Sunnis. 
 
a) Turkey and Turkicness 
	
Turkey and Turkicness are definitely advantageous concepts to invoke in any discussion 
of Azerbaijan in comparison to Turkey’s chief opponent, Iran, and for three reasons.  First, 
Azerbaijan and Turkey share not only language but also, to a great extent, a common culture. A 
great number of national heroes, narratives, and poets, as well as other forms of literature are 
shared by these two countries, or by this single nation under two separate states, to cite the 
formulation of the legendary president Heydar Aliyev.  Second, Turkey is a state that has 
adopted secularism, and given that this feature could be considered a more suitable model for the 
new Azeri state to emulate. After all, it experienced secular Soviet rule for at least seventy years, 
and that may have protected them from intense religious pressures in the early years of the 
country’s existence. Third and maybe the most important, Turkey and Azerbaijan have always 
had a fraternal relationship throughout their history. As was said above that the Soldiers of Nuri 
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Pasha (an Ottoman General) helped the Azeris in 1918 and planted the Ottoman flag in Baku. 
Today there is a cemetery, dedicated to Nuri Pasha and his soldiers, near the city of Shamakhı.  
 
Figure -1- Turkish Cemetery dedicated to the martyrs of 1918, Shamakhı, Azerbaijan 
 
All such unforgettable memories peaked during the Karabakh conflict. Turkey 
immediately closed its border with Armenia and suspended diplomatic relations with it by 
stipulating the resolution of the conflict as a prerequisite for the normalization of this relationship. 
Furthermore, it almost became a tradition for the election-winning leaders of both countries to 
carry out their first diplomatic visits to each other. Similarly, during the Eurovision international 
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song contests the two countries always award the highest points to each other. Relations between 
them do not solely have moral or emotional aspects, but also a strong economic one. That is to 
say, Turkey serves as a bridge in transporting Azeri gas to European countries, while at the same 
time being one of its biggest customers. Although to ignore the materialistic or economic aspect 
of the Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship would be misleading, the emotional aspect definitely holds 
a privileged place especially at the community level. This becomes clear when one watches in a 
sports café in Baku an international game of a Turkish soccer or national team. I did not witness 
such a scene during my research period, but when I was in Baku in 2000 I observed that the 
streets were no less filled with cheering people than were the streets of Istanbul after the Super 
cup victory of Galatasaray, a soccer team of Turkey that triumphed over Spain’s Real Madrid. 
 Similarly, the famous Turkish poet Abdurrahim Karakoc, lyricist of “Mihriban,” a 
nation-wide-famous folk-music piece, died in Turkey during my summer field research in 2012. 
It was impressive that an Azeri parliament member, Ganira Pashayeva,2 organized the first 
commemoration ceremony for him in Baku in the summer of 2013. She invited not just the 
poet’s family members but also members of the Turkish Parliament and some other notables 
from the literature domain of Turkey.  
Finally, I would argue that the official education policy of Azerbaijan seems to support 
the abovementioned points by placing the chief emphasis on the Turkic origin of the nation. If 
you enter a primary or secondary school in Baku you will see pictures of such common national 
heroes of Turkey and Azerbaijan as Dede Korkut, Köroğlu and Fuzuli on the walls. One sees in 
such things an extra endeavor occurring in the creation of a common national memory, that 
																																								 																					
2 Ganira Pashayeva is famous for the tributes she paid to the Turkish and Azeri NGOs for their 
efforts that served nationalistic ideals. She is known as a nationalist and a Turkist.  
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familiarizes Turkey and the Ottoman Empire and alienates both the Russian administration and 
Iran. Although the formal-education topic is discussed in detail in the ensuing sections of the 
dissertation, I feel it would be useful, at this point, to touch on the matter briefly. The education 
curriculum of Azerbaijan fulfills the nationalistic mission by dedicating a national day to the 
commemoration of the bloody withdrawal of the Soviet army from Azerbaijan on January 20, 
1990. Then too, it is implied in the history textbooks that southern Azerbaijan is a natural part of 
Azerbaijan unfairly coopted by Iran. As for the familiarization of Turkey and the Ottoman 
Empire, the same history textbooks praise the first independence movements carried out by 
Mehmet Emin Rasulzade and the Ottoman help provided by Nuri Pasha after the Russian 




It is generally agreed that the social and cultural relations between the following three 
neighboring countries have no clear-cut boundaries, or at the very least that the latter can be 
considered permeable: Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran. This point can be made clear by 
approaching the issue from the linguistic point of view. Although most Azerbaijanis and Turks 
speak different versions of the same Turkic language, the great poets of both countries used 
Persian pervasively especially during the Ottoman era. Pala (2010) underscores the same point 
by drawing our attention to the interesting point that the great Ottoman Sultan, I. Selim, wrote 
his poems in Persian whereas Shah Ismail of Iran wrote his in Turkish. So too, the social 
organization and material culture of villages in Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey are quite similar. 
Examples include patrilineal kinship structure, cross-cousin marriages, patrilocal residence after 
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marriage, and household organization. Also with respect to the material culture, Wistrand (2011), 
writing in her dissertation about the household structure and the material culture of an average 
Azeri village, mentions the tandır, an oven made in a hole in the earth, and the samovar, a metal 
urn for preparing tea, that are quite common and bear exactly the same names in Turkish and 
Iranian villages.3  
            
Figure -2- Tandır                 Figure -3- A Bread being baked in Tandır 
 
When it comes to the religious aspect, although I will be discussing the concept more 
fully up ahead, I would simply note at this point that there are some fundamental differences 
between these three seemingly close neighbors. I purposely used the word seemingly after being 
influenced by the 2008 book penned by Cihan Aktas, a Turkish writer, Yakin Yabanci (The 
Close Stranger), in which he seeks to answer the questions of “why the presence and 
expansionist efforts of Iran, especially after the revolution, in Turkey have remained obscured?”, 
and “to what extent can these two neighbors be considered as close or distant to each other?” 
Following Aktas and others, I say yet again, that one cannot ignore the fact that these countries 
																																								 																					
3Farman Farmaian, an American of Iranian origin, also talks about the tandır and samovar in her 
memoir Daughter of Persia, 1992. 
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have much in common in terms of culture, religion, and language. Yet when it comes to the 
differences, we find that these too are significant. One would expect there to be differences 
between Iran and Turkey given their sectarian stances. Yet one might not expect to find any 
fundamental differences between two entities that have adopted the same sect, namely Iran and 
Azerbaijan. Contrary to expectation, the differences occur chiefly in the domain of religion and 
religion-related customs. This aspect will be explored in more detail in the ensuing following 
sections. 
International relations between Azerbaijan and Iran deserve exclusive study, and in fact 
many scholars have recently become more interested in conducting this type of research. 
Nevertheless some of the most prominent points will be touched upon here, in order to help the 
reader gain an overall understanding of the chilly relationship between the two countries. First of 
all, there is an agreement among scholars who deal with the two countries’ relations that the 
main conflict originated as a result of the treaties that divided Azerbaijan in two and left its 
southern part within the borders of Iran. From that time on Iran has always keenly sniffed out 
potential nationalistic movements likely to appear among Iranian Azeris. As Jarosiewicz (2015) 
notes, supporting Armenia even when they were actively fighting against Azerbaijan was seen by 
Iran “as a way of counterbalancing Azerbaijan’s potential influence among ethnic Azeris in 
northern Iran, who number more than the total population of Azerbaijan itself ” (p. 1).  
Second, Jarosiewicz (2015) proposes that although Azeri natural resources, above all oil 
and gas, are meager in comparison to Iran’s supplies thereof, some recent developments with 
respect to the energy-transfer routes and pipeline-building activities in the region have made it 
necessary for the two countries to keep a watchful eye on each other. The Trans-Anatolian 
Pipeline Project (TANAP) kindled this tension between the two back in 2012 when it replaced 
	 29	
the European Union’s NABUCCO pipeline project.  Since the oil sector includes some third-
party actors such as Russian Gazprom, competition between these agents seems to keep tensions 
simmering in the region. For instance, the new pipeline project not only will make Azerbaijan 
independent of Russia, which wants to monopolize the role of key-gas supplier of Europe, but 
also will whet Iran’s appetite since it, according to the Fitch rating agency, “sits on an estimated 
18 percent of the world’s known natural gas reserves but needs at least five years to build the 
facilities and pipelines required to begin exporting in large volumes” (Jarosiewicz, 2015. p. 3). 
This option definitely has the capacity to cause friction between Russia and Azerbaijan, and 
since the latter will have to make a decision the likelihood appears to be that it will come down 
closer to the Russian side.  
Another point that has been made concerning the antagonisms between Azerbaijan and 
Iran is that the former’s western-oriented foreign policy comprises warm relations with Israel. 
Rob Sobhani, chief executive officer of the Caspian Group,4 notes in a 2012 article he wrote for 
The Hill, an American political newspaper published in Washington D.C., that the Azerbaijani 
government generously built a synagogue for the Jewish Ashkenazi community of Baku. When 
the religious tolerance of this western-oriented foreign policy and secular regime is taken into 
consideration, there is a chance that Azerbaijan as a successfully modernized Muslim country 
will, Sobhani asserts, have the potential of posing a threat to the theocratic regime of Iran. 
Therefore, according to him, Iran seizes every chance it sees to destabilize Azerbaijan. For 
instance, the political assassination of the U.S. or Israel ambassadors in Baku, was discussed 
during the annual Eurovision in 2012 with respect to the former and in 2011 with respect to the 
latter. As both the historical processes and the current situation shows, many significant issues 
																																								 																					
4	The Caspian group is a private company that helps other companies to do business particularly 
in the United States, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union.  
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exist between the two countries that seem to be quite difficult to overcome, at least in the near 
term.   
 
  2. Contemporary Azeri Society: An Overview of Religion and Politics 
	
As we saw in the above outline of historical processes, scholars have long contended that 
current Azerbaijani culture and politics are shaped by religion-related elements. Thus Azerbaijan 
will now be examined by looking at this prominent institution, one that not only divides people 
into groups but also reconfigures their respective traits, and chooses elements of social 
organization such as marriage and housing patterns, dress styles, recreation, and so on. Moreover, 
political affiliations, alliances, and even splits run over religious or rather sectarian adoptions are 
subject to this influence. Many scholars agree that the state administration has adopted a stance 
whereby Turkicness plays the greatest role. Little wonder, then, that Turkey has been taken as a 
nationalistic prototype and its secular regime has been perceived as a great facilitator in fostering 
national sentiments, a far cry from those radical movements that propose Ummah as an ideology 
instead of nationalism.  Thus, let’s take a picture of this highly nationalistic country through the 
lens of religion.  
In reviewing religion in Azerbaijan it is relatively difficult to make generalizations, 
because the phenomenon seems to resemble a matrushka, the Russian toy comprised of 
ensconced wooden dolls. Nevertheless, doing an overall analysis of this sphere will allow us to 
make categorize some of the religious cleavages in Azerbaijan.  According to King (2008), and 
as stated earlier, the political environment in the Caucasus was shaped by the struggle for 
influence among three Eurasian empires: the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian. Similarly, given 
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that the country was subjected to various religious inflows immediately after the independence in 
1991, the religious tendencies need to be viewed through a similar lens. According to an OSCE 
office report, we have Iranian-influenced Shiite, Turkish-influenced Sunni, and Arabic (or 
Chechen and Dagestani) -influenced Wahhabi. In addition, when we take the Azeri state’s 
combination of secular and official-religion concepts into account, the complexity of the 
matryoshka metaphor spontaneously presents itself.  
In order to provide the reader with some brief background information regarding the 
condition of religion under Soviet rule, I want to begin by vetting the notion of “official religion.” 
As stated above, this notion can be viewed as a legacy of the Soviet rule of Azerbaijan. Bedford 
(2009) refers to it, and explains that it originated in Soviet times when, “to reclaim regional 
support and to facilitate the recruitment of soldiers in the region, Soviet leaders established an 
official Muslim power structure consisting of religious leaders, muftis, willing to support the 
Soviet policies and to serve as mediators between the Muslim population and the authorities” 
(p.76). True, the Soviet administration oppressed all religions within the Soviet Union, yet 
according to Grant (2011) it allowed a space for at least some basic rituals in the Caucasus. Thus 
in Azerbaijan, for example, an alternative method of religious practice cropped up in the form of 
visiting shrines and showing a more intense interest in funeral ceremonies. Similarly my 
informants, during the field research I conducted, confirmed this aspect by saying that they were 
able to celebrate Ashura, a mourning celebration for Imam Hussein, every year even during the 
Soviet period. One of my informants said that “although the Soviet police were warning us not to 
organize a celebration, we were doing so and we were not being prosecuted. I think they just 
wanted the celebration not to be so crowded.”  A product of the notion of “official religion” the 
Muslim Board of Transcaucasia was established in 1944. Allahshukur Pashazadeh, an Azeri Shia 
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cleric, was elected chairman of the Caucasian Muslims Office and became Sheikh ul-Islam. 
After the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence gained by 
Azerbaijan, in 1992, he was elected chairperson of the Religious Board of Caucasian peoples of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Karachay–
Cherkessia, and Adygea. As a result, according to a discussion paper published by OSCE’s Baku 
office, the influence of this Soviet legacy is still observable in Azerbaijan especially via 
Lankoran Madrassah, whose spokesmen spout pro-government rhetoric under Pashazadeh’s 
approving eye.  
When it comes to the influences of the three aforementioned sects, I begin by noting the 
scholarly consensus the categorizations of the major religious sects in Azerbaijan are: Shi’ites, 
Wahhabis (radical Sunnis), and Sunnis (Turkish-leaning moderates). The first two are associated 
with the two major mosques of the capital, Baku. As is obvious from its name, the Abu Bakr 
mosque is Wahhabi, while the Djuma Mosque is Shia. Yet the third has some subdivisions, 
movements and cults within the Sunni tradition.  
A common point made with respect to the spread of Wahhabism is that Salafi Islam is a 
trending value in Azerbaijan. According to Hame Kocheta (2006), an anthropologist and the 
writer of the OSCE’s discussion paper, “a rise in well-connected and educated adherents of 
Salafi Islam is noted by observers” (p. 7). Similarly, Ibrahim Bayundurlu contends that there is 
an upsurge of Sunni Islam and that the Islam of the Wahhabi path is subsuming large portions of 
the Azeri religious community.  Arif Yunusov (2004) goes into detail about the Wahhabis and 
asserts that the spread of Wahhabism originated chiefly from the northern part of the country 
where Chechens and Lezgins live. As that author sees it there were just small numbers in the 
beginning, namely during the early ‘90s, yet the outburst of the Russian-Chechen war increased 
	 33	
the number as well as the flow of international Salafi organizations coming to help Chechen 
Muslims fight Russians. Azerbaijan became a transit country for both military supplies and 
material and humanitarian assistance for the Chechens. Consequently, Wahhabism gained in 
strength both qualitatively and quantitatively. The rapid growth of Wahhabism was slowed, 
however, after some international developments such as the United States’ anti radicalism policy 
after 9/11 and the impact of the Chechen issue on Azeri-Russian relations. In other words, the 
Azeri government took some actions that included intitating a campaign against Wahhabism in 
Azerbaijan. However, Yunusov asserts, repression had the usual unintended consequences, and 
the Wahhabi cult continues to grow.   
Although the vast majority of the country is Shia, the Iranian influence is another 
complex issue within the Azerbaijani context. As stated earlier, it is possible to say that Iran and 
Azerbaijan have almost never had friendly relations in their history, and many Azeris place Iran 
firmly on their nation’s enemy list.  There remains, however, Shiism as a religious common 
ground and in that respect Iran has an advantageous influence. The main factor that provokes 
Iranian interest, or its religious presence in Azerbaijan, appears to be the Iranian concern as to 
the ethno-nationalist tendencies of its large Azeri minority.  There are two prominent 
components of Iranian influence in Azerbaijan: the Djuma mosque, headquarters of its Iranian-
educated Imam and his followers, and Nardaran, a village that gave birth to the Islamic party of 
Azerbaijan, whose leaders recently were arrested and convicted of being Iranian spies. Nardaran 
also has a well-deserved reputation for inciting anti-government uprisings and for being a 
stronghold of Islamic activism. Iranian proselytizing efforts, according to Yunusov, began soon 
after Azerbaijan gained its independence. Yunusov notes that the religious organizations of Iran, 
such as the Hezbollah or “party of Allah,” were established in Baku in 1993 on the same model 
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as that already well established and operative in Turkey. Hezbollah carried out political 
homicides and projected an extremely radical image within the countries where it operated. With 
regard to Nardaran and its role in the spreading of the Iranian influence, I cite the Iranian efforts 
that occurred in the early years of the Islamic revolution despite the strict Soviet rule, which 
forbade virtually all kinds of interaction between Iranians and Azerbaijanis. Iran seemed to 
overlook the function of radio, however, for the preachings of Khomeini were broadcast all over 
Azerbaijan after being taped in Azeri cities near the border with Iran. If we take into 
consideration the peoples’ thirst for religion at the time, after the seventy-year, atheism-oriented 
Soviet rule, it is easier to comprehend how that network operated. In addition to this relatively 
natural process, Iran has been utilizing various peaceful mechanisms of domination that I detail 
ahead. Suffice it to say that money, education, and media all have been utilized in order to build 
constituencies within Azerbaijan even since it gained its independence. They first identified 
relatively religious communities deemed receptive to their religious views and practices, and 
then employed the various mechanisms to tie those communities to Iran. Similar to the 
Khezbollah case, current cases project a radical image and always have some sort of conflict 
with the Azeri government. For this reason, both the Shia and the Wahhabi radical movements 
have been hit with harsh government measures and some of them have gone underground.   
The Turkish Sunni influence, on the other hand, appears to be more of a civil-society 
movement in comparison to the Iranian one. Although the Presidency of Turkish Religious 
Affairs initiated a relationship with Azerbaijan, the rest of the tariqas and movements did not feel 
the state support behind them to the same extent as in the Iranian case. It was like this because 
Turkey, constitutionally a secular country, was then in the early stages of a sort of military 
intervention, a “postmodern coup,” and some of the religious leaders of those movements, such 
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as Fethullah Gulen, were beginning to be prosecuted by the Turkish judiciary. Yet in time these 
Turkish Sunni movements, because they didn’t give up, gained support and power within 
Azerbaijan. According to Balci (2004), who focuses especially on the Turkish religious presence 
in Azerbaijan, the Gulen movement is more effective than any other organization or movement 
regardless of sectarian allegiances, namely Shia or Sunni. Fehtullah Gulen, a retired preacher, is 
the most prominent representative of the Turkish “Nur congregation,” which can be seen as a 
religious revitalization movement. As Fuad Aliyev states, the Gulen movement established itself 
in Azerbaijan shortly after the country obtained independence from the Soviet Union.  In 1992, 
Azerbaijan became the first country outside of Turkey in which the movement opened its schools. 
According to Aliyev, after it had won Haydar Aliyev’s support the Gulen movement had some 
real opportunities to expand its activities, and by 1993 the movement had started to build a 
network of educational institutions and businesses. Although some accusations, such as its 
having a hidden agenda, have been directed against the movement, in fact it appears to have had 
no other ambition than to ignite a religious revival among Azerbaijanis (Balci, 2013). Balci 
asserts that the Gulen movement is quite removed from political Islam. Perhaps for this reason 
the movement is the only officially supported religious movement in Azerbaijan (Aliyev, 2013).  
Although there is plenty of room here for discussion and even debate, particularly about the 
possible presence of political factors, I think it undeniable that the Turkish side projects a more 
peaceful and tolerant image as compared to its Shia and Wahhabi counterparts.  
In sum, according to data compiled by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (2013), 
the religious cleavage in Azerbaijan is as follows: 65 percent Shia, 35 percent Sunni, with the 
Sunni side being divided into the Wahhabi and Turkish tariqah movements. Shiism, on the other 
hand, has two versions, Iranian (radical) Shiism and the other type which is directed and 
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controlled by the secular Azeri government, namely the official religion. Interestingly enough, 
while there has always been concern about tension in such Muslim countries where there is 
sectarian cleavage, Azerbaijan does not seem to have suffered from that kind of complication, at 
least not until recently. The answer to the question, “what makes Azerbaijan different in this 
regard?” can be found by pondering the three factors Goble (2013) cites. First, as a result of the 
Soviet religion-weakening policies, not many Azerbaijanis fully comprehend the difference 
between the two sects of Islam. Second, as a result of governmental efforts encouraging national 
sentiments and establishing a secular nation-state, one that Kemal Ataturk’s modern Turkey, 
Sunni-Shia differences are obscured in Azerbaijan by nationalism. And third, as a result of the 
historically cosmopolitan structure of Azerbaijan, its people are unusually tolerant about 
religious differences. To conclude our discussion of Islam in Azerbaijan, I want to quote Goble’s 
(2013) final words, as they remind us how complex and shifting religious terrain is in Azerbaijan:  
To say this is not to say that there have not been problems between the 
Azerbaijani government and Shia parishes.  The authorities have moved against 
several Shia mosques, but this has had less to do with a doctrinal commitment to 
the Sunnis than with concerns that these “Iranian” mosques are a potential source 
of political instability. And it is also not to say that the current situation will 
continue forever.  Those born since 1980—and they now are a majority of the 
population—have been far more exposed to religious instruction, and some of 
them are, therefore, more closely tied to Sunni or Shia Islam. That reality could 
have consequences in the future. (Goble, 2013) 
 
At this point, I would like to refer to one of my informants who provided me with a great chance 
to develop an informed analysis regarding both the research site and other religious affiliations 
within the country. He was a non-resident Nardarani but luckily enough I met him quite 
coincidentally, as he had come to the village to attend the marriage ceremony of one of his 
relatives. His story began with the idea of studying abroad in the mid-1990s. However, since his 
	 37	
chosen county, though a Muslim one, was not Shia, this was a concern for his extended family. 
During the interviews, he recalled for me the long lasting family negotiations, at the end of 
which a saying of the Prophet Mohammad came into his head and determined him to stick with 
his initial choice: “Go after science, even if it is in China”5. Such an incident makes it clear, I 
hope, that even in tolerant Azerbaijan sectarian affiliations are so carefully pondered as to 













5 Although there is a consensus among Islamic scholars that the reference to China was because 
of the physical distance, the family members of my informant seemed to have made a different 
inference, as they were concerned about the sectarian difference of the country to which my 
informant was planning to go.   
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III. CHARACTERISTICS OF RURAL COMMUNITIES OF THE REGION 
 
 Since the present study particularly deals with a rural community of Azerbaijan, I would 
like, after having started with a selective introductory framework of that nation, to touch on the 
characteristics of the rural communities of the region. It would not be unfair to state that few 
academic accounts have used ethnography to study the villages of the region, at least in English 
or Azerbaijani. In other words, I had some difficulty in finding classical Caucasian or 
Azerbaijani village ethnographies written in the aforementioned languages.  But, since one of the 
main purposes of this study is to present the peculiar characteristic of Nardaran, I believe it 
would be highly useful to pick out a few samples from the scarce accounts and introduce them to 
the reader. Doing so not only will provide me with the opportunity to make comparisons but also 
will strengthen my arguments when I present the similarities as well as the differences of 
Nardaran in its relation to other villages within the broader context of the Caucasus and 
Azerbaijan.  
 After a literature search and consultation with scholars expert on the region, I decided to 
pick the following three studies to present.  The first is the 1988 study of Tamara Dragadze, a 
British anthropologist who spent more than forty years studying the Caucasus region and who 
published many books and articles. In one of her studies, Dragadze delves deeply into the social 
and economic organizations of the villages and investigates the concepts of kinship and marriage 
and their practical implications.  
 Second, so as to provide a closer look at the Azeri version after examining the 
representative Caucasus villages, I will be extracting the relevant points from another 
ethnographic study conducted by Jennifer Solveig Wistrand, an anthropologist and doctoral 
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alumni of Washington University. In her dissertation “Becoming Azerbaijani: Uncertainty, 
Belonging and Getting By in a Post-Soviet Society” (2011), Wistrand devotes a chapter to 
examining Azeri villages under the heading “A Representative Present Day Azerbaijani Village.”   
 Third, and with an eye toward village level politics, I looked at the work of Mary Elaine 
Hegland, a senior anthropologist who examined village-level political organization in the region. 
Looking at Hegland’s work is useful in terms of comparison, as well as in providing us with 
some sense of the village-level politics that run through the region. As all three researchers are 
anthropologists and all spent a great amount of time doing ethnographic research in the region, 
presenting the summaries of their work will, I believe, serve the comparative purposes of my 
study.  
 
1. Caucasus Villages 
	
 Dragadze (1988) starts her second chapter, entitled “The Social and Economic 
Organization of Domestic Units,” with her definition of the concept “domestic unit.” She chose 
this term in order to eliminate the confusion that can be fostered by the multiple terms used by 
the villagers to refer to the concepts of family and household. According to her account, the 
domestic unit is made up of people who live under the same roof or within the same courtyard. 
This group of people consists of parents, their married and unmarried sons, the wives and the 
children of their sons, and their unmarried daughters.  Departing from this definition itself, one 
can extract certain fairly standard characteristics of Caucasian household organization. We have 
first, extended families that live together, either in the same house or in separate houses but 
sharing a courtyard. Second, the residence pattern is patrilineal, because only the unmarriageable 
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daughters reside in the house with the parents; the wives of sons live with their father-in-law or 
mother-in-law. Third, living together is preferred, because otherwise the separate houses could 
have been built distantly instead of around the same courtyard.  
 After starting with the above definition, Dragadze provides more information about the 
strong family ties that exist and talks about how living together is praised by one and all. 
Although not all the households meet the criterion of living together, it becomes clear that 
cohabitation is indeed the custom when she notes how sad family members become as a result of 
any unintentional separation. Clearly, the ideal type of household consists of extended families 
that live together as closely as possible. Unintentional separations derive chiefly from such 
unavoidable circumstances as migration for work and the like.  All in all, and mostly as a result 
of religious, and especially Christian factors, family is perceived as something sacred. Since 
Saint Mary was known as a God-bearer and God himself was known as father and had a mother, 
the villagers overall approach to family life seemed to be highly affected by their beliefs.  
 It may well be that it is precisely because the family is perceived as sacred that 
households are surrounded by fences, built around two meters high to prevent passersby from 
seeing inside and thereby to ensure privacy.  Although the gates of the fences are never locked, 
they are always kept closed.  Villagers do not lock the gates because they have only the symbolic 
meaning of preserving privacy within. Then too, a locked gate would be a transgression against 
the cherished value of hospitality. As Dragazdze (1988) states, “The sanctuary of a home for its 
household members is extended to whoever enters. In pre-Soviet times, a deadly enemy could 
allegedly enter your house and you would have to offer him hospitality as long as he stayed. 
People say he could be shot by the host only after he had left the premises” (p. 52).  
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 A typical courtyard contains one main house, two other houses for the sons and their 
families, a storage barn, outside toilets, and gardens between the houses. As was noted above, a 
tall fence having only one entrance gate surrounds these buildings. Houses usually consist of one 
main room, one bedroom, a storage room, and a cooking space. The main rooms also are called 
guest rooms, and the number of bedrooms varies along with a family’s wealth and size. In 











































































































































































































































































































  4. Summary 
	
The preceding historical tour through various regions and eras of Azerbaijan was 
undertaken in the hope that it will allow the reader to see the direction the national experience of 
Azerbaijan has taken over the past century. In pre-Soviet times, the war and the subsequent 
treaties had a sort of pioneering effect on Azerbaijanis’ conception of independent nationhood. 
The period of Soviet rule, on the other hand, can be seen as a strengthening one, especially when 
its citizenship policy, which kept the Turkic-speaking people of the Absheron peninsula as a 
separate element within the polity, is taken into consideration. Indeed, although the nascent 
nation-state initially was enticed by the thought of exclusive Azeri identity that could stand on its 
own, gradually it paid homage to its Turkic roots by adopting the western, secular model of 
governance utilized by its western neighbor, Turkey. 
	 53	
Its relationship with Iran, on the other hand, was negatively affected by the division of 
the Azeri population into a northern and a southern component as a result of the Gulistan and 
Turkmencayi treaties of the early 1980s. Then the gaining of independence made the situation 
even worse because an independent Azeri state only broached the threat of influence stemming 
from the ethno-linguistically Turkish population of Iran. Indeed, Iran did take several steps that 
sought to destabilize Azerbaijan, and those opened the door to an endless game of tit-for-tat 
played by the two nations. Iranian steps included but were not limited to building constituencies 
by means of religious penetration, supporting political factions and underwriting political 
homicides. The Azerbaijani response was in essence one long attempt to otherize and thereby 
alienate Iran. Typical in that regard was a parliamentary proposal to change its name to Northern 
Azerbaijan. In the 1980s Azerbaijanis were concerned about Iranian support of Armenia during 
and after the Nagorno Karabagh war, and the developments in the oil and gas market, relations of 
these two countries were deadlocked.  
It seems absurd that no mention has been made thus far of religion, for the struggle for 
influence was mostly carried out through religion. In Azerbaijan, there was an emerging 
sectarian cleavage between on the one hand the pro-Iranian, radical-Shia adherents and, on the 
other hand the Turkish-style and more moderate Sunni movements. Radical Sunni (Wahhabi) 
formations, although not very strong, can also be spoken of as a trending value in the country. 
Given that these three power-foci were all new to Azerbaijan, a nascent country ruled by Soviet 
administrators for seventy years we should not be surprised that their advent had a tremendous 
impact. The latter has rippled not just through the religious domain but also the entire social 
organization, altering virtually all elements of the social structure from marriage patterns to 
material culture. For instance, the kinship ties that may exist across the boundaries of the three 
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groups, once so important, can no longer bring affiliates of different groups together in marriage. 
A Wahhabi-affiliated person can never marry a radical-Shia-affiliated person, and vice versa.  
When it comes to the common characteristics shared by the rural communities of the 
region, one thinks first of all of the low living standards both in economic and infrastructural 
terms. Yet again, I must cite dilapidated roads, gas and electricity issues, and even the structure 
of the houses, most of which have neither interior toilets nor enough space to accommodate 
separate rooms intended to fulfil diverse functions. As we have seen here, the houses mostly are 
made of mud-brick but some are constructed as half-cement and half-wood. Due to the Soviet 
legacy the villages have, by and large, the same types of governmental buildings: village hall, 
library, clinic, sanctuary, offices for security personnel, and a school. With respect to the latter, 
although all villages have schools they usually are inadequate when compared to those in towns 
or cities. And of course the war memorials have become inseparable, but seemingly functionless, 
parts of the rural communities. 
The economy is so sluggish that villagers either experience poverty or must cobble 
together a few different jobs in order to attain even a modest living standard. Agriculture and 
animal husbandry are the most common means of livelihood in the villages. With the collapse of 
the Soviet Union its deep-seated institutions, such as sovkhoze and kolkhoze (the socialist state 
and collective farms), also were abolished as part and parcel of the land reforms implemented by 
the new states. Unfortunately, the individual citizens of those new states were not as well 
equipped as they once were to carry out agricultural activities. Thus it seems that the transition 
from one era and mode of life to another is to no small extent responsible for the economic 
challenges confronting those who live in Azerbaijan’s rural communities.  
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Many commentators have noted that men monopolize the authority in all rural 
communities. And yet the women of the Caucasus are far from being completely disregarded. 
They, and especially the married elder ones, act effectively behind the scenes. They are also the 
primary caretakers of the households. Gender equality perhaps is also helped along by the 
region’s reverence for age and the wisdom that is associated with it.  
As for political organization, this is chiefly built through kinship relationships. Biological 
kinship is the most significant element that ties people together but a value such as hospitality is 
not only adopted as a strategy but becomes a culturally prized behavior. Thus by investing their 
time and effort in the fostering of extensive social interactions, villagers enhance the networks 
that ensure help in daily life and bring support in times of crisis. Indeed, simply visiting one 
another is one of the most prominent tactics of political activity. It is a convenient way to show 
and express respect, care, and warmth. As a result of these efforts, alliance groups are 
constructed around a potential leader. The latter usually is an “elder statesman” or stateswoman, 
(someone perceived to be full of the wisdom of age), but his or her high economic standing may 
also be an attractor. All in all, what we generally have in Azerbaijan’s rural communities can be 
formulated as follows: a Turkic-speaking, agricultural, patrilineal, and poor population that has 






IV.  NARDARAN 
	 	
  1.   Social Organization 
	 	
	a) Historical/ Religious Context  
	
According to the official documents of the Civilization and Tourism Ministry of 
Azerbaijan, the oldest building in Nardaran is the Nardaran castle, which was built in 1301. And 
yet the tomb of Rahima Khanum, the daughter of the seventh imam, Museyi Kazim, and sister of 
the eighth, Imam Reza, dates back to the 9th century.  There are many other noteworthy historical 
buildings such as a bathhouse built in 1388 and a mosque that has survived since 1633. If we 
take the oldest building as a departure point, we see that the region has been ruled, in order, by 
the following: the Ilkhanate, the Safavid Dynasty, the Ottoman Empire, Tsarist Russia, and lastly 
the Soviet Union. The first four were all Turkic dynasties. According to De Waal (2010), “the 
Turkic presence in the Caucasus dates back at least to the seventh century and became stronger 
with the arrival of Oghuz Turks, who first settled in the present-day Azerbaijan in around the 
ninth century and are probably the ancestors of the modern-day Azerbaijanis” (p. 26). 
Although the Absheron peninsula has long been occupied by Turks, especially in the 
wake of Soviet rule, which made the transition easier, Azerbaijan and especially its capital Baku 
must be deemed a cosmopolitan structure both in religious and in ethnic terms (Grant, 2010). 
And yet one of my informants, formerly a professor in the department of history at Baku State 
University, told me that unlike some neighboring villages such as Kurdakhani,6 Nardaran has 
never had immigrants from Iran or any other place and consists solely of ethnic Azeri, namely 
																																								 																					
6Kurdakhani is one of the more distant neighboring villages of Nardaran. 
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Oghuz Turks. To say that is not to lay claim to any real ethnic or racial purity for the village, but 
it could easily be argued that it is no exemplar of ethnic diversity. 
“The political environment in the Caucasus was shaped by the struggle for influence 
among three Eurasian empires: the Russian, Ottoman and Persian” (King, 2008, p. 15). Going 
back in time more than 200 years ago we find that the capital city of modern day Azerbaijan, 
Baku, “was fully integrated into the Russian Empire following the signing of the treaty of 
Gulistan in 1813” (King, 2008, p. 150). After being ruled by Russians for about 100 years, 
Azerbaijan declared its independence in 1918. Although they held onto their independence for 
only three years, this declaration must be considered significant for two reasons: because this not 
only “represented the first instance of modern statehood for the south Caucasus–and, in 
Azerbaijan’s case, the world’s first Muslim parliamentary republic–but also created rivalries over 
territory and identity that would return to haunt the new, post-Soviet countries some seventy 
years later” (King, 2008, p. 161). After spending 70 years under Soviet rule, Azerbaijan re-
declared its independence in 1991 and has remained an independent country to this very day.  
The presence of Islam in the region dates back to the early 7th century (De Waal, 2010). 
The population of Azerbaijan is predominantly Shia, a sect of Islam also adhered to by the 
southern neighbor, Iran. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, primarily owing to the Russian rule 
and secondarily to the neighboring countries’ influences, religious and sectarian diversity has by 
no means been lacking. According to King (2008), Baku’s uniqueness as a place where East and 
West met and mixed meant that Azerbaijan became a center for the renaissance of Muslim 
cultural life and a hub of reformist Islam. The newly independent country’s administration 
accordingly “has allowed Islam to be revived but portrays the country as a secular state on the 
Turkish model” (De Wall, 2010, p. 23). “Portrayed” is the key word here, for despite its secular 
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stance and reputation for tolerance Azerbaijan has always felt, and sometimes been rocked by 
influences, largely religious in nature, emanating from the successor regimes of the three 
aforementioned empires, Turkey and Iran. 
Indeed, despite the government’s inclination toward the Turkish model, Iran’s looming 
presence could not be ignored, especially as Iran sought to inspire an Azeri domestic 
constituency with a zeal for radical Shiism (Cornell, 2011). “Areas with a strong presence of 
Iranian preachers and schools, such as Azerbaijan‘s conservative south, already see the 
emergence of religiously motivated conservatism, not least in the social opinions recorded by 
pollsters in these areas” (Cornell, 2011, p. 173). Wilhelmsen (2009) makes another interesting 
point: that because the shrine cult within Shia is so popular and is perceived by many believers to 
be a solution to their problems, such sites are vulnerable to exploitation by religious 
entrepreneurs. Wilhelmsen in fact adduces the Nardaran case in particular, for she points out that 
rural discontent with low living standards, exacerbated by dislike of Azerbaijan’s secular regime, 
has been given an outlet near a Shia shrine in Nardaran. 
Even within the national context of secularity, the village of Nardaran has always been 
able to preserve a certain level of religiosity. The most significant reason for this is the presence 
of the tomb of Rahima Khanum, daughter of the 7th imam, Museyi Kazim within the Shia 
“twelver” tradition. Even during the Soviet period, Nardaran was the focal point for Ashura 
mourning ceremonies. Although the gatherings were not massive given the Soviet anti-religion 
sanctions, my informants all agreed that the people in Nardaran held those ceremonies every year. 
It seems likely, however, that the level of religiosity was greater before the Soviet period. In 
those days, the medium within the village as well as within the nation as a whole was more 
exposed to the influences emanating from the empires to the west and south, the Ottoman Empire 
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and Iran. These wise men were not only the purveyors of great social influence but also played a 
counterbalancing role against Tsarist Russia, in terms of religious affairs in the region. 
Accordingly, the combination of these circumstances paved the way to the existence of the 
traditional wise persons (Seyh or Axund, in Azerbaijani) especially in Nardaran. They had long 
been known as both the people’s informal instructors and the authorities within the religious 
domain. They had taught so many how to read the holy Qur’an and how to practice worship. 
Indeed I discovered at the time when these lines were being written that, Nardaran’s website has 
a special section that presents short biographies of those religious scholars. For instance Hacı 
Şıxəli (Şeyxəli) Ağarəzi oğlu Yaxşıbəyov, who was born in 1881 in Nardaran, is one such sheikh. 
The site informs us that Şıxəli studied Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy as well as other 
Islamic subjects for about nineteen years. The sheikh was fluent in Arabic and Persian and also 
interested in literature, to which he contributed his very-well-written poems. After serving for so 
long as a scholar and a spiritual guide he died in 1966 at the age of eightyfive and was buried in 
Nardaran, his birthplace.   
The tradition of fostering and reverencing wise men continued during the Soviet period, 
but with a vast dropoff its efficacy. To no small extent Soviet repressive rule was able, via the 
peaceful mechanisms it recruited, to achieve the goal of excluding religion from the peoples’ 
lives. Many famous men were sent into exile especially during the Stalin era. Siberia, the arctic 
region of Russia, is famous for its freezingly cold winters, became home to the expatriates—if 
they were lucky. For according to the prevalent discourse in the region, religious men not only 
were exiled but in many cases shot by the Soviets. The end result of such sanctions was a decline 
in the level of religiosity within the society. Religion was never completely excluded from 
Azerbaijan, but many religious activities did go underground. Indeed, the resistance was so 
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strong at the beginning that people carried on studying religion within stables. Slowly it faded 
away, however.   
When it comes to peaceful strategies, the Soviet administration successfully utilized 
education and its social and economic outcomes to change the social structure. As a result of its 
carefully and gradually applied policies, the older form of society in Azerbaijan, as well as in 
Nardaran, came to an end, and people were not even made uncomfortable by the change. That 
fact became clear to me in the course of carrying out this ethnographic research project, 
comprised of observations and informant interviews. For instance one of my female informants, 
who was in her sixties, told me about the conditions her family members had experienced during 
the 1960s. According to her, her mother and her grandmother were both worshippers and they 
routinely wore the veil in those days. Yet the members of her own generation were just the 
opposite. She herself wore miniskirts even at the time of her marriage, not to mention the lack of 
a veil. She asserted that she and her coevals were even not aware of what and why they were 
lacking as compared to the preceding generation. “Nobody in my generation even thought about 
why we were lacking religious practices that our parents and grandparents were very sensitive 
about.” Similarly, one of my elderly informants who was in his seventies spoke to me about the 
pervasiveness of alcohol consumption and drug use in the old days in Nardaran.  
Returning for a moment to Azerbaijan’s struggle for influence, the new nation 
immediately drew the attention of the neighboring states, Iran and Turkey. Unofficial 
ambassadors, so to speak, from both states sought to export their own sectarian traditions and to 
raise the nation’s exercised religious temperature. On the Turkish side, the entrepreneurs from 
civic society were able, thanks to the shared origin and language, to develop friendly state level 
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relations with Azerbaijan. The Iranians’ side preferred to take a more political route, building 
constituencies by exporting their heavily politicized, radical type of Shiism.  
One of the immediate consequences of these Iranian efforts was the emergence of the 
Islamic Party of Azerbaijan. The IPA was born in Nardaran soon after independence was re-
declared in 1992. Most believed it was pro-Iranian and eager to see the Azeri state become an 
Islamic rather than a secular one. The Iranian penetration into Azerbaijan, plus the radical 
discourse of the IPA, attracted the attention of the Azeri government and elicited the imposition 
of strict measures. President Heydar Aliyev expelled many Iranian mullahs in 1993 and 1994. In 
1995 the Azeri Supreme Court shut down the IPA, and in 1996 the leader of the IPA was 
arrested on a charge of spying in favor of Iran. Although the accusations were denied by the 
party administration and regarded as slander, the allegations do not seem to be baseless. Details 
will be supplied about precisely how Iranians financially and ideologically intervened in 
Azerbaijan as the IPA emerged and developed.  
In 2000, unrest erupted in Nardaran just before the parliamentary elections, when almost 
the entire leadership of the IPA was arrested and accused of receiving financial support from Iran 
and of forging relationships with the secret-service agents of that state (Hadjy-zadeh, 2011).  
Indeed, several uprisings occurred there throughout 2002, 2003, 2006, and 2013 in the course of 
which some civilians and police officers were killed and police vehicles were set ablaze. With 
respect to the situation in the early 2010s, it can be said that the Nardarani people were waiting 
in the wings to take their revenge (Hadjy-zadeh, 2011). The biggest clash of all took place in 
2002, when villagers began to demonstrate against the government on the ground that they were 
sick of putting up with low living standards. Especially resented were the lack of job 
opportunities, gas, and electricity. First the demonstrations were peaceful. Later, however, when 
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members of the Council of the White Bearded (council of elders) were detained when they paid a 
visit to the local governmental office in order to demand the release of some previous detainees, 
the demonstrations turned bloody, for the Azeri government’s response to them was deadly force 
and a heavy police presence. One villager was killed and dozens of civilians and police were 
wounded. The demonstrations went on for months and the villagers, refusing to cool down, or 
back down, were placated only after extensive negotiations and the resumption of full gas and 
electricity service. 
 
 b) Research Setting and Demographics 
	
 Nardaran is located on the north side of, and twentyfive kilometers away from, the capital 
city of Azerbaijan, Baku. It has an approximate settlement area of fifteen square miles and a 
population of 9,000 people. It is called kend in the Azeri language, which one can translate either 
as “village” or “small township.” According to municipal records it has 1,500 houses and nearly 
2,000 families. Although it is known as a municipality, one should not picture a modern suburb 
or compare it with western-style municipalities. In this dissertation, I choose to call it a village 
because most of my informants used kend in a context of complaining about the poverty and 
scarcity in Nardaran.  I observed that there was a municipal building within the village but that it 
was made up of only two rooms; one was big, nearly 250 square feet, and the other was smaller, 
100 square feet, and designated as the office of the mayor, a man in his early thirties. According 
to the constitution of Azerbaijan, any settlement having a population of over 3,000 people must 
be designated a municipality. Municipal elections are held nationwide with the “members” being 
elected first. The number of the members varies, from seven to fifteen, according to the 
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population. The Nardaran municipality has eleven members, attesting to its mid-range population. 
To choose a mayor another election among the members takes place. While there are some 
requirements to become a member or a mayor, possessing a high-level education is not one of 
them. Nonetheless, the mayor of Nardaran assured me that eightyfive percent of of Azerbaijan’s 
mayors are in fact college graduates.  
Upon entering the village the landscape gives you the feeling of walking in a maze. That 
is to say, the high compound walls of the houses rise above the narrow roads of the village. The 
condition of the village roads is execrable. Although the main streets are covered with asphalt, 
they quickly become soil-ridden owing to an obvious lack of maintenance. The village houses 
contribute to this poor impression as most of them are either made of cheap brick or have no 
surface coat of paint. A few villagers own houses built of quality stone, which keep the homes 
warm in winter and cool in summer. Topping it all off are the above-ground gas and water pipes 
peculiar to Azerbaijan’s rural settlements.  
 In Nardaran there are two schools, which include an elementary school and a combined 
secondary high school, three preschools, one walk-in clinic, one maternity ward, one emergency 
clinic, and a post office.  There are a few small food marts and equipment stores where you can 
find construction materials. Not long before my arrival there had been a Medeniyyet Evi 
(recreation center), inherited from the Soviet period and comprising an auditorium useable as a 
movie theater, a cafeteria, a library, and classrooms where several art courses were taught. By 
the time I was conducting my research, the center was already gone and a new project was being 
initiated. A conspicuously abandoned building was a rug factory during the Soviet rule period, at 
that time one of the main employment opportunities.  
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 Since the village is located on Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea side it has its own beach, a great 
deal of which is occupied by resorts and hotels. The former are surrounded by huge walls and 
give the feeling of a separate world since they are quite expensive and the villagers have almost 
no interactions with whoever is inside them. Surprisingly, however, considerable amounts of 
beach territory remain virgin. The beach struck me as being separated, not only physically, but 
also spiritually, from the village by a broad two-lane road, that was under construction as I began 
my research. I asked myself why the village center was so far from the beach, and speculated 
that the distance might be a result of the villagers’ shyness when it comes to the sort of men-and-
women mixed-entertainment opportunities in the resort area.  On the beach stand fishermen’s 
shelters and booths where couples or groups can enjoy the sea and the dark golden sand. Nobody, 
not even the young men in charge of the booths, was able to answer my question regarding their 
ownership and management. They seemed to be occupied and operated in the absence of a land 
authority, but only until the arrival of a landlord after the land is officially sold.  There is no 
fixed rental price. You can rent a booth daily or for a couple of hours and enjoy. You will pay 
less when a Nardarani accompanies you.  
  It is the neighboring village, Bilgah, in which the Azeri president, Ilham Aliyev, has a 
tremendous resort, the surrounding walls of which are not less than twelve feet high. My guide, 
and also my key informant, kept telling me about the famous persons Bilgah such as Zeynep 
Hanlarova, a famous Azeri singer, who have villas in or around Nardaran’s beach side.  Likewise, 
the giant Jumeirah Beach Hotel, which actually stands within the borders of Bilgah, is a 
conspicuous landmark, and is always introduced by Nardarani with the words “Jews own it.”  
There are two ways to get to Nardaran from the capital city of Baku. One is the closest road that 
directly connects the village to the city via the bordering village Mashtaga. The Baku transit 
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service assigned the number 189-bus service to Nardaran, and this departs from Baku at the 
subway stop called Gara Garayev, after the famous Azeri composer. The other option is the 
broad, highway-like road that goes through the Caspian Sea and connects Nardaran to Baku by a 
longer route. Not long before my arrival in Baku in summer 2012, Azerbaijan hosted the 
international Eurovision song contest and was promoting a collective effort to spruce up its 
capital, Baku. The longer, peripheral highway was included in that activity and since it is the 
way to the Baku airport, the sides of it were covered with walls for the visual comfort of the 
foreign visitors who came for the song contest.  
 
c) Economy and Material Culture 
	
 The major economic activities of Nardaran are fishing, rose-raising, and horticulture 
(tomatoes and cucumbers). A Nardarani may also, however, work at a stone quarry, run a 
teahouse at the seashore, or a food mart or a hardware store, work in the fields picking and 
packing vegetables.  A rose-raiser who became one of my informants, told me about the rose-
raising profession in Nardaran. He has a 3000-square-meter garden, enclosed with a garden 
frame that wards off the autumn and winter chills. A single rose is sold for 2 manat ($3.50); he 
sells 20,000 roses a year and thereby receives 40,000 manat ($70,000), clearing a profit of 
20,000 manat. That profit does not solely belong to him, though. He lives with his parents and 
has a married brother, so the annual individual take of each family member would be 
approximately 7,000 manat ($11,000).  All those figures are of course estimates, but they provide 
the reader with a general idea of an average rose-raiser’s economic condition. Villagers who deal 
in horticulture, on the other hand, tend to pick peppers for seven months a year and tomatoes for 
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two. Each week 3,000 to 5,000 peppers are picked and sold from an average (2,500-square-meter) 
garden, yielding 4,500 manat ($7,800) in sum.  Tomatoes bring in 500 manat each week of the 
two-month period, and that means a total of 4,000 manat ($7,000).  Thus, horticulture provides 
almost the same income for villagers as does rose-raising. The products are usually bought by 
brokers and sold either in the city or in other cities of the country.  
Fishing is another major income-source for Nardaranis. In the past Nardaran was known 
for its caviar, the eggs of a special fish unique to the Caspian Sea called osetrina. Osetrina caviar 
is widely deemed one of the most delicious. Especially after independence, however, and most 
probably because of the corrupted condition of the country, illegal fishing damaged the fertility 
of the Nardaran coasts in terms of caviar. Thus now even though almost 250 Nardarani families 
earn their living by fishing, even just caviar collection is forbidden, although the rule is evaded 
by some. It is a very rare sight these days, but, an average-sized asetrin can yield up to 2-3 kilos 
(4 pounds) of caviar that can be sold for $1500.  This is not to say that fishermen live a 
prosperous life. By no means, and for two reasons. First, it is very hard to catch asetrin (or at 
least big asetrin), and second, the fishermen have to pay bribes to officials to get the latter to turn 
a blind eye to their fishing.  However, it was obvious that some fisherman had better standards 
than others.    
In brief, most people in Nardaran get by on a low level of income. An average family of 
four earns between $1000 and $1500 per month. Somewhat redressing the bleak situation are the 
low prices of gas and electricity and the advantage of being home owners. There is of course a 
relative handful of families who are notably more prosperous than the others are. Some of them 
have commercial connections in Iran, perhaps trading rugs and small appliances from there. 
Others have secondary jobs such as driving cabs, and still others have a family member who 
	 67	
works as a civil servant. But since there are no resource-holders in Nardaran such as landowners 
or herd-owners, such people’s moderate wealth has little impact on their political status within 
the community. In other words, since Nardarani power-struggles have no reference to the 
distribution of resources and since there is no landowner-wageworker binary at work, more 
prominent than the economic conditions of the villagers are such other elements such as 
knowledge, religious titles, education (preferably religious), and the status obtained by age.  
The small-scale shops in Nardaran provide a broad range of items, notably the pesticides 
used for horticulture and construction materials such as cement and tools. Most of the houses 
have been built of stone by the villagers themselves, the stone being obtained from the town’s 
own quarry. Each house has its own garden and is surrounded by walls that average seven feet 
tall. The houses have one or two stories and are constructed on an agglomeration basis. The 
newly built ones have restrooms, whereas the old ones have separate restrooms within the 
gardens. Streets are narrow, and resemble a maze given the houses’ tall garden walls. Most of the 
roofs are made of tinplate.  All Nardaran houses use gas for heating in winter and some have air 
conditioners for summer.  
Clothing and food, other than the home-grown vegetables produced by the villagers’ 
gardens, can be found in the garment stores and mini-marts. For all the materials not available in 
Nardaran the villagers usually go to Maştağa, the neighboring village that has more and bigger 
stores, or sometimes to Baku for more technological items such as cellphones and computers.  I 
can say, as someone who was kindly offered several meals in Nardaran, that the primary foods 
are potato, stuffed tomato, stuffed eggplant, chicken, beef, and homemade bread. The primary 
beverage is black tea, which usually is enjoyed in tandem with a wide variety of murebbe, or 
homemade jam. So indeed, in Nardaran as in other of Azerbaijan’s villages, murebbe is the most 
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important prerequisite for drinking tea. With respect to the material culture of tea-drinking, its 
most important elements are teapots and samovars as well as tandirs, the special ovens made of 
clay.  
The primary handicraft in Nardaran is the art of weaving carpets. Even when the carpet 
factory was still functioning it held no monopoly on the art, for the women of Nardaran have 
been weaving carpets in their homes from time immemorial. Some of them have looms in their 
houses, on which they weave both for their own use and pleasure and for profit. Carpets take 
pride of place within the material culture of Nardaran because beyond their functionality they are 
prized ornaments that grace the walls of many houses. As a valuable material, carpets can be 
given as alms as well.  
 
d) Social Structure 
	
1. Kinship System 
	
 The social organization of Nardaran can be very well explained by invoking the concept 
“segmentary lineage system.” Leaving my analysis of the functional aspect of that system for the 
political organization section, I begin here by detailing the structure itself. The segmentary 
lineage system, which was first discussed in a scholarly way by Evans-Pritchard (1945), is 
defined by Kurtz (2001) as a unilineal decent association in which the political relations are 
regulated by kinship relationships. That is to say, in such a system everyone can trace his or her 
descent through a line of ancestors. And yet in Nardaran, and especially today’s Nardaran, it is 
almost impossible to situate everyone on a unilineal descent line owing to the large population 
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size and the incomplete data. Nonetheless, the high degree of segmentation at different levels 
should be mentioned. Each house is the home of a nuclear family or of two such families, each 
usually including the parents, their youngest son, and his wife and children. When all the other 
children and their spouses are taken into account we encounter extended family ties that are quite 
strong. Territory also is divided into segments that are called mehelle or neighborhoods. The 
chief criterion for the formation of a neighborhood has been kinship, but today that criterion has 
largely lost its validity. One of my informants clarified this point as follows:  
 There are some neighborhoods, for instance, in which the father had a large piece 
of land and created a neighborhood by distributing it among his sons. This was 
more pervasive in the past but today lineages are bigger; that is, my lineage 
became neighbors with others, so I have relatives both in the nearby and the 
distant neighborhoods.  
 
The compositions of extended families, which have kinship ties among them, constitute the nesil 
or lineage that can be defined as ‘joint families’. This structure of such joint families has three 
characteristics: (1) there is a rule of patrilineal descent, meaning that membership is transmitted 
down the male line; (2) marriage preferences largely fall within the nesil in the form of cousin 
marriages, i.e. those in which a male marries his father’s brother’s daughter; (3) there is a rule of 
residence after marriage; that is, the bride moves to either her husband’s house (virilocality) or 
her husband’s father’s house (patrilocality). As a result of these characteristics a great deal of 
solidarity, not only in cases of conflict but also when coming together around life’s daily tasks, is 
formed.  
As those remarks by an informant suggest, though the social structure comprising 
elements of both mehelle and nesil still has some validity, over time in Nardan it has changed 
and added new elements. Thus I shall now elaborate on the current social structure of the 
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neighborhoods. In ensuing chapters the discussion will continue, but I begin here by 
underscoring the distinction between the “core” and the “periphery.” As was mentioned earlier, 
Nardaran has several mosques, most of them of real historical interest, in some neighborhoods 
(mehelle) there are squares, dedicated to the great imams of the Shia tradition. Quite interestingly, 
both mosques and squares are clustered around the center of the village, whereas the periphery, 
namely the suburbs, both of them. The centrality of each mosque and square comes as no 
surprise given that they loom large in people’s lives, especially during religious gatherings. What 
is surprising is that even wall paintings and graffiti tend to be centralized. As you move away 
from the center toward the borders of the village, both of them gradually decrease until they are 
entirely absent at the outskirts. Most of the graffiti bedecks on N. Esgerov Küçesi (N. Əsgərov 
Street), which is 600 metres long and located between Imam Hussein Square and Nardaran’s 
main mosque, the Pir. Similarly, and conspicuously, there are three mosques on the same street 
and several others within close range.  
I propose that this core-periphery distinction is comprised not merely of physical and 
environmental characteristics but also of social and behavioral features. In this regard I cite the 
differing hospitality etiquettes and dress codes I observed in the course of the interviews. In 
almost all of the houses located in the core, the rule that “men and women shall sit separately” 
was quite strictly observed. Indeed, there were no exceptions to it at all. On the periphery, by 
contrast, I shared the same space, albeit quite briefly, with my informants’ spouses, women who 
of course wore veils. Another observed aspect of the core/periphery distinction pertains to 
marriage patterns. As will be discussed more fully later, Nardarani almost always marry 
Nardarani. Yet, when I was in the suburbs of the village I at times encountered exceptional 
Qıraqdan qız alma or “marrying outsider girls.” 
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Nardaran’s kinship system is based chiefly on the blood ties that come from either the 
patrilineal or the matrilineal side. The nuclear family fosters closer ties with the elders, namely 
the parents. It is the deep-seated Azerbaijani trait of respect for elders that places father and 
mother on top of the priority list. After the parents, the brothers and sisters, as may be seen in 
many of Azerbaijan’s communities, are placed in a secondary position among the first-degree 
relatives. Uncles on the father’s side, known as emi in Azerbaijani, traditionally are placed on the 
third tier, and similarly aunts from that side are accorded more deference than are aunts on the 
mother’s side. Thus, uncles and aunts come after brothers and sisters within the kinship system. 
Cousins, as might be expected, are then the next relatives considered closest. As members of the 
same generation, cousins appear to have more interactions with each other, but when I asked 
informants about their priorities most of them placed their uncles and aunts before their cousins. 
Thus one could argue that there are some minor differences between what is being said and what 
actually exists.  
Indeed, this opportunity should be taken to clarify some differences between the 
discourse on kinship relationships and the actual conditions on the ground. The above-presented 
information can be seen as the culturally accepted regulations of kinship. And yet a 
distinguishing characteristic, unique to Nardaran, is that the relationship between a sister and a 
brother tends to be much closer than that between two brothers. Since a brother for a woman is 
the only male, other of course than her husband, with whom she can share her problems, needs, 
and sorrow, women usually develop close relationships with their brothers, one of my informants 
explained. The relationship between father and daughter seems to be more distant, especially 
after the latter’s marriage. Another reason broached by my informant is that since females are 
weak and need more attention than males are, brothers reach out to sisters especially after the 
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latter have left their fathers’ homes. Moreover, owing to the highly strict rule of having men and 
woman sit separately, brothers are the only privileged males in the sense of their being allowed 
to enter their sisters’ homes without first gaining their husbands’ permission. No opposite-sex 
cousins are allowed to interact with their married or unmarried cousins. All of these above 
factors tend to foster a more frequent presence of the mother’s brother within the homes, and 
increased interaction between mothers’ brothers and their nephews. According to my informants, 
this condition emerged especially after the independence that was accompanied by religious 
intensification. During Soviet times opposite-sex cousins used to interact more often because of 
the lax enforcement of the rule about men and women sitting separately.  
Moving now beyond the “blood” factor, neighborhood and comradeship constitute 
another aspect of the kinship system. Almost all of my informants referred to their neighbors and 
comrades in ways connoting first-degree blood kinship. Let it be noted, however, that 
“comradeship” means something more than friendship. It usually begins during adolescence and 
continues after marriage. Groomsmen, for instance, are usually the preeminent two among the 
groom’s comrades. Besides hanging out and sharing spare-time activities such as playing 
football, comrades usually attend celebrations and ceremonies together as well. Neighborhoods 
possess nearly the same characteristics almost regardless of whether neighbors are tied to each 
other by blood as a result of endogamy. The significance of neighborhood and comradeship 
becomes clearer during communal activities and at times of conflict. Especially at religious 
celebrations and wedding ceremonies, neighbors and comrades help each other without paying 
heed to blood ties. And if a fight breaks out between a Nardarani and an outsider, the former’s 
comrades will leap into the fray even if their companion is in the wrong. I saw this happen with 
my own eyes when all of the passengers on a Nardaran bus got off to fight with a group of men 
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 Examining the concept of marriage as it exists within the context of Nardaran is not only 
necessary but also quite significant, since it stands as the key component of the social structure. 
Make no mistake, marriage for Nardaranis is much more than just a strategy for building useful 
alliances and solidarity. The fact is, though that most villagers unite their children at young ages, 
the age-range for girls is fourteen-seventeen, while it is seventeen-twenty for boys. Little wonder, 
then, that most youngsters either give up on secondary, not to mention higher, education. The 
reader I hope recalls the reflections on the educational landscape of Azerbaijan’s rural 
communities offered earlier by Wistrand (2011). I bring them back to our minds because the 
seemingly disparate spheres of marriage and education in fact intersect in some 
anthropologically interesting and real-world-important ways. I begin here by noting that many of 
the informants complained to me about the lack of job opportunities in Azerbaijan. Their 
common point was that the low benefits of the jobs that a higher education can gain one are not 
worth undergoing such an arduous and expensive education to get. They also said that villages 
have fewer educational opportunities than do the towns and cities. Along with the reasons 
enumerated by the villagers, however, some additional ones occurred to me. The most prominent 
was the people’s jaundiced attitude toward the secular education policy adopted by the Azeri 
government. Since the mixed-gender nature of the school education and the ban on the veil both 
run contrary to the Nardarani rule of men and women sitting separately, many villagers were 
reluctant to send their daughters to school.  Given that that attitude was encouraged and 
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supported by the religious men of the village, adolescent girls looked to the institution of 
marriage as providing them with their only access to gain status within the community.  
Throughout my field research, my overarching goal was to collect as much information 
about the community as I could. Therefore, I started almost all interviews by asking the subject 
to help me construct his or her genealogy. I tried to trace four generations, beginning with the 
children of the household and moving back to their great-grandfathers. After I had done two or 
three genealogies two factors came into prominence; and I knew that the rest of my genealogy-
drawing activity would to focus on them: the endogamous marriage pattern and the patrilocal 
residence pattern after marriage.   
Virtually all Nardaranis marry. Marriage is seen as the only legitimate way of procreation, 
and rarely does a Nardarani marry an outsider. The hugely endogamous nature of marriage there 
renders the village quite unique in comparison to its neighbors. When I asked my informants to 
give me some reasons accounting for this dominant tendency, most of them cited the uniqueness 
of their cultural traits. According to them, it would be difficult for an outsider to get used to the 
lifestyle in Nardaran. Yet marrying insiders would assure harmony, most of them added. 
Otherwise there was a risk of quarrels and conflicts within the household, perhaps tarnishing the 
family’s reputation. Owing to the intimate interrelationships among the villagers, innuendo can 
spread rapidly and do real harm the prestige of a family.  
Both cross cousin and parallel-cousin marriages occur in Nardaran, and the villagers 
marry distant relatives and neighbors as well. Usually it is the mothers or sisters of the groom 
who make the marriage arrangements. Once they have decided that the prospective bride is an 
appropriate one, they “introduce” her to their son in her absence. If the son has not seen the girl 
before, they usually show a picture of her and ask whether he likes her. In cases of dislike the 
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subject is closed forever, but young men usually obey their families’ suggestions, one of my 
informants emphasized. And if the man does agree with his family, the marriage negotiations get 
started. In some cases, the prospective partners choose to “date” for some time to get to know 
each other, but that can only mean cellphone chats as no in-person meetings are allowed prior to 
wedlock.  
The elders of the family handle the marriage negotiations. Uncles and aunts usually are 
invited to accompany the parents as the reciprocal visits are made. Among the traditional rituals 
at this time are giving flowers and chocolate as presents, and taking a sacrificial ram to the 
prospective bride. During the negotiations, both sides meet to clarify the details of the wedding 
ceremony, the couple’s place of residence, their needed household items, and the like. The 
groom’s side provides the shelter, while it is the bride’s side who buy all the items. Yet, my 
informant pointed out, “we consider if the bride’s family is not prosperous enough to afford it.”  
Marriage, in all of Azerbaijan and thereby in Nardaran, is known as Ere getmek. The 
important point here, however, is that a Nardarani wife definitely moves to either her husbands 
or her husband’s father’s home when she begins her life as a wife. If a family has more than one 
son, it is the youngest one who remains with the parents after marriage. Older sons move to 
either another house or to a house within the same compound as the father’s house.  
Although it will be treated in detail in Chapter 5, I must here take note of the temporary 
marriage phenomenon that became pervasive as an outcome of the religious intensification 
kindled by Iranian mullahs and Iranian-educated Nardarani. I am not saying that villagers have 
temporary marriages within the borders of the village. As an unwritten, informal rule, the 
candidate woman is an outsider. And since the chief purpose of the temporary marriage is to 
satisfy sexual needs, Naradarani men keep the activity well hidden from the eyes of their family 
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members. Since the general tendency is to have actual marriages regardless of the male’s prior 
and ulterior temporary ones, the latter do little to undercut the prevalence and prestige of the 
former, presumably the eternal bastion of family values.  
Divorce rates are extremely low in Nardaran, and no record of divorce I had access to 
cited dissension or incompatibility as the cause. The only recorded divorce cases occurred 
because of infertility. In the old days, when the medical technology was not as advanced as it is 
today, infertility invariably was perceived as stemming from the maternal side. Therefore, these 
men tended to marry another woman after breaking up the former marriage in a conciliatory way.  
 
3.  Domestic Authority and Division of Labor  
	
I purposely choose to treat the themes of domestic authority and the division of labor 
together, because some chores are seen as detracting from male authority. Washing, cooking, 
cleaning, and childcare are all, in Azerbaijani eyes, women’s duties. When I asked one of my 
few female informants whether men do baby-changing her reaction spoke volumes, for she 
began to laugh and told me that such a thing was impossible. In addition to the aforementioned 
domestic jobs, women handle horticultural tasks as well, but only within the realm of their own 
gardens. Likewise, women do not go outside to take on heavy jobs but may handle a few of their 
own within the compounds’ walls.  
Men monopolizing authority—that can be observed in most parts of the country. In 
Nardaran, however, this condition is much more strict. Intertwined with the religious aspect of 
intimacy, women are under the supervision of men. For instance, wives have to ask for their 
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husband’s permission to step outside of their homes. One of my female informants told me the 
following with respect to the interior familial affairs.  
The men are the indisputable heads of the households and the women are well 
aware of that. Even though I have never been exposed to violence, it is possible 
that sometimes my husband might have got angry and shouted at me. We, as 
women of Nardaran, know the nature of our men and prefer not to talk when they 
are angry. In addition, whatever happens in the home stays in the home in 
Nardaran. The brides usually do not talk to their own mothers about the internal 
affairs of their family because of three reasons. First and foremost, daughters do 
not want to make their own mothers sad. Second, her own mother will not protect 
her unquestioningly, but ask her about what she had done to make her husband 
angry, And finally, she would not want to raise the issue.  
 
The authority of the men is not limited to their relationships with their spouses, but rather 
extends to the entire family. Father is the head of the household even if there is a married son 
within the same building. Children would not lie down or even cross their legs in the presence of 
their father. The naming of newborns is another indicator of male authority, for when a new male 
member comes into the family its parents either give him the name of the patrilateral grandfather 
or leave the decision to him. Although it is not a strictly obeyed rule and there may be exceptions 
to it, I believe its mere existence sheds some useful light on the issue of male authority in 
Nardaran.  
 I also wished to see whether the Nardarani women were active behind the scenes as 
Dragadze had found to be true of the women of Georgia in her 1988 study. Even though the two 
cases differ in some fundamental ways, above all the more unbending stance of the men in 
Nardaran, I do not believe its women can be considered to be fully subordinated to the men. Now, 
as then, I am mindful of one of my informant’s words” “True, men generally hold the authority 
in Nardaran, yet it sometimes depends on the personality as well. My brother-in-law, for instance, 
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looks like the authority at the community level but the actual boss at home is definitely my sister.” 
Then too,  it can be argued that women usually have more “voice” as they age.  
 
	
4.  Social Stratification 
	
 The Weberian approach as opposed to the Marxian one seems to be more relevant to this 
case study of Nardaran. Although the occupational structure provides the villagers with different 
kinds of jobs, and thereby with varying levels of income, it seems that almost all occupational 
groups have similar amounts of income. Moreover, and owing in part to governmental economic 
policies, there are no large-scale landowners in the village. Likewise, since animal husbandry is 
nearly absent from the village, no herd-owners can be spoken of. Villagers who deal with 
horticulture, fishing, or other small-scale jobs are all self-employed. Therefore, they rely to a 
greater extent upon internal solidarity and cooperation to a greater extent than wageworkers, 
when a collective effort is called for.  
 Nonetheless, various status groups and forms of stratification do exist in Nardaran. When 
it comes to status groups, Weberian suggestions of power and prestige come forward. According 
to Weber power and prestige are the two determinants of social class, in addition to wealth and 
property. Power and prestige, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, are gained and 
represented in Nardaran chiefly via education. For the fact is that the common characteristic of 
the members of these groups that possess power and authority within the political structure of the 
village is their being educated. As will be seen in the political organization section, the mullahs 
and the council of elders are the two leading groups in Nardaran. Although religious education is 
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regarded as being more valuable and prestigious, many members of the council of elders are 
villagers who have attained a secular higher education during the Soviet era. The value and 
prestige of an old-fashioned college degree seems all the more obvious when we compare those 
well-positioned elders with today’s young villagers who give up even on secondary, not to 
mention higher education.  
 The sphere of religious education now deserves a moment or two of private attention, 
since it is the most significant means of upward mobility. Religious education starts when the 
villagers enter primary school. Especially during the summertime, when the schools are closed, 
the children attend mosques, primarily to learn how to read the holy Qur’an, but where the 
mullahs also teach them such basic religious practices as how to perform the ablution before 
prayer, how to pray, and the like. At the end of the training period a contest revolving around 
such matters takes place, and the most successful students are awarded. In more ways than one, 
indeed, for the first-place student is granted a vacation in Iran where he will be able to visit the 
shrines of the greatest Shia imams. That is no small matter, for the non-Islamic reader is hereby 
informed that the man who visits the famous cities of Iran, such as Karbala and Mashad, is 
thereby permitted to possess religiously important titles associated with those cities. Furthermore 
it is not only the student who will enjoy the prestige, but also his family. They become proud of 
their child’s cleverness but even more so of his religious title, perhaps Karbala-i, which he 
earned at a very young age.  
 At the end of this early-childhood education, a number of capable young men will, 
contingent upon the consent and the encouragement of the mullahs, continue religious education 
either in the village or in Iran. Since the education topic will be handled in coming chapters, here 
I wish to touch upon it solely in its intersection with the concept of stratification. In Nardaran, 
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Iranian-educated mullahs occupy the highest-ranked positions. That is to say, they comprise the 
most respected and prestigious group. At all of the communal activities, they either preach or 
convey short addresses to the community. They are regarded as being the indisputable authorities 
of the religious domain, to such an extent that no one even dreams of critically dissecting what is 
being told by them to him or her. They occupy the seat of honor wherever they go, and everyone 
stands up when an Iranian-educated mullah enters a community gathering, without regard to his 
age.  
 As we saw in the above case of awarding children, possessing religious titles is both a 
way to garner prestige and to facilitate upward mobility. This should not however be regarded as 
something that creates a separate group, but rather as a distinguishing characteristic. The Iranian 
cities of Qom and Mashad, as well as the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala, are among the 
destinations that have profound religious meanings for the Shia world. Mecca, on the other hand, 
is the supreme pilgrimage destination not only for the Shia but for all Muslims. He or she who 
has made that pilgrimage are entitled hadji from that time on. Likewise, visiting one or more of 
the abovementioned cities is a way of holding the associated titles. When a villager returns to the 
village from one of these cities, a welcoming ritual takes place. The relatives and neighbors of 
the pilgrim, either individually or as a group, come to his house and welcome him. There is also 
a hierarchy among the cities mentioned above. Visiting Mecca and thereby becoming a Hadji has 
the highest ranking. Second is Karbala, an Iraqi city where Imam Hussein was killed. Mashad 
and Najaf, which host the shrines of the great imams of Shia belief, take the third and the fourth 
places. Visiting these cities in their hierarchical order provides a villager with especial prestige 
and status within the community. Villagers bearing these titles are respected and even envied by 
others.  
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  2. Political Organization in Nardaran 
	
a) Opening Discussion: 
	
Since the leading factor that attracted the world’s attention to Nardaran was the series of 
bloody events that occurred in the course of the 2002 uprising, treating all of that as a case and 
extending it seems to serve my overall purpose of studying Nardaran. More specifically, I wish 
to say a few things here at the very beginning of this section about the “extended case method,” 
also known as situational analysis, because I believe that providing a brief situational analysis 
will strengthen my analysis and underscore its relevance. Above all, perhaps, utilizing the 
situational analysis approach will permit inferences to emerge from the selected case and to 
support the data that I collected and shaped in the form of a community study. I wish it to be 
understood, however, that I never set out to base, and have, in fact not based, my study solely on 
the extended case method. Therefore, the criticisms of that method, largely pertaining to possible 
problems with typicality and representativeness, need not trouble us here. 
The method is known, by the affiliation of its theorists, as the Manchester School. Its 
members developed this approach chiefly as a response to the observed deficiencies of the 
“structural analysis” that had long been adopted by the discipline of sociology. As Mitchell 
(1983) notes, one of the earliest scholars who referred to case studies was Barnes (1958). Yet, 
Mitchell argues, it was Gluckman (1961) who provided a more focused statement regarding the 
extended case method. Although the members of the Manchester School did not fully reject 
structuralism, what they wanted was, in Velsen’s words, something more; “the statics of the 
structure, ‘the permanent edifice in which social relations ant activities are congealed’ as Fortes 
put it (1945, p. 232), should be supplemented and enlivened by an account of the actions−both 
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normal and exceptional−of the individuals who operate the structure, i.e. the processes going on 
within the structure” (Velsen, 1967, p. 141).  
According to Velsen (1967), since the structuralist approach focused chiefly on “how 
social structures and related human practices functioned in one way or another to contribute to 
the cohesion and integration of social systems” (Kurtz, 2001, p. 69), and since “the abstractions 
of the anthropologists are based on two types of materials: viz., statements of natives as to what 
they believe they do, ought to do, or would like to do, and his own observations” (Richards, 1939, 
p. 160, quoted in Velsen, 1967, p. 136), there occurs a possibility of the researcher’s obscuring, 
despite his best intentions, the irregularities and inconsistencies and even the conflict itself. 
Informants’ statements should not be treated as if they were objective, analytical observations 
made by outsiders, for the sociological evaluation of the same action may well be very different 
from the social evaluation arrived at by local informants (Velsen, 1967). Velsen (1967) quoting 
Schapera (1938) gets us even closer to the heart of the matter: “Culture is not merely a system of 
formal practices and beliefs. It is made up essentially of individual reactions to and variations 
from a traditionally standardized pattern; and indeed no culture can ever be understood unless 
special attention is paid to this range of individual manifestations” (Velsen, 1967, p. 136). In 
other words, Velsen clarifies, norms and general practices of conduct ultimately are manipulated 
by individuals in particular situations as they seek to gain particular ends. Therefore the 
situational analysis that attracts our attention to these exceptional phenomena, and that provides 
us with the opportunity to observe the players in action, seems to be the most helpful modality in 
terms of understanding and explaining our target group and the modes of behavior being 
observed.  
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The 2002 protests in Nardaran constitute the case that will be analyzed here. Virtually all 
parties agree that Azerbaijan is rife with economic and social problems such as corruption and 
grossly inequitable income distribution. It has long been argued that the gap between the classes 
is getting bigger every day in Azerbaijan, as in so much of the world. And yet, as we will be 
discussing in the economy section, Nardaran can be considered a self-perpetuating community. 
Most of the villagers, though not very prosperous, are homeowners, and they do hold steady jobs. 
Many of the nation’s communities are faring far worse. Why, then, did those others not revolt, 
and why did Nardaran?   
In order to contextualize that question, I would like to refer to the comprehensive study 
done by Ted Robert Gurr (1993), in which he points to the prominent factors causing communal 
groups to rebel. Gurr (1993) defines communal groups as “those whose core members share a 
distinctive and persistent collective identity based on cultural and descriptive traits that are 
important to them and to others with whom they interact” (Gurr, 1993, p. 163). According to 
Gurr, “grievances about differential treatment and the sense of group cultural identity provide the 
essential bases for mobilization and shape the kinds of claims made by the group’s leaders” 
(Gurr, 1993, p. 167). Although Gurr presents, as other variables, the group’s collective 
disadvantage, demographic stresses, and repressive governmental control, his strongest emphasis 
is definitely on the concept of “identity.” Inspired by Gurr’s suggestion, I look hard in Chapter 5 
at the Nardarani identity, shaped largely by Iran’s efforts to impose its hegemony upon Nardaran.  
There seems to be another factor, however, that is capable of pushing the community in its 
favored direction. Indeed, few would deny that the village has some leading figures who jointly 
constitute its political organization and thereby create and sustain the unique Nardarani identity. 
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Accordingly, the aim of this section is to provide the reader with a few glimpses of that 
organization, as they are illuminated by a specific situation that occurred in Nardaran in 2002.  
Utilizing the situational analysis method leads me to conclude that one of the leading 
actors driving the events of 2002 was, indisputably, the Council of the White-Bearded or council 
of elders. Yet they were not alone in leading and directing the community. Besides the data I 
gathered through the interviews, I was able to delve into the broad video archive of my key 
informant, who also created a YouTube account in order to broadcast videos captured on 
villagers’ cellphones or archived from visual media.  What I came to realize via both that delving 
and the interview comments about the demonstrations was that the leading figures of the 
demonstrations were, in order of their importance, the mullahs, the council of elders, and several 
other Nardaranis who have certain characteristics such as possessing religious titles and having 
close ties to the former two. When I say “leading” I refer to villagers who swayed the crowd by 
making speeches and who were the first to angrily shout slogans during the protests. My 
situational analysis also led me to conclude that the villagers were concerned not just with their 
low living standards but also with the overly (in their view) secular policies of the Azeri 
government. Several protesters clearly were keen to point out that the government’s oppression 
occurred not only because of monetary issues, but as punishing Nardaranis for their religiosity, 
for their love of God, honor, and the hijab.  
Especially after the death of Ali Hasan Agayev, the slogans Allahu-akbar! and Agayev! 
were identified with şehit (martyr), a politico-religious term referring to those who lost their lives 
in a struggle. One of the protesters was vowing in front of the crowd that he would take revenge 
and go down the martyr Agayev’s path. Moreover, much emphasis was placed on the well-
known characteristics of Nardaran such as its Imam Hussein tradition or “school,” to accompany 
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the slogans being chanted with right fists throw up above heads. The crowd was carrying flags 
on which Imam Hussein’s name was written in Arabic. Women in black hijabs were beating 
themselves, just as Iranians do in Shia mourning ceremonies. In addition the government 
officials, widely perceived as treating Nardaran in a hostile manner, were being named as tyrants 
by the villagers. In one of the TV broadcasts at that time, the villagers were vociferating a core 
claim: that every year the government was purposely cutting gas and electricity especially in 
wintertime and particularly in Nardaran. Invariably the villagers’ rhetoric made much of their sui 
generis characteristics as the basis of dichotomizing “us” and “them.”  
I have offered this brief examination of the leading figures of the 2002 protests in the 
hope that it would make my analysis of Nardaran’s political organization more meaningful 
because less abstract. Much as I would have liked to flesh out my descriptions of both the events 
leading up to the protests and the primary promoters, I am handicapped by the fact that the 
informants preferred, clearly out of a probably well-founded concern for their safety, not to name 
names, much less cast aspersions on their bearers.  
 
b) Political Organization 
	
As noted earlier, conducting ethnographic research in Nardaran seemed extremely 
difficult at the very beginning of my trip. This was the case because of Nardaran’s reputation, 
given the village’s extremely cohesive nature, of acting as a single entity. A stranger in the 
village gets recognized quite easily and very quickly. After being recognized, one is most 
probably under some sort of surveillance. Not perhaps in the strictest sense of the word, but 
people would definitely keep an eye on you, especially when you declare that you wish to remain 
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for several days and to talk to the villagers. To proceed you have to be granted approval to do so. 
Only quite late in my stay did I realize that my request to conduct some research had been pre-
discussed and approved by some of the village’s leading figures.  
We must pause for a moment to consider the primacy of two questions: “Who gives the 
approval?” and “Who makes the decisions?” Colson and Smith (1968) suggest that a turning 
point was reached in the emergence and development of the field of Political Anthropology when 
the importance of answering those questions was recognized. Colson (1968) tells us that Easton 
(1959)  
pinpointed a major difference between the political scientist who concentrates on 
a limited range of institutions which he has defined as political and the 
anthropologist who attempts to make comparisons using data derived from 
multipurpose institutions and who expects to include in his formulation all 
elements relevant to the attainment of the various ends which he has defined as 
political. (Colson, 1968) 
 
Nardaran was referred to by Babayeva (2002) as being the “Azerbaijani Palermo,” 
alluding surely to a widespread non-recognition of the central government and a sort of 
autonomy. The non-recognition of the central authority does not mean that we have here a full 
non-recognition situation though. After all, Nardaran contains several governmental institutions 
such as the municipal center, the maternity clinic, and primary and secondary schools. 
Nonetheless, while Azerbaijani law stipulates that mosques (masjids) have to be registered with 
the Board of Religious Affairs, it is widely ignored in Nardaran, where the masjids are run 
autonomously while benefitting from free electricity. Similarly, income in the form of alms 
dedicated to the Rahima Khanum shrine is beyond state control, with Nardaran using most of it 
to administer the main mosque, the Pir. Furthermore, even though Nardaranis have in the past 
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bemoaned the absence of a police station, they deeply resent any and all governmental security 
measures. For instance, a CCTV pole was set up in front of the main mosque during my research 
period. I say “was,” for after the specialists had set up the cameras in the daytime, the villagers 
demolished the pole and the cameras that very night.   
Returning now to Colson (1968), his words help us to understand precisely why the field 
of political anthropology emerged. Colson saw political science as having no convenient 
framework for dealing with such things as amorphous, stateless societies. Hence his belief that 
when anthropologists find themselves faced with a group of people to whom the standard 
definitions of government and political organization fail to apply, they must conjure up some 
definitions if they are to analyze whatever degree of political order may be observable. Colson 
goes on to cite Radcliffe-Brown (1940, p. xiv) on the all-but-inevitable appearance of the force 
factor: “In studying political organization, we have to deal with the maintenance or establishment 
of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority 
through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force” (Colson, 1968). 
While that emphasis on the role so often played by physical force has been criticized by 
some, others have seen force as constituting the structural definition of political organization. 
Force is also the leitmotif in a passage I have drawn from Smith (1968) in which he reviews the 
prominent approaches to this issue:  
Political organization has been defined structurally by reference to institutions 
that regulate the use of force (Radcliffe-Brown 1940; Weber 1922; Almond 1960) 
and functionally with reference to social cooperation and leadership (Schapera 
1956; Mair 1962). Political organization can be described in terms of the 
processes of decision making found in a given population (Easton 1953; 1957; 
Macridis 1955). All these schemes identify political organization with discrete 
social units, “societies” or “political communities,” within which force is 
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controlled or excluded and valid decision making or directed cooperation obtain. 
(Smith, 1968) 
 
Continuing his account, Smith (1968) suggests how anthropologists should approach the issue by 
invoking the words of Mair: 
some populations regard themselves, and are regarded by others, as distinct 
entities, but yet do not recognize any person or body of persons as having general 
authority to take decisions in matters affecting them all. In different contexts, 
different subdivisions of the whole take collective action for the purposes for 
which they are autonomous; so that if such action is the criterion of a political 
community, there are series of overlapping political communities. (Mair, 1962, p. 
106) 
 
Having put these approaches forward, Smith goes on to say that all have their deficiencies 
because “if political organization is identified with discrete communities, populations that lack 
such units must be said to lack political organization” (Smith, 1968). But, he says because these 
aggregates continue to exist, some sort of common action and some regulation of internal and 
external affairs must be transpiring somewhere. Therefore, he proposes the need for a more 
appropriate analytic framework. Departing from Max Weber’s notion of “striving to share power” 
and “relations of authority,” Smith nonetheless retains the two concepts of power and authority 
as he constructs his own framework. As for the concept of power, it has been handled both in 
ideational and materialistic terms throughout the paradigmatic development of our field. It is a 
generally accepted brief definition that “power is the ability of A to bend B to his or her will” 
(Kurtz, 2001, p. 22). The question then becomes this: “what property or attribute provides some 
with the capacity to force others to do things?” (Kurtz, 2001, p. 22). The common answer to that 
question comes in the form of the notion of “controlling resources,” but this is precisely where 
the aforementioned divergence arises for some scholars adopt a materialistic approach while 
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others take an ideational one as they all seek to account for the “resources of power.” Kurtz 
(2001) wisely takes a synthetic approach: “from a cross-cultural perspective, the resources that 
constitute the power of an agent driven politics can be subsumed succinctly, without being 
reductionist, under material (tangible, human) and ideational (ideological, symbolic, 
informational) resources” (Kurtz, 2001, p. 22). Kurtz supports his position by asserting that “the 
idea that power is grounded in distinct categories of resources permits a wider, cross-cultural 
consideration of the relationship among power, political leadership, and their environmental 
contexts” (Kurtz, 2001, p. 23).  
Authority, on the other hand, has been defined as “the socially approved ability to orient 
the behavior of others” (Fried, 1964, p. 181), and as the “right to take certain kinds of action, 
including decisions to issue commands appropriate to the circumstances” (Smith, 1968). 
Authority was seen by M. G. Smith (1968) as being the flower, if I may so put it, atop the stalk 
of power, although the flower is by no means ornamental:  
Although power may be latent and indirectly applied, it may gradually assume the 
character of authority if it is regularly effective. There are many historical cases of 
regimes based on conquest or usurpation that have later acquired authority 
through general acceptance. Power without authority remains uninstitutionalized, 
labile, and relative. (Smith, 1968) 
 
Therefore, Smith argues, the interplay between these two concepts and their combination in the 
regulation of public affairs together constitute the political organization of a given population. 
Accordingly, following Colson (1968), Smith (1968), and Kurtz (2001), I plan to investigate the 
political organization of Nardaran by the light of power and authority relations, which in other 
words means looking closely at the set of arrangements by which Nardarani regulate their 
common affairs. 
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Let us listen to Smith again: “Such regulation always integrates two modes of public 
action, the administrative, which consists in the authoritative conduct of public affairs, and the 
political, which consists in the exercise and competitions of power to influence or control the 
course of these affairs” (Smith, 1968, p.2). Given the de facto absence of governmental authority 
from the most prominent public-regulations domain in Nardaran, I have been that much more 
driven  to investigate its administrative conditions and decisionmaking mechanisms, those being 
virtually my only routes toward an understanding of the village’s political organization. To that 
end I do so, I looked at the state and local governmental structures, national services, and the role 
played in Nardaran by the mullahs and the Council of Elders.  
  
1. State & Local Government   
	
As Wistrand (2011) showed us, the state-level political organization in Azerbaijan is 
made up of villages, districts, and cities. In other words, a number of bordering villages together 
constitute the districts (rayonlar in Azerbaijani), with the boundaries of each one being 
determined by the government. These districts are officially dependent upon the cities of which 
they are part. Likewise, the villages and towns are dependent upon the districts they jointly 
constitute. In other words a number of neighboring villages constitute a district, and a number of 
districts constitute cities, and the cities all together constitute the country. It should also be noted 
that Azerbaijan is divided into ten financial regions, each made up of a number of cities.  
During the Soviet period, each village had a headman (governmental administrator) 
called a Kend Sovyeti in Azerbaijani. Each of them had a deputy and a typist in those days, my 
informant remembered. The Kend Sovyeti operated in Soviet times as what Americans might 
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consider county clerks.  Among the duties they performed were keeping the records of both 
births and deaths, issuing identifications for newborns, and keeping the village’s land records. 
They were also responsible for municipal issues; for example, they monitored the village’s 
infrastructural needs and reported on these to the regional administration. They also kept 
demographic records and acted as supervisors during the elections. Since the abovementioned 
regional organization was inherited from Soviet times, these local administrators were recruited 
by appointment and they were attached to the regional administration in the first place.  
In today’s Nardaran there is a village headman, called icra numayendesi in Azerbaijani, 
who is appointed by the regional administrators. In the same manner, both the regional centers 
and the cities have their own icra numayendesi (local administrators). Because Nardaran gained 
the status of municipality owing to its population size it has a mayor, who is currently serving his 
third term in office. It should be noted, however, there is no hierarchical relationship between the 
mayor and the icra numayendesi. As the mayor himself informed me, elections are held for only 
the following three positions in Azerbaijan: president, members of parliament, and mayor. All 
the other positions are filled via appointments made by those who hold superior ones.   
 
2. National Services in Nardaran  
 
Most of the national services in the rural communities of Azerbaijan seem to have been 
inherited from the Soviet times.  The abandoned rug factory of Nardaran stands as evidence in 
support of this argument. Likewise, the club (Kulup	Kulüp  in Azerbaijani), a combination of 
several recreational facilities such as movie theatre, library, and place to sit and enjoy coffee and 
play card games, is a Soviet legacy. (As noted earlier, the old club was demolished and a new 
one was under construction during my field research.) When I asked my informants about the 
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national services of Soviet times almost all of them remembered the club wistfully: “In those 
days everyone used to get together in the Club. It was a lively place. Some people were coming 
to watch the movie, while others were attending training courses and the like. People used to talk 
to each other and share their problems in the club” my informant told me with a sigh.  “But 
today,” he continued, “everyone, even the kids have cellphones and computers. Individualization 
is getting stronger in Nardaran as well as all over the world. But Nardaran, thanks to our 
preserved traditions and significant celebration days, is still a united community.”  
The presence of the Soviet administration of course was felt beyond just the club. The 
traditional Soviet practice of the collective farm existed as another fundamental national service 
in Nardaran. There was a headman for the Kolkhoze, a Russian term referring the collective farm, 
who organized the land distribution and decided which crops were to be cultivated. This 
Kolkhozes  headman (Kolkhoze Sedri in Azerbaijani) also collected the government’s share after 
allocating shares to the villagers.  After independence, however, thanks to the land reforms 
implemented by the Azeri government, the collective-farming tradition became a thing of the 
past.   
“In addition to the Kolkhozes headman, we had Militsiya, a Russian word meaning police, 
as other governmental people in our village,” my informant continued. They wore uniforms with 
guns on their belts and they had an office within the village. Depending on the size, there were 
only one or two militsiyas within the villages as primary responders to the criminal incidents.  
Yet in the case of larger incidents they usually called for assistance from the regional police 
force. During the bloody events of 2002, Nardarani clashed with the Azeri police for several 
months.  During the longlasting protests the Azeri government withdrew the small number of 
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police from Nardaran as a conciliatory gesture.  At the time of writing these lines, a police 
station was reestablished in Nardaran and the villagers had begun feeling a heavy police presence.  
Nardaran has primary and secondary schools plus kindergartens that they call bağçalar, 
the Azerbaijani word for garden. Schools are subordinate to the National Education Ministry of 
Azerbaijan, the latter creating a pool of teachers comprised of both Nardarani natives and some 
outsiders.  As the schools became the subject of one of the several protests, the secular 
characteristic of the nationwide formal education grabbed the attention of many in Nardaran. It 
was the ban on the hijab that rendered the case complicated and motivated most villagers to 
withdraw their daughters as soon as they had finished primary school.  I called the situation 
complicated, but its consequences are clear: because of the prohibition villagers are reluctant to 
send their girls to school and they are deprived of the formal education that would have provided 
them with the basics of nationhood and modernity. Thus the inevitable end-result is a group of 
undereducated teenagers who left vulnerable to reverse indoctrination and anti-government 
discourse.  
Finally, although the health services in Nardaran might appear to be no different than 
those in all of Azerbaijan’s rural communities, perhaps because of Nardaran’s population size 
and its proximity to the capital, they seem to be of higher quality. The walk-in clinic and the 
emergency clinic fulfill the basic health care needs of the villagers, but the maternity ward is not 





3. Council of Elders  
	
  In 2002 Nardaran became famous for its uprising against the Azeri government. The most 
significant characteristics of the events were the longlasting demonstrations and the admirable 
solidarity shown by the villagers. Graves were dug and Nardarani stayed outside, right next to 
those graves, for several months. By digging them the villagers collectively implied that they 
were already in the mood for death. Their seemingly inherent propensity for solidarity, which I 
speculate is largely derived from the previously noted strong kinship ties, reminded me of the 
work of Evans-Pritchard. In his work The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, Evans-Pritchard shows us that 
tribal divisions among the Sanusi did not keep them from banding together to ward off an outside 
threat. In this substantial 1945 study he depicts the structure of the Sanusi tribal system and 
emphasizes its segmentary lineage aspect. Kurtz (2001) defines the segmentary lineage system as 
a unilineal decent association. It falls into the category of those stateless political systems in 
which the political relations are regulated via kinship relationships. In such a system everyone 
can trace their descent through a line of ancestors. In the case of a conflict between individuals at 
the same social level, a higher-status member of the same lineage can resolves it. For example, 
conflicts between the children of two brothers can be resolved by the latter’s father, the 
children’s grandfather. Thus the structure of such a society functions as a conflict-resolution 
mechanism, maintaining order within the society.  
  Similarly, Nardaran has a lineage system and the elders act as mediators on many 
occasions, as in the context of conflicts between couples or kin members. Furthermore, the 
council of elders, a well-known Caucasus tradition, exists in the village and on many occasions 
does the necessary mediating and decision-making. In order to understand precisely what an 
“elder” means in the context of such a culture, let’s listen to what Garb (1996) has to say: 
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 The primary mediators of any conflict in the Caucasus (Abkhazians) has always 
been respected elders, usually males, and ordinarily those fifty and older. Age in 
that culture with an unusually high percentage of long-lived people is associated 
with wisdom (Benet, 1974; Garb, 1987). The formal mediation institutions are the 
council of elders that functions only when called on to settle a conflict. Any elders, 
however, may even be asked to mediate, even if they do not serve on a council. 
They may even be relatives of the conflicting parties, if the dispute is not major. 
(Garb, 1996, p. 35) 
 
  The council of elders in Nardaran consists of eight membersand a headman7. They get 
together either when some villager or villagers call upon them to do so or when an issue that 
interests the majority emerges. I asked the headman of the council, who became my informant, 
about the election process and the criteria for membership. Although his answers were not 
sufficiently revealing to allow me to develop a complete evaluation, I noted some prominent 
factors that were likely to contribute to his and the other members’ elections: gender, age, 
education level, oratory skills, and prosperity. This is not to say that a member has to possess the 
proper characteristics within all of those criteria, just most.  For example, my informant the 
headman was not very rich as compared to some other old men on the council but he was a 
strong orator, and he had studied law during the Soviet period. At any rate, he told me that the 
election of the council members occurs via the participation of almost all of the village’s males.  
No one runs for membership, but rather is nominated by a majority of the council. There is no 
regular voting process, so but verbal acceptance, or a mere absence of objection, is all that is 
required for the nominee to be nominated.  
  The council is involved in virtually all of the decision-making processes related to the 
common affairs of the village, whether that means the designs of the village squares, the content 




seek to foster collective actions likely to contribute to the unity of the community. For example, 
on one occasion the council decided that all of the village’s adult males would come together at 
the masjid of Djuma to join in the Djuma prayer and that the Friday sermon would be preached 
by a different mullah each week.  
  They also make their presence felt in times of conflict. This infuses the villagers with 
a strong expectation of an imminent resolution. The conflict in question is not necessarily an 
internal one, but may be one in which the villagers have confronted governmental forces such as 
the police. In the case of internal issues, the council is a gladly consented-to authority. Thanks to 
its members’ old ages, they are well aware of the deep-rooted traditions of the village and their 
decisions carry weight because they never run roughshod over them. Besides, since they can 
impose no tangible governmental sanctions such as imprisonments or fines, they usually act as 
peacemakers.  
  When it comes to external conflicts, the council can act in a more demanding manner 
and play the hard-nosed negotiator. During the 2002 clashes, for instance, the council was able to 
demand that the police release the detained villagers in exchange for termination of the street 
protests. They succeeded to some extent, for some of the detainees were in fact released. Thus, 
although their power to prevail over the governmental powers seems to be in inverse proportion 




  Besides its council of elders, Nardaran has its mullahs. As was stated earlier, Azerbaijan 
caught its neighbors’ eyes soon after the declaration of independence. Although the initial 
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attempts of penetration on the part of both Iran and Turkey seem to have been spontaneous on 
both sides, Iran was comparatively more successful at least in the very early years. In addition to 
sending missionaries to Azerbaijan, Iran made it possible for a considerable number of students 
from Azerbaijan to visit the city of Qom that is known as that nation’s center of religious 
education. Nardaran was the chief target of Iran owing to its noteworthy historical and religious 
background. The Iranians who came to Nardaran not only brought religious knowledge, for 
which the Azeri were eager after seventy years of atheist Soviet rule, but also the capital that 
financed the construction of both the theological school and the studies of some promising 
scholars. 
  The construction of the madrasah of Nardaran and its main mosque began 
spontaneously. While the curriculum of the madrasah was designed in an Iranian way and 
Persian was the language of instruction, many teenagers were taken to Qum with full fellowship 
awards. After two to three years, the first fruits of this endeavor were ripe. At a flashy hooding 
ceremony (emmame qoyma merasimi in Azerbijani) graduates of the theological school and of 
Qum were publicly praised and introduced as Savatlı Kishi (wise person) to the rest of the 
villagers. With the help of the Islamic institution of fatwa, an authoritative legal interpretation by 
a mufti or religious jurist, these wise persons of Nardaran began to gain the status of adjudicators 
and thereby either contributed to or individually embodied the decision-making process.  
  Thanks to the Iranian style of politicization of religion, the mullahs of Nardaran bring 
to their examination of any social or political issue a strict ideological, religiously shaped 
perspective. One takes it for granted that ideologies shape peoples’ points of views, and that it 
can be difficult to reshape them. Yet when an ideology is shaped by religious motivations, it can 
become a faith that leaves no space for a more flexibly liberal way of thinking. Thus in many 
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ways the mullahs create an intolerant atmosphere, as when the secular rulers of the state are 
identified as infidels. I think in this regard of how one of my informants began by praising the 
Turkish Prime Minister for his religious delicacy, yet, his praise turned into defamation as he 
remembered that the Turkish foreign policy on Syria was at odds with the Iranian interests there. 
Thus, his implicit accusation was the well-known one of cooperating with the infidels and 
especially with “the great Satan,” the United States. Odd as it may seem, the mullah’s habit of 
placing all issues within a religious framework, such as identifying the unwanted as infidels, 
seems to allow them to transcend even the most troubling of contradictions. Thus, what can be 
argued in the context of Nardaran is that the successful use of religion as an instrument paves the 
way for the desired ideology to become dominant.  
  Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that in today’s Nardaran, mullahs occupy one of 
the most significant positions in public life. The great advantage of being perceived as wise 
persons invests them with an authority that can hardly be challenged by the religiously 
uneducated villagers. Thus it is that that authority makes its presence felt not only in the private 
lives of the villagers but also in the common affairs of the village. As the effects upon private life 
will be discussed in Chapter 5, I will elaborate here a bit upon the latter impact.   
  It can be argued that the most prominent common affairs of the village are the 
following: religiously motivated celebrations and wedding ceremonies; administration of the Pir, 
the main mosque and shrine; administration and operation of other masjids (landscaping and the 
like). Mullahs are present in all such affairs, as decision-makers or at least as contributors. Their 
status is such that despite the traditional prerequisite of being old to become a member of the 
Council of Elders, one of the two leading mullahs, a man in his late thirties, is a member. Thus 
although there is no competition between them, the mullahs taken as a group, and as men who 
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take full advantage of the Islamic Fatwa mechanism, can easily be considered more powerful 
than the council.    
  As was indicated above, the mullahs monopolize the decisionmaking process vis-à-
vis religious celebrations (within that sphere the mullahs are the only masters of the events, 
dealing with every single detail) and the operation of the masjids. They certainly choose the 
contents of the sermons given in the latter. Likewise, religious education for the children is not 
dependent upon a fixed curriculum but rather is designed by the mullah of the associated masjid.  
  
5. A Further Distinction: The Outer Core 
	
It could be inferred from what has been said thus far that the mullahs and the Council of 
Elders together monopolize Nardaran’s leadership status and thereby its decision-making 
mechanism. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the political structure of Nardaran 
can be envisioned as being comprised strictly of “decisionmakers” and on the one hand the 
“obedient” on the other. A third realm, which I choose to call the outer core, is comprised of 
deputies of the inner-core members. These are the men who enforce and propagate, but do not 
make, the decisions.   
 To flesh out this distinction I will describe certain characteristics possessed by each of 
the three village groups. Regarding the inner core, clearly it is comprised of the prominent 
political figures, from Iranian-educated mullahs to members of the Council of Elders. Despite the 
superior status of the mullahs, the council members also are included in the decisionmaking 
processes. The superiority of the mullahs derives chiefly from the authority they wield via their 
entitlement, although unofficial, to issue fatwas. When a decision has to be made regarding the 
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needs or the rules of the mosque/shrine, the council gets together, but not without the presence of 
the mullah of the mosque/shrine, known as the akhund. As a matter of fact, one of the prominent 
mullahs is already a member of the council. Thus it seems to be impossible for the council to 
take any step that is not approved of by the mullahs of the village. Since the council members are 
elders, however, they are not completely dependent on the mullahs and they freely opine, 
especially upon the traditional aspects of the issue at hand.  
When it comes to the outer core, I must make it clear that my initial research-period 
drove me to formulate it as such. My guide chose the informants for me, sometimes by 
consulting one of the leading mullahs of the village, his goal being to provide me with some 
quintessential Nardarani models. My feeble attempts to make my own choices, almost at random, 
were essentially waved away by him with a scornful smile. As it turned out, almost all of the 
selected persons had either a close relationship with the religiously educated villagers, or was 
himself one of the latter. These are the villagers who are most deeply involved in the religious 
celebrations, organizing and participating in them and, just by being there, heightening their 
value in the eyes of their fellow Nardaranis. I also noted that my informants had close 
relationships with the Iranian-educated villagers, or were one such themselves. Finally, most of 
them possessed religious titles such as Karbala-i, Meshed-i, or Hajj-i.8 Or if they were still too 
young to hold those titles, they were the offspring of titled adults. As for the function of those in 
																																								 																					
8In Nardaran, most people have titles in front of their names such as Karbala-i, Mashad-i, or 
Hajj-i depending upon the holy places they have visited. If a person visited Karbala he/she is 
called Karbala-i Ali, for example. There is a hierarchy of importance of those places. If I need to 
put them in hierarchical order, Hajji (visiting the Kaaba in Mecca) is the most important. Then 
comes the Karbala-i (visitor to a city in Iraq in which the shrine of Imam Hussein is located) and 
then the Mashad-i (visitor to a city in Iran located on the Silk Road, in which the shrine of Imam 
Reza is located). 
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the outer core, it is to act as a bridge between the inner core and the periphery, propagating the 
ideas of the inner core and soothing dissentions between the two groups it mediates.  
Since the above analysis has sprung solely from direct and participant observations made 
by the researcher, and since there are no clearcut measurement available tools for such an 
analysis, it is difficult to provide exact figures for the population of the three units. Then too, a 
merely superficial consideration of such numbers might well be misleading, given that the social 
organization of the village is based upon close kinship relationships. That is to say, an outer-core 
individual usually is accompanied during events and gatherings by at least two to three adults 
from his close kin who are highly susceptible to his influence. Therefore, an average number of 
200, for each group, could be spoken of.  Another clarification seems to be necessary at this 
point that one should not consider the total population size of the village regarding this further 
distinction made on the core. Since the mayor of Nardaran reported the number of the 
households as nearly 1500, heads of those households should be regarded in this sense.   
 
6. Political Factions 
	
  It is a little difficult to construct a solid explanatory framework for the political factions 
in Nardaran. The initial sticking-point is the issue of whether there are political factions within 
the community. We also must remember that both outsider and insider opinions have been 
shaped by viewing things, ever since 2002, through the lens of conflict. At first glance, 
Nardarani comprise a single solitary unit, its cohesion attained via a unified show of 
disobedience to the government, or the “infidels” in the words of the village’s prominent figures. 
	 102	
Outsiders, however, view many Nardarani as being little more than Iran’s stooges, spying for 
them and the like.  
  Diversity is another subject related to this question, for it exists in Nardaran as in 
every other community. Thus I was always on the lookout for irregularities and inconsistencies 
within Nardaran, and almost to my surprise I was indeed able to uncover some rather startling 
features. As noted above, it is difficult to designate groups as pro-state or pro-Iranian. 
Nonetheless, being pro-Iranian appears to be the more pervasive allegiance, whereas no one 
could find groupings or individuals that could be deemed pro-state in Nardaran. Most probably, 
this is because many villagers suffered from the detentions and other consequences of the 
uprisings, such as a lack of gas and electricity services. Thus public criticism of the government 
became the fashion, even if the discourse did not reflect the actual thoughts of community 
members. In other words, it seems it was impossible for the villagers to adopt a peaceful rhetoric 
thanks to the social constraints prevalent in Nardaran. When, however, I began to commune with 
individuals I was able to penetrate into the protected fields and, I might say, gain a good grasp of 
unrevealed sentiments. This aspect will be discussed throughout the following section.  
 
c) Issues of Nationalism 
	
1. Theoretical Considerations 
	
Like the concept of ethnicity, that of nationalism is a relatively recent one to emerge 
within the scholarly debate on identity politics. Nonetheless, a large literature has sprung up 
around it. Ozkirimli (2000) recapitulates this literature in his work Theories of Nationalism. He 
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tells us there that the first theory is primordialism, “an umbrella term used to describe scholars 
who hold that nationality is a natural part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight, or smell, 
and that nations have existed since time immemorial” (Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 64). The second is 
modernism, which according to Smith (1994) asserts that both nations and nationalism appeared 
just within the last two centuries, “that is in the wake of the French Revolution, and they are the 
products of specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialism, the emergence of the 
bureaucratic state, urbanization and secularism” (Smith, 1994, p. 377; 1995, p. 29; cited in 
Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 85). The third and last theory is ethno-symbolism. This sees a people’s ethnic 
roots, and the attendant myths and memories, forming the basis of nationalism. According to 
Smith, this approach “enables us to understand the important role of memories, values, myths 
and symbols” (Smith, 1996, p. 302; cited from Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 169). 
The modernist and ethnic approaches, which constitute the largest part of Ozkirimli’s 
work, have been summarized by Çeliksu (2014).  According to this summary “it is possible to 
analyze the ‘thinking on nationalism’ under four categories in terms of their basis for 
explanation: (1) economical transformations, (2) social transformations, (3) political 
transformations and (4) ethnic transformations” (Celiksu, 2014, p. 25). Celiksu goes into greater 
detail thus: 
The first approach, economical transformations or political economy, comes from 
the Marxist tradition and explains the emergence of nations in terms of core-
periphery relations, uneven distribution and division of labor; in global (Nairn 
1997; Wallerstein 1991) or national (Hechter 1975) levels. The second approach, 
political transformations, comes from a more actor oriented approach in which 
nationalism is understood in terms of social engineering in the form of (a) 
invented traditions (Hobsbawm 1992); (b) elite constructs to maintain status quo 
and disguise inequalities (Brass 1985); (c) diffusion of enlightenment ideas 
through western hegemony (Kedourie 1970); (d) a form of politics used for 
maintaining legitimacy (Breuilly 1993). The third approach, social 
transformations, explains the emergence of nations and nationalism in terms of 
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the social transformations brought about by industrialism (Gellner 2006) or print 
capitalism (Anderson 1992). Finally, ethno-symbolism emphasizes the 
importance of pre-existing ethnic features such as myths, symbols, memories and 
values and argues that the emergence of nations can only be explained through 
pre-existing identities (Smith 2001). Armstrong complements this with a Barthian 
approach to regard ethnic and national identities as relational and only meaningful 
with the existence of some “significant other.” (Smith 1971). (Celiksu, 2014, p. 
26) 
 
Rather than regurgitating all of the mentioned approaches, I have elected to pick the most 
relevant concept after reviewing the accounts of Celiksu (2014) and Ozkirimli (2000). Of the 
three main theoretical accounts the ethno-symbolism approach, which does in fact inform my 
overall understanding of nationalism, seems best suited to the orientation of this study. This does 
not mean at all that I am against the other views; to the contrary, given my personal history I 
welcome any and all aids to solving the riddle of nationalism. As the son of an ultra-nationalist 
father, I was raised to believe in the intense value of Turkicness. Yet I was always puzzled when 
I failed to observe the same nationalistic sentiments emanating from my Turkish friends. I was 
unable to keep myself from asking the following question: “Since we are both Turks, why is 
Turkishness not as important to this guy as it is to me?” That unanswered question nagged at me 
until I became acquainted with the theories of nationalism and realized that the answer was clear: 
“because my friends were not as exposed to the nationalistic discourse as I was!” Or to put this 
matter in Benedict Anderson’s terms, their community was not as fully imagined as mine was. 
At any rate, I now have no trouble acknowledging the validity of social- and political-
transformation approaches as well as the economic one, which will be applied up ahead when we 
explore Iran as a nation-state.  
Returning to ethno-symbolism, what all the other accounts of nationalism fail to provide 
us is an explanation of all those pre-modern nations that have existed with their own languages 
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throughout the history. Ozkirimli (2000) pays tribute to the pathbreaking work of Armstrong 
(1982), Nations before Nationalism, which explores this issue of the pre-modern bases of 
nationalism. “For Armstrong,” Ozkirimli argues, “ethnic consciousness has a long history; it is 
possible to come across its traces in ancient civilizations, for example in Egypt and Mesopotamia” 
(Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 145). Turks, Arabs, Persians and the like can be counted as examples in that 
regard. Support for this argument can be drawn from the holy Qur’an itself, for in one of its 
almost 1400-year-old verses it says, “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male 
and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other” (Surah Al-
Hucurat, Verse 13). 
In what follows, Armstrong places the greatest emphasis on the concept of persistence 
which he bases on the social-interaction model of Fredrick Barth. Ozkirimli quotes Armstrong 
thus: “groups tend to define themselves not by reference to their own characteristics but by 
exclusion, that is, by comparison to strangers” (Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 146). The main argument 
here is the precedence of the boundary mechanism rather than the group characteristics. Since 
the boundaries of identities shift along with the perceptions of individual members of the group 
and thus have a subjective tinge, focusing on the boundary mechanism itself makes more sense 
(Ozkirimli, 2000).  This modus operandi, Ozkirimli states, has the following two advantages. 
First,  it leaves room for changes in the cultural and biological contents of the groups, as long as 
the boundary mechanisms are maintained. And second, it tells us that ethnic identity is not 
necessarily linked to particular territories. 
Armstrong’s main contribution, Ozkirimli asserts, lies in his prioritizing of attitudinal 
factors over material ones. Armstrong particularly refers to these three attitudinal factors: ways 
of life, religion, and language. We say “ways,” because there are two fundamentally different 
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ways of life, the nomadic and the sedentary. “These two ways of life are important in this context, 
because the myths and symbols they embody−expressed, notably, in nostalgia−create two sorts 
of identities based on incompatible principles” (Ozkirimli, 2000, p. 147). Thus, as Ozkirimli sees 
it, in Europe, where the sedentary way of life prevails, the territorial principle and the peculiar 
nostalgia it engenders became predominant, while in the Middle East the genealogical principle 
prevailed as a result of the nomadic way of life. The second and third factors of religion and 
language have served to reinforce this basic distinction, for the myths and symbols associated 
with them have done much to shape the formation of ethnic identities (Ozkirimli, 2000).  
Another contribution to our understanding of ethno-symbolism was made by Anthony D. 
Smith. According to Ozkirimli, Smith is a critic of modernism; he thinks that modernist theories 
provide a definition not of the nation per se but merely of a particular kind of nation: the modern 
one. What he thinks we need is an ideal definition of the nation. A nation therefore was defined 
by him as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all 
members” (Smith, 1991, p. 14). As is clear from that definition, Smith’s analysis has two chief 
factors: territoriality and ethnicity. He also, however, divides nationalism into two types: civic-
territorial and ethnic. The former conception of national identity, which he associates mostly 
with colonialism and the West, is described by Smith as having the following components: 
historic territory; legal-political community; legal-political equality of members; and common 
civic culture and ideology. The ethnic sort, on the other hand, is deemed non-western and is 
distinguished from the West by the emphasis it places on a community of birth, a native culture. 
In Smith’s words, “whereas the Western concept laid down that an individual had to belong to 
some nation but could choose to which he or she belonged, the non-Western or ethnic concept 
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allowed no such latitude” (Smith, 1991, p. 11). Making this non-Western ethnic conception the 
centerpiece of his approach, Smith lists six main attributes of ethnic communities: “a collective 
proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more 
differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific 'homeland,' a sense of 
solidarity for significant sectors of the population” (Smith, 1991, p. 21). Although as Smith 
handles these attributes one by one he makes an implicit case that ethnicity is anything but 
primordial, I am not convinced. Perhaps his failure in this regard was inevitable, for he was 
trying to prove the nonexistence of something, when it is a generally accepted fact that while 
ninety-nine pieces of evidence do not fully prove absence, a single piece of evidence proves 
existence. And the single evidence here could be the language factor. When we take that into 
consideration, it seems no easy feat to disregard the primordial roots of various ethnicities.   
When it comes to the application of ethno symbolism to Azerbaijan, in addition to the 
common proper name (Azeri), the linguistic aspect certainly competes for first place. The Azeri 
people, almost the entire population, speak Azerbaijani, a Turkic language, also spoken in some 
of modern Turkey’s eastern cities. Although the language has undergone many transformations 
from either the Persian or the Ottoman language, Azerbaijani clearly remains a Turkic language. 
Second, history informs us that the Turkic presence in the Caucasus dates back to 7th century, 
and that the region was ruled by several continuous Turkic dynasties. Thus the notion of a 
common ancestry has validity, in this country at least. Shared historical memories also pervade 
Azerbaijan. As Brubaker (1994) notes, even when the country was under Soviet rule the 
administration officially recognized Azeri identity by issuing identity cards having the 
nationality section filled out as “Azeri.” Thus it is entirely credible to assert that the Azeri nation 
existed long before its current incarnation as a nation-state. Among the shared historical 
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memories are the first independence movement from Tsarist Russia led by Mammad Amin 
Rasulzadeh, and the second from the Soviet Union. Taking the top spot, however, of 
Azerbaijani’s shared historical memories is the bloody war with Armenia and the subsequent 
Armenian occupation of Azeri lands. The territorial aspect indeed can only loom large, given 
how long the Azeri people have occupied the territory now known as Azerbaijan.  
2. Nationalism in Nardaran 
	
                                
Figure -4- Mubariz Ibrahimov, Martyr and the National Hero of Azerbaijan, 
(Located in Imam Ali Square, Nardaran, Azerbaijan.) 
The text reads: On 18th June, 2010 he was martyred after killing 140 Armenians during the 
battle of Terter. 
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In the previous sections, I tried to situate Nardaran’s place within the greater Azeri 
society in accordance with the theoretical framework I adopted. Although Nardaran’s current 
condition exhibits the characteristics of an ethnic group, I feel that examining the issue through 
the lens of nationalism will serve to support the study’s main arguments. It will be seen shortly, 
however, that the ethno-symbolism approach is the most suitable framework for an analysis of 
the greater Azeri society. To hark back to our previous discussion of ethnicity, it could be stated 
that people in Nardaran acknowledge, besides their distinct Nardarani identity, their Turkic 
heritage. Furthermore, since the village exhibits the characteristics of a huge family and has 
never, in living memory, had migrants from any other parts of Azerbaijan or neighboring 
countries, it seems fair to dub them “ethnically Azeri”. In one of my informants’ words, 
“Nardarani people are Turks in terms of race but they are Iranians when it comes to religion.”  
This statement was made by an individual whom I locate in the outer core.  In other words he has 
the characteristics of that group, such as possessing religious titles and playing an active role in 
propagating the inner core’s ideology. Therefore I deem his statement significant, providing us 
as it does with a glimpse of the nationalistic sentiments possessed by his fellow villagers. 
 We return here yet again, however, to my image of Nardaran as being caught on the 
horns of a dilemma. For while the ethno-symbolic approach to the greater Azeri society, with its 
emphasis on a common ancestry and language and shared historical memories, is valid for 
Nardaran as well, the intensification of the sectarian (religious) aspect seems to push us beyond 
the bounds of that approach. It can be said, in short, that Nardarani exhibit certain of the 
characteristics of an ethnic group and yet the nationalistic sentiments, of either Azeriness or of 
Turkicness, albeit weak, very much demand our attention. The nationalistic aspect, which will be 
delved into more deeply up ahead, either cannot be recognized at first glance or, when 
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recognized, strikes one as being secondary or even tertiary in Nardarani thinking. Appearances 
can be deceiving, however.   
 
a) Father of Selim & Personal Names in Nardaran 
	
Like the individual who gladly acknowledged his Turkic descent, another informant, who 
played a leading role during the birthday celebration of Hazret Abbas, opened up to me during 
the six-hour-long interview I conducted in his home. He not only had close relations with 
persons in the inner core, namely mullahs and members of the Council of Elders, but also was 
recommended by my key informant as someone embodying the appropriate characteristics of a 
Nardarani. Prior to our meeting, I had the opportunity to observe his role and the range of his 
activities during the celebration. He struck me as being both its organizer and its detail-oriented 
stage manager, right down to the illumination of the celebration area and the positions of the 
tables and chairs. Via his input, I began to draw up a genealogy chart at the beginning of the 
interview, at which time something came to me that is worth mentioning here. As Barnes (1967) 
puts it by quoting Rivers (1906), “long lists of distant ancestors are of little value for the 
investigation of social organization” (p. 116). Hence my determination to look at the present and 
recent generations when drawing up my genealogies. In this case I recognized in the three-
generation genealogical chart that my informant’s grandfather’s name was Selim, and that he 
gave this name to his son as well. This name is extremely important, especially if you encounter 
it within a Shia community, for I. Selim (Selim the First) was an Ottoman sultan who defeated 
Shah Ismail, the famous emperor of the Safavid dynasty and leader of the Kizilbash (Ottoman 
Turkish for Red Heads) forces in 1514. From that time on the name “Selim” has always had 
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negative connotations for Alawites, as they deem themselves descendants of Qizilbash, and for 
the Shia world. To give my reader a sense of the seriousness of the matter, I share a few facts 
about a recent dispute over the naming of the bridge that was being built over the Bosphorus 
strait at the time these lines were being written. In 2014, after the Turkish president declared that 
his government had decided to name the new bridge after Yavuz Sultan Selim, outcries emanated 
only from Alawite NGOs but also from the Iranian government. Thus, the fact of my 
encountering this name within an ultra-Shia community has considerable importance. When I 
expressed my interest a bit later in the interview, my informant’s response, which evaluates the 
struggle between the two emperors only served to intensify my surprise “I personally believe that 
Shah Ismail did wrong (sehvetmish) for he opted to exert his own power instead of directing it 
toward the unification of the Islamic world.” I found, and still find, it remarkable that he should 
hold that position when it is so contrary to the dominant view of the Shia world, which is always 
being imposed on the villagers either by the mullahs or through the Iranian media. This man told 
me about his own life history, in which a soccer game had a distinguished place. Perhaps because 
I had mentioned my own football background, he found me to be a kindred spirit, and felt less 
shy about opening up. He said this:  
I am not only an amateur goalkeeper but also, as one would expect, very keen on 
watching soccer games, especially the national ones. Wearing the Azeri national 
uniform and waving the Azeri flag are among my passions during the games. 
However, these kinds of things are seen as being worthless here in Nardaran. 
 
Although he struck me as being contented with his place in life, these statements were significant 
because they revealed his inner nationalistic feelings. He was right, by the way, about the 
common view in Nardaran about soccer and national soccer matches, the Mullahs consider all of 
that to be pointlessly time consuming.  
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 My informant went on to make the following illuminating remarks that revealed both his 
feeling and the dominant view in Nardaran: “Nardaran helped Abulfaz Elchibey and the Popular 
Front a lot. When Elchibey and his Popular Front escaped from Ayaz Mutallibov, they took 
refuge in Nardaran. I can even now show you those houses in which they stayed. In those days 
80 percent of Nardaran supported the Popular Front” 
 Since Abulfaz Elchibey, leader of the Azeri Nationalist Popular Front party and second 
president of Azerbaijan, is known for his pan-Turanian views, Nardarani pride in the help they 
rendered him is noteworthy. It was not long, however, before a dramatic change took place and 
nationalist sentiments were largely obfuscated in Nardaran. He said:  
Both during the Soviet rule and now, people do not want to send their children to 
do military service. Some people would even give a bribe for that. I don’t think 
the same way. On the contrary, I promised a prey to sacrifice on the day that my 
son will leave for military service. When you say “nation” in Nardaran people 
take it as meaning the government and that’s why patriotism is almost absent here. 
Yet, I love my country (the term ‘veten’ was used with reference to nation) a lot. 
 
Finally, I would like to extend a bit further this discussion of personal names. As Strauss (1966) 
revealed, personal names can be sociologically analyzed, as they may indicate a variety of 
statuses and/or affiliations in different communities or social settings. Garibova and Blair (1996) 
invoked DNA as a metaphor while designating the role played by personal names within social 
organisms. In their work, History in a Nutshell, in the course of which they expound upon the 
topic of personal names in Azerbaijan, they note “how a tiny strand of letters carries a large 
amount of vital information about a person’s social heredity” (p. 54). So too, they suggest, “from 
a single word, it is often possible to determine a person's gender, education level, social and 
economic status, language, religious preference, sense of aesthetics and values, political 
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inclinations, nationality, age (in terms of historic period), and sometimes even birth sequence” 
(Garibova and Blair, 1996, p. 54).  
 As noted earlier, given Azerbaijan’s historical status as a battleground shaped by the 
political struggles of three great empires, its naming-patterns tend to be permeable. More 
specifically the Persian influence, Russification, the Ottoman legacy, and Turkic origin all are 
fundamental determinants when it comes to the choosing of names in Azerbaijan. Russification 
aside, it could be argued that the personal naming patterns visible in Ottoman, Persian, Turkish, 
and Azerbaijani communities have a lot in common. It also is possible to find many Persian 
names in modern Turkey. Kartal (2008) posits that some of the sultans of the Anatolian Seljuk 
stateadopted the names of great Iranian Shahs, such as Keykhubat and Keyhosrav. 9 But while 
the language aspect, which was officially Persian in our example, can be seen as the primary 
determinant, the cultural influence cannot be dismissed. According to Kartal (2008), another 
reason was the dominance of Iranian culture around Malatya, the Anatolian city in which the 
Seljuk Sultans were educated before their reigns began. 
 Given all of the above, in the context of these suggestions it is not unexpected that the 
Nardarani would possess Persian names, yet it is precisely this point that I would like to 
elaborate upon. True, Nardarani have names that arguably are of Persian origin, but most of the 
names I encountered were Arabic ones such as Ali, Hussein and Fatimah. These names also are 
pervasive in Iran owing to its Shia faith. Original Persian names such as Aryan, Darius, and 
Cyrus cannot be found in Nardaran, and probably not in the whole country. Similarly, I drew 
three-generation genealogical charts for every informant and never encountered any instance of 
names indicating a modern Iranian influence, such as Khomeini and Khamenei. According to my 
																																								 																					
9A Turkic state that existed between 1077 and 1307 in Anatolia.  
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key informant these names are not preferred because, first, they are simply the names of places 
where supreme leaders are from, and second they are not names but rather surnames. He went on 
to make the interesting comment that there were some in Nardaran who wanted to give the name 
Khamenei to their sons, but who did not do so for some reason. My purpose here was to 
demonstrate the absence of any Iranian, or rather Persian, inclination in Nardaran when it came 
to the choice of personal names. I have shown that the most common names in Nardaran not only 
are Arabic in origin but are chosen out of religious concerns.  
 
 b) The Son of the Martyr 
	
When I was interviewing the mayor of Nardaran, who is the son of Ali Hasan Agayev 
(the “martyr” of the 2003 Nardaran uprisings), a similar evaluation was forthcoming: “It was 
chiefly Shah Ismail’s attitudes that caused the war between the two brotherly empires.” Such a 
view may have been shaped by the Ottoman legacy of Azerbaijan, for the people cherish their 
memory of Nuri Pasha, the Ottoman commander who came to Azerbaijan’s aid and planted the 
Ottoman flag on its soil after triumphing over the Tsarist Russian troops. But whatever reason 
may explain the above comment, it remains a source of wonder to me that such thoughts can 
arise in an ultra-Shia community such as Nardaran, as if in defiance of the view held by the 
greater Shia world.  
 At any rate, let me shift gears as it were by describing a few of the characteristics that 
arguably rendered the mayor a member of the outer core. First and foremost, and as briefly noted 
earlier, he was the son of Nardaran’s most legendary figure, and that fact alone ensured his 
access to the inner core. Let us attend to what he said next: 
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Starting with my grandfather, everyone in my family has been prayerful. My 
mother wears the hijab as does my fiancé. I spent six years of my childhood with 
my grandfather, and I was impressed by him in terms of worship. I started 
attending mosques in 1989. The masjid of Djuma was pretty close to our home. 
My first teacher was Mullah Abdul Hassan and the second was Axund Ali Nur. I 
was taught Islamic history and Islamic jurisprudence by them, and one of the 
sources was the book Islamic History written by Cafer Subhani, a Shia ayatollah. 
 
Those statements help us to see why the mayor possessed certain characteristics of the outer core. 
First, he lived within close range of one of the masjids. Second, he was educated by mullahs and 
intellectually fed by Iranian sources. Third, and mostly because of who his father was, he had 
close relations with other people who also could be counted as natural members of the outer core.  
Finally his wedding ceremony, in which I was honored to participate as a guest, was conducted 
in the form known as Darvesh Toyu (a religiously oriented wedding ceremony) the form 
preferred and encouraged by the inner core’s members. 
 90 percent of our population, I would say, has a pious way of life; they are 
sensitive to the distinction between the halal and the illicit. Sixty percent of this 
portion could be designated as radical or fanatic. Yet I am not. I think it is useless. 
I like to read a lot, and I became a member of the “World Literature History” 
reading club in Baku, allowing me to borrow five books a month. I think it is my 
inclination toward reading a variety of books that keeps me from radicalism. 
Although my father was shot during the Nardaran events in 2003, I love my veten 
(an emotionally charged version of homeland) even if it is ruled by an infidel. I do 
not like Persians; they are the same as Armenians for me. I do not approve of 
what they have been doing; they claim that they are an Islamic state on the one 
hand, yet they are supporting the infidel Armenia on the other. 
Present at the interview was another informant, and he was strongly against the ideas of the 
mayor. He revealed his dissident attitude toward the government by referring to the Nardaran 
events and the death of Agayev. Despite his provocative discourse, however, the mayor stuck 
with his own interpretation of the Nardaran events and the death of his father: “I don’t believe 
that any president or government would like to kill their own people. The events were too bad 
and I don’t even want to remember them, yet I don’t see the government officials as my enemies.”  
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 It must be remembered that most Iranian-educated Nardarani view the Azeri government 
as being corrupt and oppressive. So too, they try to justify the international policies of Iran and 
are aided in that regard by the Iranian media (TV channels and websites). All that emerges from 
the following extract of our dialogue. It began when I asked “Why does Iran publicly support 
Armenia, the enemy of Azerbaijan?”  
Informant: These are all about international and economic relations. You answer 
my question, why did the Turkish national team played a game with the 
Armenians? And why does Turkey has close relations with Israel, the biggest 
Satan? 
Me: Good point. Where do you get those kinds of ideas from?  
Informant: I usually watch discussion shows on TV 
Me: Which TV channel mostly? 
Informant: Sahar TV (Iranian TV channel which broadcasts in Azerbaijani) 
 
 It was clear then that Nardaranis are exposed to a great deal of indoctrination coming their way 
via either the Iranian media or its natural representatives, as it were, the Iranian-educated group. 
Agayev’s statements thus faithfully reflect the national sentiments that exist in Nardaran.  
   
c) The Tarzen (Tar Player) 
	
 Similar revelations emerged when I went to meet an old man who during the Soviet 
period, was a tarzen, a player of a traditional Turkic instrument. Our conversation somehow 
found its way to wedding ceremonies, of which there are two types in Nardaran: chalgili toy and 
darvesh toyu. The former is the traditional Azeri wedding ceremony, replete with Azeri dance 
and the appropriate music. The latter is a far more religiously inflected wedding ceremony with 
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no dancing but many religious hymns. Darvesh toyu is propagated and encouraged by the inner 
core to such an extent indeed that mullahs do not participate in chalgili toys even if they have 
been invited to do so. The tar player, a man in close contact with the mullahs and possessing the 
traits of the outer core, had this to say on the topic: “True, darvesh toyu is trending in Nardaran, 
but if I were to make a choice between the two I would definitely choose the Chalgili Toy. A 
wedding ceremony (toy) should be like a wedding ceremony, and a funeral should be like a 
funeral.” 
 I went on to ask about his traditional instrument, whether he still performs it, and if so 
how often. His response surprised me: “It has been long time, son. I am an old man now and it is 
considered a shameful thing to play this at my age.” Nonetheless, he did perform for us and I had 
the feeling, while he was passionately playing, that his “shameful thing” comment was a mere 
subterfuge. In fact, or so I felt and still feel, he plays less these days because of the social 
constraints that now have their grip on the village.  
 
d) Storytelling, Mugham, and the Group of Divine Tunes 
	
 Another aspect I investigated as part of my attempt to understand the conditions of 
nationalism in Nardaran was the stories that have long been told there. On one occasion, one of 
my informants wanted to illustrate his point by telling a story. That point was one of the distinct 
characteristics of Nardaran, the Mugham tradition. Mugham (or Muğam in Azerbaijani) is the 
traditional folk music of Azerbaijan. It is a highly complex genre that brings classical poetry and 
musical improvisation together in some specific local modes. The story he told was about one of 
Nardaran’s nationwide-famous Mugham performers. Inspired by this man’s example, I 
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proceeded to collect the stories that are prevalently told in Nardaran. I have decided that most of 
them fall quite neatly under one or the other of these two headings: Stories about the Mugham 
tradition and stories about exiled wise persons.  
 To begin with the latter, Nardaran once was home to Rahima Khanum, daughter of the 7th 
Imam Musa al-Kadhim, and after her passing several sheikhs or mullahs followed her path and 
thus were seen as wise persons in Nardaran. Their prominent role was to lead their community 
toward piety. During Soviet rule, however, and especially Joseph Stalin’s brutal reign, many of 
those sheikhs were either exiled or killed by the NKVD (Narodny kommissariat vnutrennykh del) 
or People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, an agency closely associated with the Soviet secret 
police and known for its political repression during the Satalin era. The picture seen below 
depicts Sheikh Əhməd Nаrdаrаni who in 1937was first detained and then killed by the NKVD. 10  
The stories about sheikhs invariably dwell upon their unparalleled piety and the resulting 
supernatural powers. 
                                                     
    Figure -5- Sheikh Əhməd Nаrdаrаni 
        Source: www.nardaranpiri.com 
 
																																								 																					
10 https://nardaranpiri.com 10.11.2015. 
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The former story category, however, is the bigger one and looms larger in the villagers’ eyes. 
Since the unique musical genre of Mugham is peculiar to Azerbaijan, stories about it struck me 
as being worthy of consideration in connection with my analysis of Azeri nationalism. One of 
my informants told the following story about Kerbelayı Mirzeaga (Kerbelayı Mirzeaga Haci 
Movlam Oglu Aliyev), who was born in 1864 in Nardaran. Mirzeaga, whose job was animal 
husbandry, was a Mugham master of nationwide fame (Söz ve Mugam Beşiyi Nardaran, Hacı 
Alemdar Mahir, Baku, 2009). 
 
The name of the person is Kerbelayi Mirzeaga. The story is as follow. One day, 
while Mirzaga was grazing his sheep, he heard that the famous Mugham 
performer Cabbar Qaryağdı Oglu  was singing a Mugham. Yet when he paid 
attention he noticed that the singer was making a mistake for he skipped a 
particular tune which was essential. Then, he sent a boy to the singer in order to 
warn him and had the boy say, “you ought not to skip the Segah tune at that 
particular point.” The message reached the singer but he did not know who the 
sender was. Fifteen years later, the same singer came to Nardaran and performed 
the same Mugham with the same mistake. This time Mirzeaga warned him 
personally and was asked whether it was he who had sent the same warning 
fifteen years ago. Mirzeaga said, “Yes it was I,” and the singer replied: “I was not 
taught that I should perform this piece in that way. I also asked the most famous 
performers, but they were unaware of it as well. Yet they told me that whoever 
had warned you about that had a deep knowledge about Mughams and that the 
Segah tune definitely fitted very well to this piece. 
 
Another account of storytelling in Nardaran comes to us from Elbrus Şahmar, a police colonel 
who worked in Nardaran for five years. In his 1995 book, Mehebbet Allah’ın Emanetidir 
(Fondness is a Relic from God), he devotes a chapter to this issue that is entitled “Nardaran ve 
Nardaranlılar” (“Nardaran and the Nardarani”) Şahmar (1995). In this chapter, written in the 
form of a memory, the author talks about the most prominent characteristics of Nardaran and its 
people. For instance he tells the following story, in which piety, bravery, and solidarity loom 
large: 
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One day, Axund Əbdüləli, his brother Əbdülməhəmməd and Kərbəlayi Nağdəli 
were going to Dərbənd to buy some corn. While they were taking a rest on their 
way, bandits appeared who began to shout at them. Having seen the bandits, 
Axund Əbdüləli carelessly replied, “we have money to give, we have fists to 
punch, and we have lives to give away, which one do you guys want?” When the 
leader of the bandits recognized Axund Əbdüləli, he got off his horse and offered 
an appology: “Nardarani are fearless!” This was told by Hacı Şamil, elder brother 
of Haci Hafiz, if I am not mistaken. After these words he told me the following 
story; in 1937, when three axunds [sheikhs] of our village,  Şeyx Rəsul, Şeyx 
Həsən ağa, and  Şeyx Əhməd,  were being detained, Kərbəlayi Baba Hacı İman 
oğlu, a Nardarani who felt humiliated, asked the Russian officers whether they 
were aware to whom they dared to do that. The officers threatened him by saying, 
“yes, we know, but what we don’t know is why you are so willing to be exiled as 
well?” İman oğlu’s response was brave and made the officers silent: “I put my 
head where those guys put their feet, it would be a great honor for me to die next 
to them.” 
 
It is clear from the story and the entire chapter that the Nardarani identity is perceived as 
being distinct. Yet based upon both my ethnographic research and the accounts written on 
Nardaran, I would argue that there has never been any other ethnicity than Azeriness. The 
nationalistic aspect of the stories persists nontheless. Here is another story, one that pertains to 
one of the most significant national figures of Azerbaijan:  
There is a great deal of respect in this village for Fuzuli11, the greatest Azeri poet 
whose life was full of sorrow. You will see his masterpiece Leyli and Mecnun 
next to the holy Qur’an in every household. Approximately in 1973, while I was 
chatting with Adil, the brother of Kəblə Əlisgəndər oğlu, in his home, I 
recognized Leyli and Majnun on the shelf. As soon as I attempted to take a look, 
Adil interrupted and advised me to wash my hands and say Salavat before 
touching the book. I did so, and he said, “now you can open it at whichever page 
you want.” As I read different passages from different pages, he concluded the 
passages even without looking at the book. I was surprised, and hoped to attain his 
own deep affection for Fuzuli. 
 
As for the group of divine tunes that is the essential element of the darvesh toyu, it was created 
by an old Mugham composer and performer (muğam ifaçısı) who lives in Nardaran. Although 
																																								 																					
11Fuzuli (Azerbaijani Fuzuli) was an Azeri Ottoman poet who lived between 1494 and 1556 
during the Ottoman era in Karbala, Iraq. He is considered one of the greatest contributors to the 
Divan tradition of Ottoman (and/or Azeri) literature.  
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these new songs are replete with religious themes, their form is vintage. The vast majority of the 
songs are in Azerbaijani, and when attending wedding ceremonies I never noted any hymns in 
Persian or in any other language such as Arabic. My informant, however, who was the founder 
of the Mugham group, stated that sometimes they sang in Arabic, and to a lesser extent in 
Persian as well.   
 
  3. Summary 
	
When we look at Nardaran through a diachronic lens, what can be seen is a sort of center 
that has long been infused with varying types and degrees of religiosity. Owing to the presence 
of the Rahima Khanum’s shrine, Nardaran has always attracted attention and has created men 
who have gained a strong reputation for sanctity. Indeed it was precisely this aura that paved the 
way to the village’s current situation, for the most powerful center of religious influence, Iran, 
picked Nardaran mostly because of its religious potential. Iranian clerics seemed to think that 
intensification would be easier in a place like Nardaran than in a more ordinary and secularized 
Azeri community.  
Moreover, when we look at the village as a research environment what we see is a 
relatively large village that has in fact actually became a municipality, a place having 
infrastructural issues and experiencing shortages of gas and electricity and a deficiency of 
modern means of household construction. The economic landscape exhibits similarly weak 
characteristics. Most of the villagers just barely eke out a subsistence-level existence.  
When it comes to the social structure, one is not surprised to come upon strong 
community ties. The marriage patterns in particular render the village a huge family. The too, the 
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poor conditions, both economic and infrastructural, seem to simply lead the villagers to rely upon 
each other that much more devotedly.  
Nardaran’s political organization, on the other hand, is shaped more by ideational than by 
tangible factors. In other words both the dominant, religiously educated group and the 
decisionmaking Council of Elders derive their power not so much from economic resources as 
from the authority and the social-constraint mechanisms they create and operate.  
As will be seen up ahead in the hegemony discussions, as result of Iranian efforts the 
village projects an anti-nationalist image at first glance. What I tried to do, however, back in the 
nationalism discussion was to reveal the hidden essence of the villagers. That is to say, although 
time has deposited many levels of ash atop them, the percipient observer can still descry the 
deep-seated national sentiments that lie beneath.  
It is true that the village is much like the other rural communities of the country, in terms 
of both social and political organization, but those properties can be seen as being both an 
advantage and a disadvantage for the village. On the one hand, its unique historical and religious 
background and idiosyncratic social structure seem to elicit the attempts at domination extended 
by the external hegemonic centers, but on the other hand its nationalistic sentiments and ethnic 
homogeneity serve to rebuff those attempts. In plain words, exercising hegemony in a 
community, which exhibits the feature of being a large family, would be easier. Consequently, as 
will be grasped from this study that the latter seem to be achieved by Iran. In a community such 
as Nardaran’s, comprised of members (especially the young) who lack educational opportunities 
but are always open to the allure of religiosity, Iran could not have chosen a better approach than 
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that of deploying the religiously educated Iranian mullahs, who now monopolize the power and 


















V.  IRANIAN HEGEMONIC INFLUENCES UPON NARDARAN 
 
	
            1. Growth of a radical Shia constituency 
	
If we may believe a study published by the Caucasus Research Resource Center in 2012, 
Azerbaijan is one of the most secular countries within the Islamic world. As noted earlier, the 
most prominent reason for that condition is, indisputably, the seventy-year-long atheist Soviet 
rule.  While not disputing that factor, the report suggests that most Azerbaijanis still lack 
knowledge of Islamic tenets and practices even two decades after the country gained its 
independence.  One of the most significant indicators of this is that although many accounts 
show the percentage of the Shia population of Azerbaijan to be 65 percent, the data shows that 
only 15 percent of the participants define themselves as Shia (see figure 1). Then too, a 
whopping 82 percent of the participants in the CRRC study did not specify any sectarian 
preference when they were asked about their religious adherence. I would contend, however that 
one fact, taken in isolation, is misleading since “Islam” is seen as an umbrella term and takes the 
pride of place in Muslim minds. Thus further probing questions would be needed to reveal 
people’s sectarian affiliations. The complexity of this issue becomes clear when we look at the 
constitutional name of Iran, the most prominent Shia nation on earth. Rather than emphasizing 
that sectarian point, Iran chose to prioritize the broader religious aspect and named itself the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. All of that having been said, however, I do believe that the CRRC data 
reflect a quite genuine Azeri non-prioritization of the sectarian aspect of religion.  
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Figure -8- Source: Caucasus	Research	Resource	Center 
	
All of the above data have their stories to tell, and I have no desire to silence them. I must, 
however, share with the reader a few of my own experiences while conducting research in 
Nardaran, for I believe they reveal it to be far more deeply infused with religion than the data 
allow us to believe. On the second day of my trip, when I went sightseeing in Nardaran, the 
landscape fascinated me. There were many outstanding elements that would easily hypnotize a 
novice anthropologist, such as the Pir, the huge mosque, that dominates the village, and its 
murals and wall paintings, which consist of the holy words and bloody pictures of Imam 
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Hussein12 as well as of his father.13 Women wearing the hijab14 were a rare sight in downtown 
Baku; on my first day in Nardaran, however, I saw almost no woman without it.  My friend and I 
wandered into the huge mosque. I was surprised that this mosque, unlike those in neighboring 
Turkey, has basements.15 Then we realized that there is a shrine beneath the mosque, and we 
were informed that the mosque was built over that shrine in 1994.  
 
Figures -9-10- Nardaran Pir. (The biggest Mosque of Nardaran) 
The silence became disturbing after a while, and at that moment we saw a man sitting next to the 
four-foot-high entrance door to the shrine, which you encounter after entering the mosque’s main 
entrance. A mosque over a shrine was a strange scene for me, even though I was familiar with 
the region. Of course we plopped ourselves down in front of the man and my friend engaged him 
in conversation. After the man had introduced himself, he immediately asked whether we were 
journalists: 
																																								 																					
12Imam Hussein is the most important figure in all of Shiism. Soldiers of the Umayyad-Dynasty 
caliph Yazd killed him at Karbala in 681 AD.   
13 His father is the fourth Caliph, Ali who was the groom of the Prophet Mohammed.  
14A religious head-and-body covering. 
15 The reason the mosque has a downstairs instead of an upstairs is that a shrine dedicated to the 
daughter of the seventh Imam Musa al-Kadhim lies right beneath it. The mosque was built over 
the shrine between 1994 and 2000 and it quickly became one of Nardan’s great landmarks. 
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Jurnalist zat dögulsuz? 
You are not journalists, are you? 
He asked this in a manner that clearly conveyed his unwillingness to talk to a journalist. Up to 
then I had been in a happy mood but that question suddenly made me feel uncomfortable. It 
brought many other questions and concerns crowding into my mind: Would the villagers talk to 
me, if this man did not want to talk to a journalist? Are they that much on their guard against 
outsiders? 
After we had assured the shrine caretaker that we were not journalists, he spoke quite 
freely about both the history of the shrine and its holiness and the importance of the Imams of the 
Shia tradition and their descendants. As I listened to him talk about the supernatural incidents 
that occurred in the shrine, ones that he had either witnessed or heard tales of from others, my 
pleasure rose. I refrained from saying anything about my future goals and myself, however, for 
his question was still echoing in my head: You are not journalists, are you? I was on a knife-edge, 
anxious not to let anything damage my project. Thus I simply listened and smiled until we left 
the shrine.  
While we were on our way to downtown Baku, I was still under the spell of the wall 
paintings and murals. Such highly decorated and monumental mosques are rarely seen in 
Azerbaijan, most probably because of the secular tendency of the current administration and the 
secular policies of Soviet rule. One cannot see religious murals and wall paintings in any other 
part of Baku, and perhaps not within the whole country including Nardaran’s neighboring 
villages of Mashtaga, Bilgah, and Mardakan. Thus, and speaking more as a tourist than as an 
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anthropological researcher, I believe one has the feeling of entering another world when one 
comes into the village from any of its neighboring villages.  
On our way to my rental apartment, we stopped by a mini food mart in Nardaran to buy 
some beverages. A notice on its entrance door read: “No alcoholic beverages, do not ask.” This 
caught my eye because I knew that the alcohol-consumption rate was very high in Azerbaijan, 
with the raising of glasses being a sort of tradition, even if one that began only with the advent of 
Soviet rule. I asked the cashier about the notice, and his response was significant. He told me that 
no store could sell alcohol in Nardaran. If someone were to attempt to do so, his store would 
surely be set on fire. That was the moment when I first realized that radical rules pervade village 
life. Other strict rules that everyone had to obey while in the village included having the proper 
attire when visiting the shrine. Short pants and so on would be sure to elicit a stern warning from 
an insider.  
Thus Nardaran has some quite distinctive characteristics, the sum of which projects a 
radical Shia image. Let me quickly recap the prominent points from the information provided 
above. First of all, Azerbaijan has a relatively small number of mosques in comparison to the 
other Muslim countries of the region, but unlike the rest of the country, only Nardaran has seven 
mosques within a considerably small territory. 16 Second, the mosque/shrine’s wall paintings and 
the murals render the village quite different and unique. Third, the women’s dress code can be 
																																								 																					
16An interview conducted by a reporter for the Turkish newspaper, Radikal, with Azerbaijan’s 
Minister of Religious Affairs, Elsad Iskenderov, on October 12th, 2012. Cited from 
www.radical.com.tr. According to the information presented by the minister, Azerbaijan had 
only 20 mosques right after independence; however, that number has skyrocketed so as to reach 
1500. On the other hand, according to the official numbers of the Religious Affairs Presidency, 
Turkey had an astonishing 82,693 mosques in 2011. Cited from www.diyanet.gov.tr. Even if we 
take into account the ratio of the populations, Azerbaijan has four times fewer mosques than does 
Turkey. 
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considered different as well. Fourth, unlike downtown Baku and the neighboring villages, the 
sale of alcoholic beverages is strictly forbidden within Nardaran. Fifth, unlike other places in 
Azerbaijan, the Nardarani mosques and their mullahs play a vital role in shaping the religious 
lives of the villagers. 
 
            2. Religious Intensification 
	
What I believe the five aforementioned factors tell us is that to an unusual extent, 
religious motivations are shaping Nardaran. Of course there are other Islamic communities, 
where one can see much the same process of religious intensification underway, as reflected in 
such things as the strict dress code for women and the ban on alcohol. In Nardaran, however, 
there are the abovementioned supplementary factors, such as the strict rituals of worship that the 
mosques impose and the unique environmental design. Those two represent and reflect the 
Iranian, radical-Shia presence in the village. The call to prayer and the prayer schedule, for 
instance, were implemented in Nardaran in precisely the Iranian way. There are three prayer calls 
and, accordingly three prayer times during the day, whereas prayer is performed five times a day 
in Sunni congregations. So too, and again in contradistinction to the other sects of Islam, during 
Shia prayer calls, very much including those that occur within Nardaran’s mosques, the mullah 
enunciates the name of the fourth Caliph, Ali. Furthermore, Nardarani worshippers use the 
möhür, circular stone that is made out of compressed soil from the holy city of Karbala and that 
is a prerequisite of prayer for Iranians as well. During their prayers the Shia perform Sajdah 
(prostration), placing their foreheads on the möhür. The use connotes the deep Shia respect for 
the martyr Imam Hussein, as he was killed in Karbala and his blood seeped down into that soil. 
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Yet another distinguishing Shia practice that shows itself in Nardaran is the rejection of binding 
hands while praying. In other words, Shia tradition does not require the binding of the hands 
while praying, and this custom is strictly implemented in Nardaran. 
Moving now from rituals to the second factor that renders Nardaran intensely Shia in its 
ambiance, its unique environmental design, we find that the pervasive emulation of the radical-
Shia style becomes much more concrete. Both bloody pictures of Imam Hussein and the radical 
rhetoric of Ayatollah Khomeini decorate the walls of the village. The words and images seen in 
Fig. provide the reader with just one example of this condition. One notes on the wall 
decorations, which will be handled shortly in a separate section, pervasively radical 
demonizations of “infidels” and “enemies.”  
 
 
Figure -11- a wall painting regarding ‘hijab’ from the city of Qum, IRAN 




Figure -12- almost the same wall painting in Nardaran 
 
      The text reads: Hijab is the most valuable ornament of women 
 
 
Additionally, one can observe the famous words of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian 
revolution, and of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current religious leader of Iran, on many walls of 
the village. Indeed, these two giants find places for themselves not only on the walls of the 
village but almost everywhere in Nardaran. I saw biographies of Khomeini, translated from Farsi 
into Azerbaijani, on the library shelves of the mosques. And I can hardly fail to mention the 
calendar (see Figure 18), designed by Nardarani and delivered all over the village, which is 




                        
      Figure -13- a book on Khomeini’s life on the shelves of a mosque library in Nardaran 
                        




By now, the reader is well aware that I have presented him or her with so many 
descriptions of Nardaran’s unique characteristics, the village’s pre-independence religious 
condition, and the general religious circumstances of the broader Azeri society in support of my 
contention that a heavy and rapid religious intensification has taken place in Nardaran within a 
remarkably compressed period of time. The village’s unique religious history made it a perfect 
target for Iranian missionaries, and it wasn’t long before a multifaceted endeavor of intensifying 
religious life was underway. Let us now flesh out the intensification by looking more closely at 
some of its concrete elements.  
 
a) Mosques and wall decorations 
	
As I have often been moved to note, the most remarkable building within the village is 
the Pir, the huge mosque built over the shrine of the Rahima Khanum, daughter of the seventh 
imam Musa ibn Ja'far (Al-Kazim).17 The term Pir, a Persian word, means “a spiritual leader.” 
The shrine has always been considered a holy place, a fact that has shed a special luster on 
Nardaran. Over the entrance door of the shrine stands the following Arabic inscription: “This 
building was ordered to be built by the most distinguished of all Hadjis, the unique of the era and 
the great leader Khaca Hadji Hamza ibni Qutlu Mahmud Şahabadi in 1363 [765 in Hijri 
																																								 																					
17The Shia believe in imams, consisting of Ali (cousin of Prophet Mohammad and husband of 
the Prophet's daughter Fatima) and a select number of his descendants. The number and identity 
of these imams varies from one Shia sect to another. Some of them believe in only 7 imams 
while others believe in 12. The largest Shia sect (known as the Twelvers) believes, of course, in 
12 Imams.  
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Calendar18].” Şahabadi held third place in the state hierarchy of the Sirvansah dynasty, a local 
ruling dynasty founded in 799 and dissolved in 1607. The construction of the mosque, which 
also functions as coverage to the shrine, began in 1994 and it took four years to finish the main 
construction. There was ongoing decoration work at the time of my research.  
 
 






Figure -16-The “Pir” (Main Mosque) of Nardaran 
 
Figure -17- Inside view of the Shrine “Pir” Figure -18- Closer View captured 
from a little window in front of which 
the visitors stand and pray. On the 
ground lay the gifts and alms donated 
by the visitors.  
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The shrine opens early in the morning and remains open until late at night. At the 
entrance of the compound there is a booth, usually occupied by a female worker who not only 
welcomes visiting women, but provides (free of charge, although tips are welcome) those who 
have come unprepared – with heads uncovered or inappropriate clothing such as stretch pants or 
spaghetti-strap tops − with long skirts and long-chador type body-covers. Standing at the 
entrance to the building there is always someone who maintains order and provides information 
when it is asked for. The floor is covered with traditional carpets, and the visitors are supposed to 
take off their shoes upon entry. One of the personnel then takes the shoes and places them in the 
wooden shoe rack. Once one has passed this primary entrance one comes upon another one that 
provides access to the tomb in which Rahima Khanum is buried.  
Inside the mosque vsitors usually perform ritual worship (salat in Arabic) and pray either 
on their knees or while leaning against the little window through which the tomb can be viewed. 
When these practices completed, perhaps after ten minutes, alms are usually placed on the floor. 
The objects of the prayers vary along with the needs or wishes of the worshippers. Some ask for 
God’s forgiveness by having the buried saint serve as a mediator. Others may ask for a cure for 
an illness or the courage to surmount the obstacle they see blocking the path ahead of them. 
Young ladies may pray for an appropriate spouse, childless ones for a baby. In addition to the 
silent incantations of these prayers and wishes, there is another ritual that takes place near 
another saint’s tomb, located within the same compound and right in front of the mosque. 
According to villagers the saint buried in this tomb, a descendant of the Prophet Mohammad, 
came to Nardaran along with Rahima Khanum centuries ago. The tombstone is V-shaped and 
hosts another oval-shaped smooth stone, capable of being placed within of a hand. In one of my 
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informant’s words, “this stone is a source of healing.” People believe that recovery follows when 
the problematic area is rubbed with that stone.     
The compound of the shrine comprises the village cemetery as well. There one finds 
hundreds of graves, the stones of which exhibit fundamental some differences depending upon 
their age. The old ones have ordinary stones and show only the deceased’s name and the birth 
and death dates, while the newer ones have either idealized depictions of the departed, a 
miniature mosque built over the grave, or a similarly idealized picture of Imam Ali, the fourth 
caliph. Curious as to the possible similarities and difference, I conducted a quick search on 
Iranian-style graveyards and gravestones. There, too, I encountered fancy gravestones bearing 
pictures of the dead. I cannot say I was surprised, for while the practice is said at least within the 
Sunni school, to have been discouraged by the Prophet Mohammad, building gorgeous graves 
for the holy imams and visiting them has always been a tradition likened to the pilgrimage to 
Mecca in the Shia world. My search had by no means proved, however, that this particular 
Nardaran tradition derives its spiritual (even more that geographical) proximity to Iran. Soon, 
however, I realized that this is a widespread Azerbaijani tradition, even practiced by the Sunnis 
of Azerbaijan. An informant made it clear that building glorious graves is seen as a means of 
gaining prestige within the society: “Building a good grave for your family members is a way in 
which you show people how caring you are. If you build a moderate one without a nice marble 
on it, people will bandy that about and talk about how uncaring you are. Building fancy graves is 
a widespread tradition all over Azerbaijan, if not in all post-Soviet countries.” 
In addition to the Pir, there are eight venerable mosques in Nardaran, six of which are 
still in use today. These masjids are all old one-story buildings constructed of stone blocks. 
Although their walls have a width of nearly three feet, which provides coolness in summer and 
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warmth in winter, almost all of them have electrical air conditioners. So too, all are furnished 
with traditional carpets, both hand and factory made. The washing facilities are located nearby 
but as separate rooms, and most of them quite uncared-for and dirty. A shocking sight for me 
was that of a gentleman stepping with bare feet into the toilet room, the floor of which was wet 
with a urine-water mixture and giving off an unbearable urine stench. He washed up and then 
came into the masjid for prayer. I was shocked because ablution, meaning both bodily and 
environmental cleaning, is a prerequisite for prayer in Islamic practice. I can speak here of 
“shock value” in a different sense, however, for that was one of the several moments when I 
realized the huge difference that the Shia school has in its religious perspectives, even as 
reflected in the most practical terms.  
All of the mosques are clustered in the center of the village, and this configuration played 
a part in inspiring my formulation of “core” and “periphery.” Besides the mosques, squares 
bearing the names of great imam and wall paintings also are all concentrated in the center of the 








Figure -20- Inside View of Hacı Qulaməli məscidi 
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Although it was closed by the government in 2001, right across from the Pir there is a 
Muslim theological school or madrasah. Located in the village’s second biggest building, the 
madrasah had been operated by Iranian mullahs for ten years until the government decided to 
clamp down on exogenous religious activities. It was the closure of the madrasah and the 
deportation of its managers that presumably made Nardaran famous in 2002, with the subsequent 
uprisings that resulted not only in several deaths but also in many injuries, as well as many 
incurable psychological wounds.    
When you first enter the village either from the northern neighboring village, Maştağa, or 
from the southeastern one, Bilgah, the wall paintings that welcome you are most remarkable. As 
you proceed you also see many murals and squares bearing the names of the most influential and 
revered Shia imams. Most of the wall paintings consist of the holy words of the great imams of 
the Shia tradition. The Azeri script is used in almost all cases, with just a few exceptions being 
written in Arabic. As stated earlier, the concentration of the murals and the graffiti appears to be 
around and between Imam Hussein Square, Imam Ali Square and the Pir.  
Counting both large and small items there are more than fifty graffiti artifacts and murals 
in Nardaran. And given their abovementioned concentrated condition, an intensive religious 
existence is felt as one walks along the street that connects Imam Hussein Street to the Pir. For 
research purposes I noted the most remarkable twenty such graffiti artifacts, and I believe that 
they can be sorted into the following five categories: expressions of affection for Ehl-i Beyt (the 
Prophet’s family); homilies on the importance of religious practices; condemnations of 
oppressiveness and tyranny; glorifications of modesty; and a few nationalistic effusions. Here are 
examples of the first four categories: 
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-The Prophet said, “My intercession will only be upon those who love my family 
members.” 
 -“Perform prayer even if you are the target of an arrow.” 
  - “If you support tyrants, the hellfire will surround you.” 
  - “Modesty is the endless fortune.” 
As for the expressions of national pride, one sometimes sees the Azeri flag on the walls of 
Nardaran, and there are stirring murals such as one that depicts Mubariz İbrahimov, the 
legendary soldier and national hero of Azerbaijan, who died in 2010 in a battle against Armenian 
soldiers.  
 
Figure -21- Imam Hussein Square 
The text reads:"Everyday is Ashura, everywhere is Karbala" 
(The famous words of Ayatollah Khomeini) 
“Ashura is the day when blood defeated the sword” 
“The wind sleeps so does the storm, but not the School of Hussein” 
“I inherited this honor and the spiritual escrow from Master Hussein” 
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Figure -22- Imam Ali Square 
 
Figure -23- a wall painting in Nardaran 
The text reads: Who loves our city, The God loves him in return (Words in green) 
O company of jinn and men, if ye have power to penetrate (all) regions of the heavens and the 
earth; then penetrate (them)! Ye will never penetrate them save with (Our) sanction. (Qor’an, 
Surah Al-Rahman, Verse 33). (Words in red) 
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b) Darvesh Toyu  
	
 Another aspect of Iranian influence in Nardaran, noted earlier in passing, is the 
establishment of a new style of wedding ceremony. It was a common observation of my 
informants that during the Soviet period and in the early years of independence, traditional Azeri 
music and dance were passionately performed in the village. Most of them also asserted, 
however, that in recent years Darvesh Toyu, which is known as the more surefire (or the only 
surefire) form of adhering to the religious rules, has become more common among the villagers. 
Darvesh is a Persian word that refers to “a humble” and “a poor ascetic” member of a religious 
sect.19 Thus these ceremonies are not supposed to be glorious and showy. Neither Chalgi, 
meaning instrumental music, nor dance are allowed in Darvesh Toyu. Instead, a religious group 
performs sacred songs and a mullah teaches a homily on the holiness of family values.  
 Darvesh wedding ceremonies are held either in the gardens of homes or in the village’s 
wedding hall. In both instances men and women sit separately, as expected. Depending on the 
families economic status, a few refreshments or a great feast are offered to the guests. During the 
research period I participated in several Darvesh wedding ceremonies in which the same amateur 
religious group, comprised entirely of locals, performed and several Iranian-educated mullahs 
preached. In fact, all of my Iranian-educated informants supported and encouraged Darvesh 
wedding ceremonies. Furthermore, when I asked them about the Chalgili Toy ceremonies, those 
featuring instrumental music and dance, they uniformly denigrated what until quite recently was 
the traditional Azeri wedding ceremony. At any rate, as of summer 2011 there were 33 Darvesh 
Toyu and 16 Chalgili Toy weddings in Nardaran, and the former have continued to grow and to 




 I believe Darvesh Toyu can be deemed one of the key elements facilitating our 
understanding of the concepts of identity and hegemony within the context of Nardaran. The 
popularity and newfound dominance of the Darvesh Toyu allow people to channel their sense of 
identity and belonging. One can hardly fail to see, however, that the Iranian educated elite, who 
are widely seen as being wise persons, promote and encourage Darvesh Toyu, and that it therby 
becomes prestigious in the eyes of the villagers. All of which brings Gramsci to mind, for he 
emphasizes the spontaneous consent given by the masses as a result of the prestige represented 
by the dominant group. In the Nardaran case, however, the elite’s perceived prestige certainly 
serves to further Iran’s slow extension of its hegemony over Nardaran.  
 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the mullahs prefer not to attend traditional Azeri 
wedding ceremonies, with their coolness to them implicitly saying that the appropriate type of 
wedding ceremony is the Darvesh Toyu. The chief offense of the traditional ceremony in their 
eyes lies (or so it might seem at first glance) in its traditional dance. As it is performed by 
women and men together, they rate it a transgression. I feel confident, however, in assenting that 
the mullahs’ rejection of Chalgili Toy in fact has deeper and more cultural, as opposed to strictly 
religious, roots than a mere uneasiness at the sight of women and men in mixed dances. If the 
latter were the real bone of contention, the mullahs could ban just that one aspect of Darvesh 
Toyu while allowing men to dance on their own while enjoying the traditional music–precisely 
what occurs in many religious communities in modern Turkey. In order to clarify my point here 
as to an attempted imposition of different cultural values, allow me to refer to a hadith (saying) 
of the Prophet Mohammed’s. After his wife had married a poor girl off, the Prophet Mohammed 
asked his whether the traditional music had been performed. He then said “I wish it was 
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performed because people of Medina like it and they are used to it.” 20 Many Islamic scholars, 
interpret this hadith as meaning that there are many legitimate ways of having fun, one of them 
being to enjoy the music and dancing at wedding ceremonies. And yet the Iranian-educated 
mullahs seem to be determined to root out the traditional Azeri wedding-style and replace it with 
Darvesh Toyu. At this point it should be noted that the above hadith is cited often by Sunni 
scholars who are not recognized by the Shia. However, given the fact that worldwide, an 
overwhelming majority of Muslims identify as Sunni, these highly reputable sayings of the 
Prophet are still rendered significant within the Islamic domain.  
 
c) Dress and Behavior 
	
As noted earlier, it can be argued that Nardaran, owing to its historic-religious 
background, has always accommodated a certain pious climate. Women, especially the middle-
aged and the elderly, wear a veil or at least they are familiar with it. We have seen how, during 
the Soviet period, however, and particularly in the couple of decades preceding independence, 
most Nardaran’s women did not wear headscarves. Indeed, many of its young women were even 
wearing mini-skirts. Thus, the oppressive Soviet policies stripped the significance away from not 
just the use of head covers but also many other religion-related practices.  
In stark contrast to all that, these days, as a result of the religious-intensification process, 
it is almost impossible to see a Nardaran woman walking in the village without a hijab on. In one 
of my informant’s words: “Women in Nardaran do not go out without a hijab, and they do not 
																																								 																					
20 This Hadith can be found in the following reputable Hadith sources: Ibn Ma'ce, Nikah 21; A. 
ibn Hanbel, IV/78. 
	 147	
even sit in the front seat of the cars.” After the onset of adolescence, young girls do not interact 
with males, not even those with whom they have kinship ties. For instance a young woman, 
either married or unmarried, cannot stop in front of a male cousin and talk to him, no matter what 
the topic of the conversation might have been. Likewise during the visits and weddings and other 
ceremonies, males can neither see nor contact females. The same unwritten code makes its 
presence felt even during a bus commute. If a male is sitting alone on one of the double seats, 
rather than offering the empty seat he will definitely stand up and leave both seats to a single 
Nardarani woman as she gets in.   
When it comes to wearing the hijab, the social pressure is so severe that non-resident 
Nardarani women feel obligated to wear at least head covers, if not a hijab, when they are on 
their way to the village. One of my informants made this point in an amusing way when he told 
me that the non-resident Nardarani women cover their heads inside the bus as soon as it enters 
Mashtaga, the neighboring village.  
Like all of Nardaran’s women, it’s leading men pay close attention to their style of dress. 
Mullahs almost always wear slacks and long-sleeved suit shirts, even in hot weather. Indeed, and 
as we will note again in the Identity section, most of the men are mindful of their dress. 
Especially in the case of gatherings and ceremonies, a young man will definitely change out of 
his blue jeans so as to ensure compliance with his social milieu.   
 
d) Temporary Marriage (Mut’a Nikahi or Sigheh) 
	
The primary purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the Azeri and the Iranian types 
of Shiism have drawn apart within Azerbaijan in the post-Soviet period. Based upon both the 
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literature review and my own more current ethnographic data, which includes observations I 
made outside of the target site of Nardaran, I can contend that Azerbaijan’s Shiism only looks 
like the Iranian version in some ritualistic ways while being very different. Temporary marriage, 
a topic to which I will return shortly, is a major modality of that difference. Before I elaborate on 
that concept, however, I would like to cite some possible reasons explaining the differences 
between the two types. Swietochowski (2002) offers us two interesting theories in this regard. 
First, according to him Azerbaijani people are ever mindful of the great repression, in terms of 
religion, that they believe they suffered under Soviet rule. He contends that as a result of this 
brutal, persistent and all-pervading campaign against Islam “the observance of the five Pillars of 
Islam, namely, the profession of faith, the pilgrimage to Mecca, the month of Ramadan fast, 
almsgiving, and the five daily prayers came into disuse, except for almsgiving” (Swietochowski, 
2002, p. 72). In his ensuing discussion of Islamic revival, Swietochowski talks about the 
disappearance of polygamy and implies that the void has been filled by the custom of temporary 
marriage, or sigheh. Second, he reminds us that Shia-majority Azerbaijan always had a relatively 
substantial Sunni-minority community, one that he believes has had a suppressive influence in 
different parts of the country, keeping the more extreme interpretations of Shiism from taking 
deep root here.  
Returning now to sigheh itself, the idea sounds like the legalization of prostitution, since 
there is no prerequisite or post-requisite for it, beyond that of the female’s being unmarried. The 
male can be married to another woman at the time and does not need to inform his legal wife of 
the sigheh he is planning to make. The marriage can be forged even for just several minutes and 
even if the man is ninetynine years of age. The Sunni tradition stipulates that a woman must have 
a waiting period after a divorce. When it comes to the sigheh, however, there is no waiting 
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period; that means a woman can get pregnant from a sigheh, enter into another sigheh or a 
permanent marriage right after the sigheh divorce and have her baby as if it were the latter 
husband’s, perhaps while never knowing the truth. When such a lax and amorphous condition 
becomes pervasive in a society then there comes the possibility of incestuous marriages, entered 
into unwittingly. It is for that very reason, to forestall incestuous relationships, that almost all of 
the monotheistic religions including Sunni Islam impose strictures upon marriage and the 
conditions of women after a divorce. Even ancient societies viewed incest as taboo and took 
steps to prevent its occurrence. Yet the Shia interpretation gives the man’s sexual needs priority, 
as opposed to the goal of keeping men and women from straying into incestuous relationships. 
Sciolino (2000), in her New York Times article “Temporary Marriage,” says something about the 
Iranian approach to religion and religious rules that is worth quoting: “Iran is a country where 
rules are fluid, where people of all classes and degrees of religiosity pride themselves on finding 
loopholes in the Islamic system. Temporary marriage, or sigheh, is one of the oddest and biggest” 
(Sciolino, 2000). 
In what follows, Sciolino makes some interesting points about how sigheh is presented 
and perceived as legal even as premarital sex is well wrapped within an Islamic cloak. She 
mentions some of the institution’s more unlikely supporters, such as the feminist editor of a 
magazine who, ironically enough in a country where women are forced to wear the hijab, 
believes that the relations between men and woman would become freer through the use of 
temporary marriages. She also cites, as examples pertaining to the possible legitimization of the 
phenomenon both the worldwide existence of illegal partnerships and prostitution and sigheh’s 
usefulness in sating the sexual needs of the pilgrims to Mecca.  
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From an Azeri point of view, on the other hand, sigheh is nothing but mullah-approved 
prostitution. This was the impression I obtained not only from my Azeri friends who are not 
from Nardaran, but from other cities of Azerbaijan such as Goranboy and Sheki, but also from 
people I got in touch with in Baku such as my landlord, my driver, and the waiter at the café I 
usually went to for meals. While I am aware that examining such a subject in a society where 
religious intuitions are unsettled and fragile could prove to be difficult and misleading, I still feel 
confident in asserting, based on both those personal contacts and the literature on the difference 
between the two types of Shiism, that temporary marriage is far less pervasive in Azerbaijan than 
it is in Iran. I also believe that the issue of virginity in its relation to the highly random 
characteristics of sigheh, is at the heart of this matter. Although virginity is one of the most 
important traditional prerequisites for regular marriages in both Azerbaijan and Iran, the Azeris 
strike me as being more repulsed by the temporary-marriage idea with its blatant disregard for 
virginity. I hypothesize that this repulsion’s roots go back to the Sunni Ottoman21 rule and that it 
continues to flower via the ongoing Sunni presence in Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, during my 
research-period I had the impression that when people were talking about what they actually felt 
about temporary marriage, they simply did not want to challenge what the Iran-originated 
mullahs preached to them on the issue. This reluctance to oppose a decree issued by the religious 
authorities became clear when one of my informants said this: “I do not approve sigheh as well. 
It is against my personality. Yet I cannot condemn anyone due to his preference of sigheh”. 
 Regardless of the reluctance of many villagers, however, temporary marriage is 
becoming more popular in Nardaran with each passing day. To say the least, children as young 
																																								 																					
21This hunch has been inspired by the work of Crone in her book The Nativist Prophets of Early 
Islamic Iran: Rural Revolt and Local Zoroastrianism (2014) she talks about the Ottoman 
opposition to Iran as stemming largely from the old Iranian tradition of polyandry (wife sharing). 	
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as ten get to know about temporary marriage as it flourishes in Nardaran. I thus see sigheh as 
constituting just one more proof of Iran’s imposition of its hegemony Nardaran.  
  
            3. Expansion of political power 
	
The Iranian hegemonic presence in Nardaran is not limited solely to the growth of a 
radical-Shia constituency and to religious intensification, but also manifests itself as an 
expansion of political power within Azerbaijan. The emergence of the Islamic Party of 
Azerbaijan (IPA) can be seen as one of the most significant developments in that regard. The 
IPA, has, as might be expected, been considered by the rulers a threat to their secular rule of the 
newly independent country. Consequently, as a result of several measures taken by the 
government, the IPA and Nardaran became foci of interest for Azerbaijani government security. 
As in the chicken-and-egg conundrum, the measures caused discontent and the events derived 
from the discontent prompted other measures, and so on. Only when the problem worsened and 
no compromise was in sight did the Nardarani adopt a rebellious manner, which which 
culminated in their taking control of the local government apparatus. What is more, the protests 
and uprisings that have cropped up in Nardaran over the last fourteen years, have allowed its 
denizens to leverage some, albeit weak, national political influence.  
 
a) The Islamic Party of Azerbaijan 
	
Wilhelmsen (2009) reminds us that the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA), which sees 
Islam as being the only basis for an Azeri state, emerged in Nardaran immediately after 
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independence. Heydar Aliyev, the nation’s second president, perceived the IPA as a threat and 
fought against it from the very beginning.  
The party lost its registration in 1995 and its leaders, including the chairman Haci 
Alikram Aliev, were arrested in 1996 amid charges of spying for Iran. In 
connection with the 2000 parliamentary elections practically the entire leadership 
of the party was arrested, and in the 2005 parliamentary elections several of the 
party’s candidates for parliament were accused of religious extremism and barred 
from running for office as alleged religious figures. (Wilhelmsen, 2009, p. 729)  
 
A person, who was one of the three founders of the IPA, became my informant, and he revealed 
the following during the interview: 
The national awareness movement emerged in Azerbaijan in 1985-86. I first 
joined the Azeri Popular Front, which was led by Abulfaz Elchibey at that time. 
My Islamic activities grew together with my political ones. In 1991, I was among 
the three who established the IPA. We left the Popular Front because of their 
over-inclination toward the West and Western values. Our flag has the color green 
which stands for our religion of Islam, and Islamic values are quite important for 
us. The Popular Front dissolved because it was unaware of this point.  In 1992 the 
IPA was able to register as a political party. I was issuing the newspapers called 
The Voice of Islam and The Islamic World at that time. In 1996 the leaders of the 
IPA were detained and I was sentenced to 10 years in prison. After spending three 
and a half years in prison I was freed, and carried on my duties at the party. In 
2001 we were detained for a second time, and I spent six months in prison. The 
new administrators also were detained and sentenced to about ten years in prison. 
Despite these kind of difficulties the party still exists, albeit illegally. 
 
Thus as we just heard him say, my informant, formerly a member of the Azeri National 
front, his and his colleagues’ split from the Popular Front was not because of nationalistic ideals, 
but rather the inclination of the Popular Front toward the West and Western values. Indeed, his 
stance reflected a strong opposition to the idea of nationalism. I found this dramatic ideological 
change to be interesting, though it did not further the discussion. Yet throughout my research 
period, I realized that there were some contradictions in his statements and ideas. The first point I 
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wish to make in this regard I will frame as a question: Is it impossible to combine nationalism 
with religious values? If my informant’s split occurred merely because of the Popular Front’s 
western inclination, I thought, he could have treasured some national sentiments and have 
combined them with religious values. He could have done so because nationalism was not 
strange to him; to the contrary, he had a nationalistic background. Nonetheless, he adopted a 
strongly dissident stance against the nationalism. Second, the Azeri Popular Front was not 
dissolved but was overthrown by Aliyev in the form of a coup d’etat, and Aliyev also adopted 
and encouraged a secular style of administration but faced no major public opposition in that 
regard.  Third, when I asked my informant about the Iranian impact upon his village’s religious 
domain, he tried to obscure the financial support provided by Iran for the construction of 
Nardaran’s madrasah. Two other informants openly spoke about Iran’s financial contribution:    
I personally don’t believe the sincerity of the Islamic Party because while I was 
suffering from poverty, its members were enjoying luxury cars. Besides, they 
were recording the Nardaran Ashura meetings and presenting those to Iran in 
exchange for monetary benefits. Moreover, I heard that Iran has been sending 
money, by means of the IPA, to the families of our martyrs who were killed 
during the Nardaran uprisings, yet none of them has received the money until now.  
 
 A similar statement was made by another informant, whom I also situate within the outer 
core: “I never participated in the elections and never voted for the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan.”   
 Wilhelmsen (2009) posits that the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, which claims to have 
10,000 members, is not a significant political force within the nation and its rather extreme anti-
Turkic, anti-Semitic, and anti-American doctrines, propagated in a “crackpot tone,” have not 
been well received by Azerbaijanis. And while the party does have a strong standing in Nardaran, 
its internal opposing voices can be considered significant as well. Looking at the example of 
Turkey, which has its own ethnic political movement on its hands, namely the Kurdish one, may 
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also help us to understand the IPA and its movement. The regime has officially confessed that 
the Turkish state adopted a repressive policy against its Kurdish citizens and Kurdish movements 
and it certainly is true that several Kurdish political parties have in the recent past been banned 
from elections by the supreme court of Turkey. Furthermore, many prominent Kurdish 
politicians have been either banned or detained on the ground that they propagated the Kurdish 
terrorist organization, the PKK. Nevertheless, after each repressive measure the Kurdish 
independence movement has not lost but rather gained in power and momentum.  
A reverse dynamic obtains, in relation to state repression, for the Islamic Party of 
Azerbaijan. As noted above, it has been banned from elections and its administrative staff has 
been detained several times. But the party has seemed to lose its power and efficiency each time. 
It could be argued, in accordance with the theoretical framework suggested by Anthony Smith, 
that one of the main factors, preventing the IPA from progressing is its extreme anti-Turkic 
doctrine. One thinks, when it comes to the main determinants possibly lessening Azerbaijani’s 
political decomposition and preventing the IPA from strengthening, of Smith’s (1991) repertoire 
of ethno-symbolic elements: the collective proper name; the myth of a common ancestry; shared 
historical memories; one or more differentiating elements of a common culture; an association 
with a specific “homeland;” and a sense of solidarity among significant sectors of the population. 
The Smith (1991) stance gains support from the following statement, in which Wilhelmsen 
speaks of the IPA’s exploitation of religiosity. “Nevertheless, the party has a strong standing in 
Nardaran, and its very existence shows that popular Shi’a religiousness could develop into a 
political force if religious entrepreneurs manage to exploit it more effectively” (Wilhelmsen, 
2009, p. 729). 
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b) Control of local government apparatus 
	
In 2002, when the success of the aforementioned exploitation peaked, the events that 
placed the village on the world’s agenda commenced. To avoid repetition I do not go into the 
details of the incidents, but rather deal with their consequences. Since the events can be counted 
as being among the first protests staged against the government of Azerbaijan, it can be argued 
that the government was caught unprepared and unaware. Given both the greenness of the 
government and the fact that the events lasted for a long time and had such serious outcomes as 
deaths on both sides, one can understand why the administrators had so much difficulty dealing 
with the problem and preferred to step back and negotiate. Among the concessions made at the 
time was the permanent withdrawal of the police force from Nardaran. From that time on, 
namely between 2002 and 2016, the village had no police station or liaison office in Nardaran. 
During my research period, the villagers were on their own, in terms of maintaining order and 
imposing sanctions. For instance, on the last day of my short-term research visit, four British 
anthropologists came to Nardaran apparently just for sightseeing purposes. Owing, however, to 
their inappropriate attire, villagers ordered them to leave the village immediately. In the absence 
of an official authority in the village, the mullahs and their close circle came to constitute the 
only such authority.  
Similarly, the organization and operation of the shrine are beyond the state’s jurisdiction 
as far as registration processes and regulations go. The alms donated to the shrine are not 
officially registered, for instance. Mosques and other places of worship must be registered with 
the Administration of Religious Affairs, yet neither the Pirr, nor the combined mosque/shrine nor 
other masjids in Nardaran have been registered with the administration. Rather, they are operated 
by the mullahs along with some other leading figures selected by the Council of Elders.  
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c) Political influence at the national level 
	
Besides filling the news headlines in times of unrest, Nardaran has also had several other 
nationwide impacts.  Before I handle those, however, I first would like to touch the media aspect. 
The village has the opportunity to partake of not only the national TV channels but also in 
international ones. Sahar TV, an Iranian channel that broadcasts in Azerbaijani, seemed to be the 
most prominent one in terms of covering the uprisings and discontent that shook Nardaran. One 
of its correspondents promptly appears on the scene and conducts in-person interviews with the 
villagers every time unrest occurs in Nardaran. The channel is highly interested in the village, 
and it followed even the minor political developments that were taking place at the time of my 
research. One such instance occurred in the summer of 2012 when local government officials 
made a visit to Nardaran. These men demanded that the villagers send their kids to school so that 
they would gain a formal education. This affair made it onto Sahar TV on the evening of the very 
same day, in a manner that criticized the ban on the wearing of the hijab in Azerbaijan’s 
secondary schools.  
As for other modalities through which Nardaran purveys its message, the most significant 
ones seem to be the Ashura mourning ceremonies and the anniversary of the death of Imam 
Hussein. Since the Rahima Khanum Shrine is respected as one of the most important holy places 
in the nation, tens of thousands of Azeri gather each year in Nardaran. Thus there are 
innumerable interactions between the villagers and the visitors during the several long days of 
mourning. Expectedly, the mullahs and other Iranian-educated Nardaranis take the lead during 
these ceremonies. They begin the preparations days before the Ashura begins in order to ensure 
that the event goes off as planned and that all the visitors are satisfied. Indeed, the outsiders 
respect the piety of Nardaran as long as they are not forced to remember its rising tide of 
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radicalism under the guiding hand of Iranian advocacy. On many occasions, I saw visitors 
listening to the preachers in a highly respectful manner. The alms donated by the visitors can be 
seen as another proof of this respect. I doubt that the donors even care much about where their 
money is headed. I freely admit, however, that outsiders’ perceptions are in a state of flux. The 
political rhetoric adopted by the leading figures of the village may not sit well with those whose 
ears are attuned to the rhetoric employed by those who are intent upon pure religion and faith. 
Likewise the media outlets, all of them notably government-influenced, very likely raise question 
marks in the minds of most Azeris, given their consistent Iranian inclination. In accordance with 
the rhetoric adopted by the Iranian administration, Nardarani mullahs stand against western 
values regardless of the utilitarian aspect of these. For instance, they frequently condemn mobile 
phones and social media as being innovations of the infidels, and an emphasis is usually placed 
on their harmful impact upon moral values, even as few, including the mullahs themselves, 
eschew their use. Little wonder then, that this rhetoric helps to shape Nardaran’s image, within 
the secular and western-oriented Azerbaijani minds, as puritanical and underdeveloped. Such 
was the sense I gained through my informal talks with police officers, taxi drivers, and restaurant 
workers in downtown Baku during my field research.  
What is to be deduced from my presentation of the above factors? Perhaps all too little, 
given that Nardaran’s message for Azerbaijan and for the world often seems to be a strictly 
limited one. At the very least, however, Nardaranis are, via the political rhetoric that is fueled by 
Iranian or Iranian-directed media outlets, raising some valuable question marks in many minds as 
to freedom of religion and the various restrictions imposed by the government. The question 
marks could be considered as enduring, reinforced as they have been by the governmental steps 
taken against the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan. In the final analysis there can be no doubt that the 
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village’s inclination toward Iran is just strengthening the government’s hand, legitimizing the 
measures it takes.  
 
            4. Development of Economic Resources 
	
The Iranian penetration, which began soon after Azerbaijan gained its independence, has 
been sophisticated and multi-pronged. In other words, the peaceful mechanisms recruited by this 
Middle Eastern power center have not been limited to the ideological and informational 
apparatuses of the religious domain but also have comprised several concrete elements. Beyond 
economically supporting the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, Iranian mullahs also are fostering the 
physical reorganization of Nardaran as seen in the construction of the Madrasah and the mosque 
over the shrine. Some of my informants denied that the monetary support for the construction of 
these two remarkable buildings has come from the Iranians, while a few of them attested to this 
as a fact. Those who denied it emphasized Nardarani generosity and the alms donated by outsider 
Azeris. I believe they were also probably vaunting their village’s self-sufficiency by adopting the 
view that they need no help from any external source. Their stance is understandable when one 
takes into consideration the current political climate, (the feeling of isolation that hangs over the 






a) Religious Tourism 
	
Iran’s outreach efforts, shall we ironically say, may or may not have been deliberate at 
the outset. Regardless of their nature, however, the relationships that began in the one field, 
religion, have triggered several other types of relationships between Nardaran and Iran. Religious 
tourism, both domestic and abroad, looms large in this regard. The holy cities of Iran have 
ignited the interest of Nardarani, and mass pilgrimages have begun to be organized to such cities 
as Qom and Mashhad. One of the villagers, having gained the advantage of entry without 
obtaining a visa, embarked upon the task of organizing these trips to Iran. They tend to take 
place once a month and are on a first-come first-served basis. The average number of pilgrims 
varies between thirtyfive and fourtyfive. My informant, the organizer, obtained a fixed price of 
$3000 for each bus, and thus the individual shares depend upon the total number of passengers. 
“That amount is not the net profit though”, he insisted. “I have to pay nearly $200 at the customs 
office, $300 for insurance, $1200 for the fuel and other maintenance requirements. The 
remainder, which usually is $1300, goes into my pocket.”  
A typical trip to Iran lasts for a week or so. The first destination is the city of Qom, where 
the villagers visit the shrine of Hz. Masomah, daughter of the Imam Reza and sister of Imam 
Musa al-Kadhim. Then it is on to Masjid of Camkeran, known as the masjid of Imam Mahdi, the 
twelfth imam. Since the distance between Baku and Qom is great, the villagers remain in Qom 
for the night. The next day they set out for the city of Mashhad. Visiting Mashhad is the most 
significant part of the trip owing to the presence there of the tomb and shrine of Imam Reza, the 
8th imam. The pilgrims who have visited the city are termed Mashhadi from that time on. Of 
course the trip does not consist solely of the three noted destinations. The visitors also have the 
opportunity to enjoy the Museum of the Qur’an and several others, and to sample Iranian foods, 
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desserts, and beverages. Nor should we discount the elevating tone of the pilgrimage. As my 
tour-organizing informant stated: “During the visits of shrines and masjids, the villagers mostly 
pray and think about the otherworldly things.”  
 As for domestic tourism, Nardaran became more attractive after the construction of the 
great mosque over the Rahima Khanum Shrine. The mosque is among the most remarkable 
buildings of Baku. Like the Khanum Masomah Shrine of Qom, Rahima Khanum Shrine is one of 
the most respected holy places, which are considered as pilgrimage destinations, within the 
country. Accordingly, Nardaran now receives a considerable number of visitors, seven days a 
week, from all over the country. Most of them are “day trippers” but some spend the night as 
well.   
 
b) Mosque and mullah fees 
	
Perhaps the most unexpected fact about the shrine is the custom there of Nazir or alms 
given to the shrine. According to its president of the shrine the busiest day is Sunday, when 
nearly 800 people visit. On other days the number is approximately 200. Almost every visitor 
gives nezir in an amount varying from 1 manat ($1.50) to 100 Manat ($150) − or sometimes even 
more, if the visitor is both pious and wealthy. Thus a simple calculation allows us to say that the 
shrine brings in around 15,000 manat ($20,000) per month. And that figure goes way up when 
we take into consideration the greatest celebration day (Ashura), on which tens of thousands 
flock to the shrine. Its president is responsible for the moneys use, some of it being allocated to 
the personnel of 40 persons, most of whom receive 100 manat per month. The remaining money 
generally is used for educational purposes or to help the poor. It should be noted here that in 
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addition to the monetary donations, visitors also may donate sacrificial sheep and other such 
goods as carpets and clothing. The president of the shrine, who became my informant, told me 
how he and his personnel use the donations: 
We distribute the clothing and the items that can be used in households to the 
poor.  Carpets, for instance, usually go to the newly married couples that cannot 
afford to buy everything for their households. It’s the same thing for the meat as 
well. There are many unemployed people who cannot afford to buy meat in this 
village. So, we generally distribute the meat to them but sometimes we cook it for 
our staff and temporary workers as well. 
 
Although the shrine complex was largely completed, minor construction work was still going on. 
The architecture and the environmental design looked so nice that it gave me the feeling of 
entering a different world, especially after I had passed through the village’s dirty roads. The 
huge compound was bedecked with marble stones that looked quite expensive, and one cannot 
help but be impressed by the huge memorial to Imam Hussein, in which his name is written in 
Arabic and which is covered with real roses. One must realize that all such expenditures were 
made via the income of the donated alms. Furthermore, since the akhund (mullah) of the mosque 
was not registered with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, he too was being paid through the 
informal administration of the shrine. Although I was not able to learn the actual figure he would 
be paid a considerable amount, since he represents the holy place.   
 In addition to the mullah fees, prizes for religious-education competitions also emanate 
from the shrine administration. We have seen that the latter is able to send the village’s 
successful pupils on trips every six months. Although this topic is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter, touching upon it here may help us to understand the development of the village’s 
economic resources and the Iranian hegemonic presence in Nardaran.   
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c) Commerce and Tourism  
	
As was briefly stated earlier, the shrine recruits guards and staff to provide information 
and services to tourists. The guidance begins at the compound gate where head and body covers 
are provided, especially for female visitors. Then at the entrance to the building several 
personnel provide information and maintain order.  Finally, the tomb is always under the 
supervision of on-duty staff. The attendants of this area are selected from a pool of individuals 
who have both religious and historical expertise. Most frequently, visitors find an attendant in 
front of the tomb reading the Qur’an. Accordingly, they sometimes ask the attendant to read a 
certain section on their behalf and pay him to do so.  
 The shops must definitely be mentioned in connection with the development of village’s 
economy. Although there are only a few within the village, three do seem to cater to the tourism 
trade. One, adjacent to the main gate, looks like a mini food mart but sells souvenirs as well, 
from prayer rugs to towels to ornamental rugs bearing the image of Imam Ali.  Another shop had 
been established nine months prior to my initial research period by the same man who organizes 
the trips to Iran. This second shop also is focused on tourism and is located near the shrine 
complex. My informant, owner of this small, 100-square feet shop whose monthly rental was 70 
manats (around $100) employed a female shopkeeper whom he was paying 150 manats (around 
$250) monthly. She informed me that monthly sales averaged around 1500 manats ($2500). A 
third shop, also well within range of the shrine and operated by female shopkeepers, seems to 
satisfy the needs of both villagers and tourists. I may perhaps note parenthetically that Nardarani 
shop-owners seem to have discovered women’s fondness for shopping, as they prefer female 
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shopkeepers. Joking aside, most of the ornaments, souvenirs, and clothing offered by the shops 
do in fact appeal more to the women than to the men who drop in.  
Given that Nardaran has a considerable potential for domestic tourism, it can be said that 
there is a concomitantly greater need for additional shops and more professional guidance for the 
visitors. Sanitation, for instance, appears to be a fundamental concern, given the extraordinary 
number of visitors. Perhaps in the near future, if the government achieves its desired supremacy 
over Nardaran, we will see local venture capitalists making their bets on the village’s potential 
growth.  
 
  5. The Nardaran Identity 
	
a) Theoretical Considerations 
	
The concept of “identity” has been one of the most substantial points of interest 
throughout the history of anthropological studies. Indeed an immense literature, rife not just with 
agreements but also with dichotomies, divergences, and debates, has grown up around it. In the 
early days the scholars adopted two basic theoretical approaches, the essentialist or primordialist 
and the constructivist (Holland et al. 1998, Laitin 1998).  The essentialist theory, basically a 
Freudian point of view, sees identity or the drive toward its formation as being an essential force 
inside of a person. Constructivist theory, on the other hand, “emphasizes the social positioning 
that goes on whenever people interact” (Holland et al., 1998, p. 11). The essentialist camp, 
according to Holland et al., can itself be divided into the culturalist and the universalist 
categories, with the culturalists seeing cultural identities as being inflexible and almost fixed. 
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Putting that aspect aside, I wish to point out that although the essentialists may seem to be 
suggesting that identity is completely inherent, what they really believe is that the “self” is fixed 
at an early age. Thus the essential self is not purely essential in the sense of its being given at 
birth but rather it is constructed, constructed in the early stages of a person’s life. Thus it has 
been suggested that both of these theoretical approaches, namely the essentialist and the 
culturalist, overlap at some points and can be conceptualized as unwitting allies (Holland et al., 
1998).  
The following researchers, in their book, Identity and Agency in Cultural Worlds which 
explores the concepts of “self” and “identity,” have and provided us with a comprehensive 
account of the concept of identity. Heavily influenced as they have been by the Russian thinkers 
Vygotsky and Bakhtin, they place themselves on the constructivists’ side. In their account of a 
practice theory of identity, they begin with the old debate as to its culturally specific or universal 
nature. Although they are drawn to the constructivist position, they remind us of the need to be 
cautious about fully embracing or rejecting one or the other approach. In this respect they speak 
about how misguided childrearing practices have the potential to lead to dangerous anomalies 
regardless of the cultural or historical context in which they occur. They then move on to present 
the “critical disruption,” that is, the fundamental changes that have shaped the discipline of 
anthropology itself via Foucault’s objectivity concern and criticisms about the collaborations of 
anthropologists with colonial powers and the overly male-centered focus of the studies. As a 
result of this disruption, they assert, anthropologists have become chary of treating cultures as 
though they are coherent, integrated, and timeless wholes.  The more common objects of cultural 
study have become processes, and historically and socially situated texts or forms.  
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Holland et al. then elaborate on their practice theory of self and identity.  Since it was 
already understood that general characterizations are prone to reification and that many doubts 
surround the supposedly unproblematic relationship between culture and self, the notion of 
“selves in practice” now looms large in the eyes of the new ethnographers.  “This self in practice 
occupies the interface between intimate discourses, inner speaking, and bodily practices formed 
in the past and the discourses and practices to which people are exposed, willingly or not, in the 
present” (Holland et al., 1998, p. 32). According to these researchers this practice (or activity, 
they use the words interchangeably), is regulated by “semiotic mediation.” We must recall “in 
Vygotskian theory, humans often develop qualitatively different mental functions as a result of 
learning to use collectively derived symbols in regulating their behavior” (Holland et al., 1998, p. 
38).  Environment therefore is extremely important in the practice theory of self and identity.  
“According to Leontiev, accounts of behavior by, anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists 
tend to reduce to two terms only: person (or group) and environment” (Holland et al., 1998, p. 
38). It is needless to say that they emphasize the social aspects of the environment and the impact 
of these conditions upon behavior. All of this becomes clearer when they cite the example of the 
hunger sensation: “Hunger when one feels no right to request food from one’s host is likely to 
feel different from hunger when one is a customer in an expensive restaurant and the food has 
been inordinately delayed” (Holland et al., 1998, p. 40). 
I have dealt so extensively with the theories advanced by Holland et al. because I have 
adopted their notion of socially constructed identities, and above all its suggestion that people’s 
identities alter along with the various social positions they find themselves in. Whiting (1994) 
cites the example of a man who is a father and husband at home and a teacher at school. But 
while different identities take shape in different social settings, one can argue that there still is a 
	 166	
sort of fixity to the latter. In this regard Holland et al. (1998), speak of “figured worlds” and 
invoke the metaphor of a liquid inside a bottle, so as to insist that the concept of “cultural 
identities” is too broad to explain the fixed nature of so many social positions. Indeed, over a 
half-century ago Erikson (1950), who handled the concept of identity in a holistic manner but 
made the constructivist positions appear more salient, alluded to the flexible and fluid nature of 
identity. He sees identity as being highly cultural and thereby predetermined and yet nonetheless 
subject to adaptation, open to influence. For me even Erikson the pioneer is typical, in the sense 
that almost all of the culturalist accounts of the concept of identity seem to fall into the trap of 
adopting a holistic approach. The suggestion of “figured worlds,” strikes me as being more 
reasonable, both by not being fully holistic and by not fully rejecting the condition of fixity. My 
presentation of that equilibrium brings us to the following two points that I deem highly relevant 
to this study. First, artifacts and materiality, which can change over time but also can be 
considered durable and fixed to some extent within a particular time-span. And second, the 
notion of apprenticeship learning, for which Holland et al. refer back to Lave and Wenger (1991).  
The latter researchers’ key notion is what they call, “situated learning,” the idea that the process 
of learning occurs in a cycle and that thus there are oldtimers and newcomers. The newcomers 
begin as apprentices of the oldtimers but gradually they become full participants and finally 
oldtimers through the processes of participation and learning. That cyclical vision allows them to 
acknowledge the role played by changing historical circumstances in altering this planet’s many 
cultural worlds.  
When referring to their notion of “positional identities,” Holland et al. (1998) drew 
attention to the types of behavior, that may occur in different social positions regardless of the 
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figured worlds of moral meanings. They expand their point by providing the following example 
that deserves quoting in full: 
In the testimony of witnesses in court cases, O’Barr and Atkins (1980) identified 
several patterns of speech–such as the use of “hedges”, locutions like “there may 
be” or “perhaps”–that experimental studies later showed to undermine the 
credibility of the testimony of any witness who exhibited them. There was a 
correlation between the use of these nonassertive patterns of speech and being 
female and/or of low “social power.” O’Barr and Atkins see these speech 
behaviors as responses Americans use in formal situations that include people 
who are more powerful than the speaker. These speech behaviors are not peculiar 
to the figured world of law courts; instead, hedges “intensifiers,” and “hesitation 
forms,” among others, communicate relative position in other figured worlds as 
well. They are indices of relational identities that are not particular to any figured 
world. (Holland et al., 1998, p. 130) 
 
According to these authors, “positional identities have to do with the day to day and on the 
ground relations of power, deference and entitlement, social affiliation and distance–with the 
social-interactional, social relational structures of the lived world” (Holland et al., 1998, p. 127). 
I draw inspiration from that point, for “positional identity” fulfills my felt need for a more 
precise version of “social identity.”  
In a recent study, Brubaker and Cooper (2000), assessed this issue from a critical point of 
view. According to these authors 
Social analysis–including the analysis of identity politics–requires relatively 
unambiguous analytical categories both constructivist and essentialist approaches 
to account for the identity. Whatever its suggestiveness, whatever its 
indispensability in certain practical contexts, “identity” is too ambiguous, too torn 
between “hard” and “soft” meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist 
qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social analysis. (Brubaker and Cooper, 
2000, p. 2) 
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These researchers go on to insist that there is an amalgam of the abovementioned approaches, 
one that takes into account both a reification process whereby identity is achieved and the 
contradiction lurking within the constructivist theory. They argue that “we should avoid 
unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing such reification (reification of ethnicity, race, and 
other putative identities) by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis” 
(Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 5). By categories of practice they mean “native” or “folk” or “lay” 
categories, and according to these authors  
the problem is that “nation,” “race,” and “identity” are used analytically a good 
deal of the time more or less as they are used in practice, in an implicitly or 
explicitly reifying manner, in a manner that implies or asserts that “nations,” 
“races,” and “identities” “exist” and that people “have” a “nationality,” “race,” 
and “identity” (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 6)  
 
On the other hand they criticize the constructivist approach and imply, by asking, “why what is 
routinely characterized as multiple, fragmented, and fluid should be conceptualized as ‘identity’ 
at all?”, that there is indeed a considerable contradiction within this approach. As a result of 
these criticisms and further analysis of the misuse of the term identity, Brubaker and Cooper 
(2000) suggest three alternative clusters of terms: “identification and categorization,” “self 
understanding and social location,” and “commonality, connectedness and groupness.” In short, 
they argue that too often the term “identity” is ambiguous and thus incapable of carrying out the 
mission it is expected to perform. 
On the basis of what has been said here thus far, the reader might feel tempted to write 
off the entire concept of identity as being a vexingly multidimensional and ambiguous 
phenomenon. However, there is a thread that binds all of these studies together: the strong 
human need for identification. Be it consciously or unconsciously, persons and groups have 
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always felt the need to identify themselves and others in a variety of ways. Other common 
conceptions shared by almost all accounts of identity are “connectedness,” “categorization,” and 
“social position” (or location). In a similar vein to Brubaker and Cooper (2000), the study that 
has set the gold standard in this area by delving deeply into those three central components, Ger 
Duijzing (2000) tells us that “identity (as a sociological concept) represents primarily a link 
between the individual and a specific category or group of people” (p. 18). That is to say, the 
concept of identity can more easily be understood by tracing the individual’s links to either 
categories or groups. Laitin (1998), on the other hand, proposes that identities are categories of 
membership based upon such typologies as gender, race, class, personality, and caste.  
All in all, in the sense of taking the best from all of the above accounts, I understand 
identification as a socially constructed phenomenon. While it emerges chiefly from the positions 
a person occupies in society, it also is influenced by relatively culturally fixed factors. It is best 
understood as being an individual’s feeling of connectedness to or membership in a category or 
group of people. Because such a definition comprises the notions of “category” and “group,” 
there is no need for us to open a separate discussion of “group identity” or “collective identity.” 
Before we leave this topic I feel obligated to pay heed to Bill Rolston’s (2010) notion of 
“cultural memory.” He tells us that 
Acting together, people construct “imagined communities of memory whose 
members share a sense of a common past and a set of remembered reference 
points encapsulating their key values” (Dawson, 2007, p. 12). Cultural memory is 
a central element in the group identity; it articulates its sense of a lived connection 
between past and present. (Rolson, 2010, p. 290) 
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As my target community had garnered a nationwide reputation for its solidarity, I adopted an 
approach that, as opposed to focusing upon individual identities, seeks to view the case of 
Nardaran through the lens of group identity and the linkages of individuals to it.  
 When it comes to how I trace the concrete elements of identity within Nardaran, I heed 
Barth’s (1969) suggestion that people use overt signals or signs such as dress, housing form, and 
general lifestyle, to look for, and to exhibit, identity. Inspired also by Holland et al., I look at the 
deeds people undertake, the places they go, the emotions they express, and the clothes they wear 
as indicators of their claims to and identifications with social categories and positions.  
 
b) Identity in Nardaran 
	
We have noted on numerous occasions that Nardaran has a reputation for being involved 
in Islamic activism as well as anti-government uprisings. Indeed, the village gave birth to the 
Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, whose leaders were convicted of being Iranian spies. Thus in the 
eyes of outsiders the village and villagers are seen as being religious and rebellious even to the 
extent of comprising a kind of Iranian “fifth column” within Azerbaian. This was the sense I had 
even before I went to Nardaran, and I know it was widely shared because my Azerbaijani friends 
who are not from Nardaran advised me, half- jokingly, not to go there, or at least to be careful if 
I did! In fact I never had any sense of insecurity, and my buoyant mood was confirmed when I 
actually got to Nardaran and found that my hosts, and the people in general were quite friendly. 
Nonetheless, most of my informants were proud of being harsh, resistant, and rebellious. For 
example, the pleasure of one particularly passionate informant was apparent when he was telling 
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me about the police force: “Police cannot come to Nardaran because they know they won’t be 
able to get out if they do!” 
 During my research in Nardaran, the first question I posed to my informants always was 
this: “What does a typical Nardarani look like?” I received fascinating answers from the more 
than twenty informants I interviewed, people of various neighborhoods and various economic 
statuses, and on that basis I was able to mentally formulate the characteristics that comprise the 
Nardaran identity. Chief among them are these: participating in the village’s religious (social) 
organizations and attending a mosque on a regular basis; the strict dress code, for women, 
especially the hijab, and careful dress for the men; obeying the rule that men and women must sit 
separately; preference for the Darvesh Toyu, religiously oriented wedding ceremony; and 
possession of honorific, travel-related religious titles. I also can assent, now that I have 
participated in so many social events such as religious celebrations and wedding ceremonies that 
the group identity I attribute to the Nardaran community can most easily become recognized 
when they have come together to enact this or that group activity.  
When I talked to individuals separately and away from any group activity, I was able to 
access their individual stories and to find inconsistencies within them. When engaged in a 
collective activity, however, they usually emphasized Nardaran’s unity as revealed by various 
characteristics. On such occasions their severity and the seriousness were very notable. When 
individuals were away from the group and its activities, however, they tended to let their guards 
down. For example, while I was spending time with some fishermen on the beach, I met two 
sons of one of my previous informants. His family was one of the respected families of Nardaran 
and he was known as an intellectual within the village, a poet possessing the most substantial 
titles of Shia belief. I visited him in his home and spent several hours with him. Following Barth 
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(1969), it is possible to say that he embodied almost all of the stereotypical properties of 
Nardarani (group) identity. Despite these facts and his all-but-perfect representation of the 
Nardaran identity, his sons, who were in their twenties, were “hanging out” with their girlfriends 
on the beach in a quite contradictory way. Although the women in their families wear the hijab, 
as appears in Fig. 4, they “hang out” with girls wearing western-style mini-skirts. When I asked 
these young men whether their families approved of that kind of behavior, their answer was 
“absolutely not!” On another occasion I was able to observe the same individuals acting in a 
quite different way because involved in a group activity. Although some might see here an 
identity-conflict, and hence a separate subject for further investigation, my purpose here is 
merely to depict differences of behavior within and outside the group activity.  
I should perhaps note that I observed young adults wearing eastern- and western-style 
clothes interchangeably. For instance, a member of the amateur religious choral group was 
wearing jeans and Ray-Ban sunglasses in the morning when he was on his own, but he wore a 
long-sleeve shirt and suit pants in the evening for a religious celebration at which the West and 
western styles frequently are condemned. That even took place in a village that is only 
twentyfive kilometers from Baku, where almost the whole way of life strikes one as being 
westernized. 
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Figure-24- (Women in Nardaran wearing Hijab) 
           







c) Religious Celebrations and the Group Activity 
	
1. The Mebes Day 
	
In order to depict a group activity as vividly as possible, let me recount the first events I 
had the opportunity to participate in. All important days are called Alametdar gunler, and a 
special calendar to feature them was printed and distributed all over the village. Remarkably, 
however, the calendar alludes only to the religious-oriented days, not the nationally or 
traditionally important ones. I must leave to ensuing sections my analysis of how that fact in 
relation to hegemony and nationalism. For now I would simply like to continue describing my 
first two group-activity experiences.  
The first one occurred on the 18th of June, 2012, and the activity was called Mebes day: 
“the first divine inspiration day.” This event commemorates the day when the prophet 
Mohammed first received divine inspiration. Throughout that day people greeted and celebrated 
each other by saying “Bayram Mubarak” (Happy holy Mebes). My informant told me that there 
would be a meeting inside the mosque before noon, and that I would be welcome to participate if 
I cared to do so. Together we went to the mosque and sat inside. There were approximately sixty 
men and thirty women inside the mosque. They were sitting separately, with a curtain between 
them. My informant told me that the number was low because it was daytime and it would be 
more crowded in the evening, since almost every villager would participate in evening prayer. 
The mullah was preaching to the audience in a passionate manner, telling them to keep their faith 
pure and clear. In the middle of the sermon, he called upon two of the young children who were 
of primary-school age, asking them to read passages from the holy Qur’an. A young man who 
was one of several religious-education providers guided the children. Then the mullah began to 
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discourse upon the history of Islam. According to him the chapters of the holy Qur’an were 
collected and combined into a book during the era of Caliph Ali. This was contradictory to the 
knowledge that I had, according to which the holy Quran was collected and issued as a book by 
Caliph Osman. Thus it was only as a result of this first participant observation that I realized a 
different version of Islamic history is being preached in Nardaran.  
 
2. Birthday Celebration of Hazret Abbas 
	
The second celebration occurred on June 4, 2012, and was called Hazret Abbas Movludu 
(birthday celebration of Hz. Abbas, the son of Caliph Ali and his second wife). The Azan22 
having been proclaimed, passages from the holy Quran were read through the loudspeakers of 
the biggest mosque. The meeting took place in Hz. Abbas Square where nearly 300 male 
villagers gathered. The square was had been made amenable for an open-air meeting by setting 
up tables and chairs for the congregants, plus a stage for the mullahs, speakers, and an amateur 
choral group. Both the organization of the square and the overseeing of the refreshments were 
undertaken by some neighborhood volunteers.  
If I am to adequately convey the extraordinariness of this event I must make it clear that 
any open-air meeting in Azerbaijan is subject to the government’s approval and that religious 
events are extremely rare sights in the country. In Nardaran, however, villagers do not ask for 
permission, and I did not observe any police presence during the meetings. My informant told 
me that this hands-off policy was adopted by the government after the bloody uprisings.  
																																								 																					
22The call to prayer 
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After starting with a divine prayer, replete with compliments to Caliph Ali, the mullah 
came to the stage and began to preach. As he was walking toward the stage the audience rose as 
one, a remarkable sight given that the mullah was far younger than most of those in the crowd23. 
The subject of his sermon was “trust in God,” resting upon God and trusting him under any and 
all circumstances. Interestingly, he connected the subject with the concepts of race and 
nationality: “What kind of nationality are we talking about when God’s name is absent? Enemies 
of God have always pursued the concept of race. For how long have the Jews been the lords of 
the world? Moses told a lot to them and tried to direct them to the true path.”  
At various points throughout the sermon, the mullah led the crowd in saying salavat24. If 
he thought that their combined voice was not loud enough, he immediately warned them to say 
loudly: “We only have the salavat as our salvation, if you don’t say it in the way that you should, 
they will take it from our hands.”  
The mullah then introduced two speakers, both of them being aksakkal or elders of the 
village. One of them was the founder of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, and holds the title of 
hajji, and the other also was a front-bencher hajji of the village. After sending their greetings and 
expressing good wishes, both speakers underscored the privileged characteristics of Nardaran 
and its community. The emphasis was on Nardaran’s success in protecting and promoting 
religious consciousness and activities. This brought the following question into my mind, 
however: If they are already as pious as they appear to be, why are the speakers overtly 






community’s condition, or they were not talking about “what is,” but rather about “what ought to 
be.”  I will designate one of the two answers as true in the next section.   
 
3. Discussion on the Celebrations 
	
In both events the clergy, namely the mullahs, were central in terms of organizing the 
events. Indeed, the most active mullah, who would later become my informant, played a key role 
in most of Nardaran’s organizations. Especially at the second meeting he made almost all the 
decisions: starting and ending times, length of sermons, order of speakers, and subject of 
preaching. The members of the amateur choral group always maintained eye contact with the 
mullah and were acting according to his gestures. Up ahead consider, by following Gramsci, the 
directive role of the clergy; here I simply suggest that their contribution to the formation and 
maintenance of the Nardaran identity is significant.  
Let me begin by reminding us that the mullahs clearly were and are perceived as wise 
men. They were called Savatli kishi, which means enlightened person, and they were perpetually 
imposing a model of identity that was against nationalism and entailed a complete emphasis on 
the concept of ummah.25 The founder of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan who became my 
informant put it bluntly: “Nationalism is the worst disaster that can ever befall a country.”  
When I try to extract the significant elements from these social events, I can only begin 
with the efforts of the mullahs, given their visible impact in rendering the community a single 
unit.  The mullah did not interfere or exhibit any kind of discomfort when the audience, 




East being elderly is the most basic and pervasive way of gaining status within the community. 
Youngsters generally show their respect for elders by rising for them. In this case, however, 65-
year-old men were standing up for a 36-year-old mullah and he was taking full advantage of the 
situation. Then too, letting the group say salavat quite frequently was obviously the mullah’s 
way of strengthening its corporate consciousness. As for the underscoring of the notion of the 
ummah, it cleverly usurped any blatant appeal to national consciousness.  
All such factors make me think that the concept of identity in Nardaran is best understood 
by viewing it through a collectivist lens. I base my argument upon the following two reasons. 
First, Nardaran identity naturally becomes visible through group activity. Second, the efforts of 
the religious elite, which intertwine with the concept of hegemony, all serve to render the 
community a single unit. Indeed, the religious elite clearly was prone to oppressing any persons 
or groups deemed to be lacking in the above-mentioned characteristics of Nardaran identity. One 
example of this was the previously mentioned de facto ban on the sale of alcohol in the village. I 
believe the religious elite was not only oppressing “others” (exceptions), but also concealing and 
repressing them. As I stated in the Limitations section of this study, one of the hardest times I 
had in Nardaran came when I was attempting to contact Nardarani alcohol-users. I encountered 
great resistance from the mullahs when I attempted to explore that kind of irregularity.  Thus, I 
would argue that there is an obvious effort underway in Nardaran to project an image of the 
community as being monolithically homogeneous. And the cultural context certainly is 




d) Pipe Beating 
	
  The final aspect of consensus building I would like to touch upon is the tradition of pipe 
beating, which I believe is unique to Nardaran.  As an outcome of rural Azerbaijan’s Soviet 
heritage, the gas and water pipelines are situated chiefly on the ground.  Although one can 
observe some visible pipes in the suburbs of Baku, in villages like Nardaran all the pipelines are 
on the ground and visible. They are spread all over the village, not only surrounding every 
building but also going in and out of each.  They extend alongside the tall garden walls, 
approximately twenty inches (sometimes higher) above the earth’s surface.  The solution when it 
comes to garden and garage doors is to let the pipes run over the doors by creating clever lifts 
and then letting them return to the previous level.  
 
Figure -26-   Gas and water pipes in Nardaran 
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Figure -27-  Water Pipes in Nardaran 
  The form of the pipelines is the same throughout rural Azerbaijan, including in 
Nardaran’s neighboring villages. What is interesting and unique, however, is the secondary use 
made of them by the Nardarani: as a tool for common and rapid communication. I first took note 
of this fascinating phenomenon when I was interviewing one of my informants.  He told me that 
pipe beating occurs on any occasion that interests all or at least most of the citizens, and prompts 
them to collectively respond. If for example if a police operation starts in the village and the 
inhabitants of some houses are targeted for detention, a person in one of those households, or a 
neighbor, may begin to beat upon the pipes with an iron rod. Given that the pipes extend within 
as well as without each building in the village, close neighbors will definitely hear the noise even 
if they are inside their homes. Soon, those neighbors have joined in the activity and the “message” 
is being spread across the whole village. If someone hears the pipe-beating noise he knows that a 
serious incident is transpiring and demanding attention, and his immediate response is to go 
outside and join in the beating for a while. A more articulate collective response emerges after a 
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while, when the villagers will usually gather in Imam Hussein Square, the village’s premier 
meeting-place.   
  According to one of my informants, the origins of pipe-beating may be traced back to 
the previous century.  The roots of the tradition, he posits, are embedded in the activities carried 
out during solar and lunar eclipses.  In the Islamic world eclipses always have been regarded as 
times of prayer, of petitioning God for mercy. Prior to the rise of information technology people 
beat upon bowls and pots to signal the collective need to pray for forgiveness during an eclipse. 
The beating of pipes really took off only after independence. The most recent pipe beating took 
place in April or May of 2012, when the electrical administration cut off the citizen’s electricity. 
Regardless of this strange custom’s origin, however, it certainly alerts to the Nardaranis’ 
distinctively offbeat (or perhaps I should say on-beat!) way of asserting their collective identity.   
   
   6. A Glance at the concept of Ethnicity 
	
Apart from whatever scientific meaning the term ethnicity may or may not have, as it 
crops up in everyday use it connotes a blood relationship. Although it retains a certain validity in 
some fields, many anthropologists such as Eriksen (2010), Barth (1969), Bauman (1999) and 
Lewellen (2003) are repulsed by its racial implications. According to Eriksen (2010), for 
instance, there are several reasons for modern genetics not to speak of “races.” First, the 
distribution of hereditary traits has unclear patterns. Second, hereditary characteristics do not 
explain cultural variations. And third, different human populations have always interbred. 
Bauman (1999) says this: “even the most racist biologists have failed, despite generous funding 
from eugenicists in America and fascists in Europe, to establish any link whatsoever between 
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race or ethnicity and mental properties, behaviors, or even preferences for behaviors” (Bauman, 
1999, p. 20). Lewellen (2003) asserts that “Race got a bad name from the deadly genetic 
nonsense of the Nazis, and the gap between common parlance ‘race’ and anthropological 
conceptions became so wide that the two seemed to have nothing to do with each 
other.”(Lewellen, 2003, p. 166) 
When it comes to what anthropologists have to offer instead, these words of Eriksen’s 
provide us with a clue: “When we talk of ethnicity, we indicate that groups and identities have 
developed in mutual contact rather than in isolation” (2010, p. 15). Eriksen goes on to talk about 
“ascription” thereby indicating that ethnicity is an aspect of a relationship rather than a property 
of a group. Similarly, Barth (1969) prioritizes social effectiveness, over other determinants, such 
as territory and ecology, as he explains the nature and the forms of these groups. Essentially 
Barth believes that social effectiveness, emerges out of self-ascription and ascription by others. 
Hence his assertion that ethnic groups have “a membership which identifies itself and is 
identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same 
order.”(1969, p. 11) Likewise Lewellen (2003) underscores the significance of outsider 
identification by saying that although the crucial components of ethnicity are ideas of inheritance, 
ancestry and descent, territory, and sense of kinship, this emic point of view has to be reinforced 
by the outsider perceptions of a given ethnic group.  
Almost all of the anthropological accounts of ethnicity emphasize the concepts of culture 
and cultural differences rather than race, descent, and ancestry (Barth 1969; Eriksen 2010). For 
instance, ethnicity has been defined by Eriksen (2010) as “aspects of relationships between 
groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive” 
(Eriksen, 2010, p. 5). Barth (1969), sees shared fundamental cultural values, showing themselves 
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as overt social unity in expressed cultural forms, as being among the four characteristics of 
ethnic groups that pervade the anthropological literature. Hence his insistence on the need for 
cultural analysis when one is attempting to assess differences in group traits. There is a clear 
scholarly consensus that anthropological studies should give prominence not to supposed racial 
factors, but rather to cultural traits and aspects of the relationships between groups.  
Another aspect of anthropologists’ discussions of ethnicity, the relation of ethnicity to 
politics and power, is highly relevant to this study. Lewellen (2003) points to the Marxist 
approach taken by Wilmsen (1996), whereby ethnicity is defined as “the essence of ethnic 
existence” and “the differential access to means of production and rights to shares in production 
returns” (Wilmsen 1996; quoted in Lewellen 2003). According to this view ethnicity is  
relational in a power sense; the form and content of a particular ethnicity will be 
determined by its positions of power relative to other contenders and to the 
dominant power. From Wilmsen’s perspective, because ethnicity arises out of 
power differentials, ethnic politics are, by definition, the politics of marginality; 
dominant groups are never themselves ethnic. (Lewellen, 2003, p. 168)  
 
There is, for instance, no Turkish ethnicity in Turkey and, as expected, no Azeri one in 
Azerbaijan.  
Nonetheless, it can be argued that there are within the aforementioned countries several 
marginal religious or sectarian groups that perceive themselves and are perceived by others as 
being distinct. Since the differences at issue appear chiefly in the form of social and cultural as 
opposed to racial and ancestral traits, this anthropological approach of prioritizing cultural 
distinctiveness, mutual ascription, and aspects of group relations is highly relevant to the overall 
purpose of this study.  
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Lewellen (2003) examines both the unity and the fragmentation of the Jews of Israel, for 
whom descent, ancestry, and race are highly important. This study shows us a wide variety of 
immigrant Jews, from all over the world, bringing into Israel quite different cultural traits. 
Indeed, there were fifty different languages, such cultural variants as the practice of polygyny 
and child marriage, and problems of adaptation to city life. As a result “Synagogues, traditional 
dance groups, cultural organizations, and even political parties were formed around such 
differences” (Lewellen, 2003, p. 170). Although the state of Israel adopted a policy of absorption 
it eventually failed, and a new policy of multiculturalism was adopted. Despite this ethnic 
separation, says Lewis, as quoted by Lewellen, there also exist these overarching forces making 
for unity: the consensus as to the oneness of the Jewish people, the legitimacy of the state of 
Israel, and the Hebrew language. “Finally, there has emerged a sort of pan-Israeli culture for 
public places—the job, government, the market—that assumes a degree of conformity to a 
common set of behaviors. Thus, we find a continuing fragmentation of Jewish ethnicities 
existing within a strong unifying Israeli nationalism” (Lewellen, 2003, p. 171). 
In addition to the above enlightening account, I also refer to the work of Gerd Baumann. 
While Lewellen’s case study points to institutional differences such as language and marriage, 
Baumann speaks of “religion as culture.” Baumann (1999), in his piece “The Multicultural 
Riddle,” refers to the two different views of culture, the essentialist and the processualist. The 
former “comprehends culture as the collective heritage of a group, that is, as a catalog of ideas 
and practices that shape both the collective and individual lives and thoughts of all members” 
(Baumann, 1999, p. 25). In this view culture therefore appears as a “giant photocopy machine 
that keeps turning out identical copies” (Baumann, 1999, p.25). The processual view, on the 
other hand, and as its name suggests, focuses on the concept of change. Over the last twenty 
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years, Baumann emphasizes, every single culture has changed its traits such as funerals, 
childbirth celebrations, and birthdays. Having presented the two views, Baumann opts for the 
highly plausible essentialist view: “No one will deny that every cultural collective shows a 
certain stability in the traits and tastes, styles and routines that its participants have learned to 
cultivate” (Baumann, 1999, p. 25). He supports his choice by pointing out what a clear picture 
one obtains when one speaks of national cultures such as the German or British, as well as when 
one speaks of religious cultures such as the Catholic or, with Max Weber (1930), of the spirit of 
Protestantism. Once Baumann has summarized the common views on culture in this way, he 
seeks to base one of the corners of the multicultural triangle upon the institution of religion. The 
remaining two are for him ethnicity and nationalism, or the nation state. Here again we are 
reminded of Smith’s (1965) account of pluralism, in which the difference with respect to social 
institutions that occurs between groups living side by side under a common government equates 
to cultural plurality, a multicultural condition. Let it be noted, however that the prerequisite for 
cultural plurality to be considered cultural pluralism is the complete equivalency of the various 
groups before the law without any exceptions.    
Communities such as Nardaran, having been situated within the framework of the ideas 
we have just been invoking, can be seen to exhibit the characteristics of cultural distinctiveness 
and on that ground can be categorized as ethnic groups. This is so because in Nardaran religion 
itself not only has a unique place in its people’s lives, but also has a considerable impact upon 
other cultural institutions. Yet again we are confronted with a sort of chicken-and-egg question: 
Does Nardaran’s intensely religious inflection create its unique versions of such standard cultural 
institutions as kinship, recreation, and education, or should the latter lead us to deem religion a 
culture rather than an institution? At any rate, one of the clear outcomes of this study is that the 
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politicization of religion and its utilization for hegemonic purposes can result in a condition 
whereby religion becomes a culture inclusive of other cultural institutions such as education, 
recreation, and the like. In plain words, and as the following sections of this study will 
demonstrate, it is the religion that became, with of course the contribution of multiple factors, a 
culture, and that made of Nardaran so distinct and non-aligned a community. Not only do 
Nardarani perceive themselves as distinct, but they are perceived as thus by virtually all of their 
compatriots. A taxi driver whom I hired for the one-day commute from downtown Baku revealed 
this outsider view when he said, “I don’t understand which century these people of Nardaran 
come from, but I know they are not living in the same era as the rest of our community does.” 
When we take the governmental view and the accusations of their being inclined toward Iran into 
account, the notion of mutual ascription also can easily be spoken of with respect to Nardaran. 
Taking all of the abovementioned factors into consideration, this religious (or sectarian) 














Hegemony is yet another highly substantial concept within the field of political 
anthropology. Dictionary definitions define it in terms of dominating authority or influence over 
others, but there has been considerable debate over the details and over the concept’s 
implications for the political field. Kurtz (2001), tells us that although the anthropologists have 
shown interest in the concept of hegemony, often have used the term in an ambiguous way, the 
authors of recent articles have used the concept to conduct analyses of the resistance offered by 
subaltern populations in various nations to political domination. He also points out that some 
research monographs have used the concept to analyze the historical impacts of colonialism and 
capitalism on indigenous peoples. Kurtz asserts that with an exception or two anthropologists 
seem not to have read Gramsci carefully, since they stray far from his notion of hegemony. 
Arjmand (2008) is one of those exceptions, for he tells us that “the concept of hegemony, 
the ideological dominance of the ruling class over the subaltern classes within civil society, is 
defined by Gramsci (1999b: p. 145) as the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of 
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (p. 
9). According to Arjmand, “through the alteration of the classic Marxist model, Gramsci 
attempts to explain that the ascendancy of the ruling class does not solely include the modes of 
production; rather it expands to include all social, political, and ideological aspects.” (p. 9)  
Kurtz (2001) asserts that “Gramsci does not equate hegemony with the leadership of 
single individual or any occult structuralist energy such as a discourse, collective consciousness, 
deep structure or culture. Instead, he says, the term hegemony refers to a property of different 
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organizations of people and agents in state formations, such as a structure, a practice, an 
apparatus, a unity of opposing structures or a function of leadership” (p. 107).  
Furthermore, Kurtz (1996) argues that the concept “may also refer to several aspects such 
as a social category related to a particular social, cultural or ideological formation, such as the 
working class, ruling class, the city over countryside, or Venice, which either leads or is 
attempting to lead others” (p. 107).  This notion is also useful, according to Kurtz, in directing 
our attention to such hegemonic centers, as governments. Indeed, it is here that the concept of 
“legitimacy” comes into its own: “Hegemony is always aimed at obtaining consent and 
establishing its legitimacy” (Kurtz, 1996, p. 107).  The foregoing review of these accounts, 
allows us to see the following concepts that have come into prominence via the scholarly 
discourse on hegemony: “the dominant group” or “hegemonic center;” “the apparatuses” they 
utilize to impose their hegemony upon others; the “consent” or “legitimacy” that the hegemony 
often drapes itself in. In addition, since Kurtz associates the hegemonic center with the 
government, the concept of force comes to mind.   
Femia (1987), on the other hand, eschewing the traditional dichotomy of force and 
consent, tells us that the socially dominant group manifests its supremacy via either coercion 
(domination) or intellectual and moral leadership. In the latter case the predominance is obtained 
by consent rather than by force. Thus Femia distinguishes between hegemony and domination by 
saying that “whereas ‘domination’ is realized, essentially through the coercive machinery of the 
state, ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ is objectified in, and mainly exercised through, civil 
society, the ensemble of educational, religious and associational institutions” (p. 24). Gramsci, in 
his view, saw political society as being the groups that have a tight grip on governments and 
governmental institutions, but he “identified civil society and its ideological superstructure as the 
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institutions and technical instruments that create and diffuse modes of thought” (Femia, 1987, p. 
26). “Gramsci’s division of the superstructure into two realms (civil and political), and his 
concomitant distinction between hegemony and domination, signal an attempt to construct a 
theory of the superstructure, which, before Gramsci, constituted a glaring lacuna in Marxist 
thought” (Ibid, p. 27). 
For Femia, then, the Gramscian sort of hegemony takes place largely within civil society 
and is based less upon coercion and more upon the consent given by the subordinated group. Yet, 
Femia goes on to acknowledge, however, that Gramsci’s distinction between political and civil 
society was essentially analytical, since Gramsci was mindful of the reciprocal interpenetration 
of those two realms. Femia speaks about how the state creates in advance a suitable climate of 
public opinion when it wants to initiate an unpopular action or policy; that is, it mobilizes certain 
elements of civil society to its advantage. Gramsci too saw the manipulative potential of the 
media, and the possibility of coercive state intervention in civil society.  
Crehan (2002) picks up the thread at this point, for she draws our attention to the 
entanglements of coercion and consent. She does so by alluding to two pieces, which provide us 
with two different definitions of the state, written by Gramsci. In the first one Gramsci states that 
“ ‘the State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class 
not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those 
over whom it rules,’ and in another note we find him referring to the State (in its integral 
meaning: dictatorship + hegemony’ ” (2002, p. 102). The basic point that Crehan wants us to 
grasp is that the state both uses force and elicits consent to keep itself in business. Indeed, and 
especially over on the civil-society side of things, the two opposing concepts seem to find a 
mutual accommodation, a modus vivendi. Force may not be legal or legitimate, but in places 
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such as Nardaran where the state authority is absent or not fully effective, but the people’s 
solidarity conduces at times to the granting of a massive amount of consent, alternative 
authority-mechanisms may fulfill some of the state functions and effectively proscribe certain 
acts.  
Leaving my elaboration upon the practical implementation of these considerations to the 
situation in Nardaran for later discussion, I continue this theoretical discourse by suggesting a 
formulation in which I combine the Foucauldian concepts of “power” and “subjugated 
knowledge” with the concept of hegemony (1980). Kurtz brings Weber to mind when he says 
that power can be defined as “the ability of A to bend B to his or her will” (2001, p. 22). On this 
basis, I argue that the hegemonic center or group exercises, and /or seeks to possess, the requisite 
power to at least give a subaltern population the desired impetus. This function can be fulfilled 
either by the political elite (the group holding down the governmental positions) or by the civil 
elite (the intellectuals, preeminently). According to Kurtz (2001), Foucault views power as “a 
force, a sphere, a moving strata, an instrument and a multiplicity of forces, all of which function 
as ‘force relations’ that affect individuals as mechanisms of control”(p. 29). Power for Foucault, 
he asserts, “is not a force controlled by agents” (p. 29). Inspired by this view, I contend that 
hegemonic coercion is not necessarily derived from political society but also can be found on the 
civil-society side, albeit in a different form. In other words, the dominant group that fulfills the 
role of intellectual and moral leadership may use at least some of its power to shape the 
ideological and/or moral thoughts of the dominated group. For instance, the hegemonic elite may 
create or represent some unique and exclusive norms and thereby elicit praise of those norms and 
a sense that alternatives to them are unthinkable. By becoming the only option for group 
membership, they constitute a sort of implicit coercion. Examples might include a common dress 
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code, a certain form of education or a highly valorized traditional institution. This can be deemed 
the domain of spiritual pressure or, in the Turkish sociologist Serif Mardin’s words, 
“neighborhood pressure” (Cakır, 2008, p. 17).  
I have cited Mardin via Cakir, but David Laitin’s (1985) article on British imperial 
control of and political cleavages within Yorubaland, in which he extends the Gramsci’s concept 
of hegemony to analyze the activities of an external (colonial) state, is perhaps even more 
pertinent. According to Laitin, “Hegemony can be defined as the political forging–whether 
through coercion or elite bargaining–and institutionalization of a pattern of group activity in a 
society and the concurrent idealization of that schema into a dominant symbolic framework that 
reigns as a common sense” (1985, p. 287). A central administration can be described as 
hegemonic if it has “the motivation and power to structure the pattern of political group 
formation in society” (p. 287).  Gramsci used “hegemony” to depict “the coercive and 
ideological power of a historical bloc coming from within a society” (Ibid).  Laitin shows that by 
strategically manipulating the identities of the colonized, the British colonial administration was 
able to control “which sociocultural cleavages would become politicized and which would 
remain politically irrelevant” (p. 286).  The colonial administration acted as if allegiance to one’s 
ancestral city was the only real political affiliation in Yorubaland, thereby obtaining the fealty of 
those ancient cities’ kings who had lost their influence over Yorubas. In a sense, the colonial 
administration (re)legitimized the kings and thus institutionalized a political system in which the 
people’s ancestral-city identities continued to loom large. In the end, Yorubas strategically 
remanufactured their ancestral city identities, which thereby allowed them to gain access to 
certain economic and political advantages that the colonizers had robbed them of.  
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As for Bond (2000), in his article “Historical Fragments and Social Constructions in 
Northern Zambia,” he analyzes the political structure of the Yombe community. According to 
him, Gramsci’s model, with its assumption that a new intellectual elite is created alongside a new 
class, does not fit Yombe. Bond, therefore, tries to place a group of intellectuals, who are 
themselves the basis of a new class and intimately connected to one another, into the traditional 
social order. Based on this analysis, Bond departs from Gramsci’s notion of “organic and non-
organic ideologies” and suggests a third type of ideology, the ideology of a social section. 
Furthermore, he identifies the apparatus through which the new educated elite asserted 
hegemonic influence, namely via the rewriting of Uyombe history. In this way, Bond 
demonstrates the concept of ‘peaceful mechanisms of domination’.  
I find particularly relevant to this study Gramsci’s (1971) emphasis on education’s great 
significance within hegemonic settings, given that it represents the dominant group’s effort to 
develop a society-wide common sense. Arjmand (2008) nicely places Gramsci’s contribution in 
historical perspective for us: “Education is a mechanism through which ‘the ideal adult’ is 
produced (Durkheim).  It is a way of imposing a dominant ideology on members of a society 
(Marx), a means of social control (Weber, and Whimster, 2004), part of the state apparatus to 
sustain hegemony (Gramsci)” (Arjmand, 2008, p. 23)." 
Given that highly distinguished intellectual lineage, I can gladly embrace a conception of 
hegemony that sees in it the presence of culturally and historically shaped ideologies, which are 
utilized by a social section or organized centers to dominate and direct the masses.  
One of the main purposes of this study is to ascertain the factors that caused the Nardaran 
community to become alienated from the greater Azeri society. Following Bailey’s (1969) 
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definition of politics, as being the rules that regulate competition for the fundamental political 
prize, power, my goal will be to uncover the rules of the game that have long been played in 
Nardaran.  No one can deny, at any rate, that there has been a challenging competition under way 
there ever since Azerbaijan gained its independence, and I believe it can best be understood via 
the concept of hegemony. I explore all three phases of the hegemonic efforts discernible within 
Nardaran: the Soviet period, Iranian efforts since independence, and the efforts mounted by the 
Azeri State.  Taking this diachronic and comparative approach allows me to explain the 
conditions creating the de facto situation in Nardaran. In short, I show why and how Nardaran 
became religious, why it is tightly linked to Iran, and what the position of the Azeri state has 
been within this context.  
 
2. The Soviet Period 
	
The answer to the question “Why is Nardaran more religious than the rest of the country, 
and so rebellious?” can be found by tracing its recent history. Azerbaijan was ruled for about 
seventy years, from 1920-1991, by a Soviet regime that oppressed religion and suppressed 
religious activities.  Thus one can ask the same question but in a different way: Did the 
Nardarani become so religious only after independence? The answer certainly must be “no,” but 
it can be supported only by investigating the Soviet period. At this point we must begin by 
determining whether the Soviet administration implemented repressive policies across the board 
in an attempt to dominate a range of foreign nationalities such as Azeri, Kyrgyz and the like. 
Some answers to that question were easy to obtain through my ethnographic research. In order to 
uncover information on those policies, however, my second question deals with the institutions 
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of, and the way of life under, the Soviet rule. If you were to ask a Nardarani about the USSR, 
virtually every answer would include a reference to the denial of freedom of religion during the 
Soviet period. Yet my informants also revealed their great pride in the presence of the shrine of 
Rahima Khanum. That seeming contradiction or at least inconsistency in fact coincides perfectly 
with the argument advanced by Bruce Grant, an anthropologist, who has published several works 
on religion in Azerbaijan. According to Grant (2011), Soviet rule ended up creating new outlets 
for Azerbaijanis’ religious impulses, such as lavishing more attention on funerals and being 
punctilious about visiting shrines.   
I surmised that by extolling the Pir my informants were celebrating the fact that the 
Ashura was celebrated in Nardaran even at the time of the Soviet rule. Here is a little exchange I 
had on this topic: 
Me: How were you able to celebrate Ashura if doing so had been forbidden by the 
Soviet administration?  
Informant: They said it was forbidden because they didn’t want it to get too 
crowded. But we were celebrating and nobody was being investigated afterwards.  
 
 Such confidences confirmed my hunch that religion was by no means completely suppressed by 
the Soviet administration. The oppression was of a controlled sort, a kind of peaceful domination.  
Nonetheless, many other of the Soviet administration’s hegemonic efforts were still 
observable during my research period. I am thinking of the institutions established for stability 
purposes. The kulup or club was a one of them, as we have seen, and served as a multifunctional 
institution. Indeed, in the light of the information I gleaned from the interviews, I would argue 
that the kulup functioned as the single most prominent hegemonic apparatus of the Soviet rule. 
Nardaran’s elderly people told me they missed their old days in the kulup, where the elements of 
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western civilization were presented to them. Although the traditional Azeri music and 
instruments were in use, several Russian and western elements were adopted by the villagers 
over time. Movies were selected by the administration and usually made up of Indian Bollywood 
fables. According to some of my informants there were two possible reasons for such choices. 
First, the administrators wanted to forestall any protest about being fed only Russian films. 
Second, they thought that Indian movies, in which the characters often are thoughtful thieves and 
the like would expose the Nardarani to a different way of life, and thereby alienate them from 
their own values. Regardless of the underlying reasons, however, the efforts are worth 
considering since they constitute potent examples of a hegemonic power craftily employing 
peaceful mechanisms of domination.  
In addition to the recreation center, there is a memorial for the veterans and martyrs of 
Nardaran who joined the Soviet Army during the Second World War. On each anniversary (even 
in 2012) villagers celebrate this event by visiting the memorial. The inscriptions upon it are 
written in the Cyrillic alphabet of the Russian language. Via the memorial and its associated 
cult−a mixture of martyrdom, which is quite important for a Muslim community, bravery, the 
Cyrillic alphabet, and the hammer and sickle−the Soviet administration continue even after their 
departure to massage the community into adopting the Soviet Army and WWII as its own.  
The final apparatus utilized by the Soviets as a peaceful mechanism was the manipulation 
of literature. I heard several stories from my informants testifying to the Soviet manipulation of 
Azeri literature, especially through famous poets. One of my informants gave the example of 
Fuzuli, one of the most famous poets of Islamic mysticism. He said: 
During the Soviet period the literature textbooks consisted of poems that were 
carefully chosen for manipulation purposes. For example, I remember our 
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teachers presenting us with these lines of  Fuzuli: “ Könül, seccadeye basma ayaq, 
tesbihe el vurma, Namaz ehline uyma, onlar ile durma, oturma. (My heart, do not 
step on the prayer rug, do not touch the prayer beads, do not follow or accompany 
those praying)”. In this poem, Fuzuli is ironically suggesting that one should not 
accompany those who merely pretend to be praying.  By offering us such 
passages, the teachers were trying to represent Fuzuli as a non-believer.  
 
The truth of the matter is that, as Yazan (1994) tells us, Fuzuli is not only a poet but one of the 
most famous representatives of Islamic mystical poetry, “love poetry dedicated toward Allah and 
the prophets, mainly Mohammed” (Yazan 1994, p. 7). When we look at the following lines 
drawn from his “Water Ode” it becomes clear that he was a strong lover of Allah and his prophet, 
and that being a non-believer was never an option for him:  
   Yâ Habîballah yâ Hayre'l beşer müştakunam 
  Eyle kim leb-teşneler yanup diler hemvâra su 
 
“The God’s beloved (Mohammed), the most benevolent of humankind, I miss you 
(crave you) / Just as the dried lips crave the taste of water” (Yazan 1994, p. 14). 
 
A similar story told was about Stalin and his representation to the Muslim community as 
a way of weakening their belief in God. Let us listen to one of my informants: 
When I was a child my father told me that they were occasionally gathered in 
sports complexes for indoctrination during the Soviet period. Some Russian 
teachers and administrators directed the primary-and secondary-school children to 
ask Allah for bread. They did what they were told and nothing happened. There 
was always a person hiding on the roof of the building with bread. The teachers 
next directed the children to ask Stalin for bread, and the hiding man threw the 
bread down from the roof as soon as the children asked Stalin for it.   
 
These particular examples show that there were several ways of peaceful domination 
adopted by the Soviet administration. Some were successful, some not. With respect to the 
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Soviet efforts to create a non-believing community, the failure was evident from the fact that my 
informants laughed loudly as they told me the story of Stalin’s bread.  Nonetheless, and 
especially when the whole country is considered, the sum-total of all these efforts at weakening 
the institution of religion within the society can be seen a success.  
 
            3.  The Current Situation: The Hegemonic Influence of Iran 
 
a) Preliminary discussion: Iran, a nation state 
	
It is one of the findings of this study that Iran, after it had desisted from its official 
revolution-exporting efforts in the early 1980s, began to utilize some instruments, from the 
politicization of Islam to several peaceful mechanisms of domination, to influence its 
neighboring states. While evidences of this condition can be found throughout the study, what 
matters here is that Iran applies these as a state policy. Hence the necessity to start here by 
discussing Iran as a nation-state. With respect to the emergence and historical development of 
the phenomenon, it is a generally accepted fact that the ideas of nation, nationality and nation-
state all emerged out of particular western European histories, especially those of England and 
France. The nationalism movements of Europe had great spreading potential and eventually 
affected most of the world’s countries.    
In reviewing Iran’s process of nation-state formation, I would like to refer to Etienne 
Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein. Balibar and Wallerstein (1991), who takes a Marxist point of 
view, point to the economic factor and the class struggle as being essential elements of national 
formations. These researchers find valid the “world systems theory,” according to which nations 
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are bound up not only with that abstraction, the capitalist market, but also with a hierarchically 
organized (core and periphery) world economy that is prone to exploit labor power and 
characterized by relations of unequal exchange and established dominations. Such notions bring 
to mind the era of Mohammad Mossadeq in the Iranian context, and the nationalization of the 
Iranian oil industry. Dr. Mossadeq served as Prime Minister  for almost two years from April 
1951 to August 1953. He is well known not only for his nationalizing of the Iranian oil industry 
but also for constituting the Iranian National Front, a political coalition comprising a broad 
spectrum of parties and associations. What is important about the era of Mossadeq is that he was 
supported against the Shah not only by the National Front but also by the communistic Tudeh 
Party of Iran. As a result, and quite significant as an aid to understanding the emergence of 
nationalism in Iran, Mossadeq was able to preserve his position despite the army-and-Shah 
coalition. Ervand Abrahamian (2001), in his article on the 1953 coup in Iran, reminds us that on 
July 21st, 1952, large crowds clashed with the army that was upholding Mossadeq, and that three 
days of bloodshed forced the Shah to recall Mossadeq, who had resigned in protest, as Prime 
Minister, and give him control of the War Ministry. Although back in the Reza Khan era from 
(1925-1941) there were some developments that can be associated with  the concept of “modern 
nation,” it is possible to say that Iran has been a state for much longer than it has been a nation 
(Grebennikov, 2013). Thus, after the country’s name had been changed from Persia to Iran in 
1935, the era of Mossadeq saw the transition to modern nation-state status.  Returning for a 
moment to Balibar and Wallerstein, they point to the ever-larger presence in the country of the 
Anglo Iranian Oil Company, or the AIOC as constituting the strongest sign of modern-nation-
state emerged in Iran. They made this point in the context of their suggestion that nation states 
emerge reactively, as a kind of protest against the presence of an Other, within the world system. 
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In this case, the nation-state-spurring idea was simple: If the oil is Iranian, its revenues must be 
as well. Given that the British were taking 83 percent while leaving Iran the paltry remaining 17 
percent, a clash was inevitable.   
 Neverthless, this process can account only for the initial period of modern-nation-state 
adventure. Smith (1986) outlined a number of different types of nation-states, differentiated by 
the relation between the state in relation to the groups within them. With an eye on those 
categories, I contend that Iran’s modern nation-building process most closely resembles Smith’s 
“western” category, which he describes as “territorial states built around definite ethnic core” 
(Smith, 1986, p. 242). This is so because Persian ethnicity and Shiism have always been 
dominant in Iran. The biggest evidence in this regard is provided us by Zubeida (2004), “Article 
15 specified that the President must be Iranian both by origin and citizenship, and have a 
convinced belief in the official school of thought in the country, that is to say, he must be Shii. 
Jaloladdin Farsi, a longtime disciple of Khomeini, was prevented from standing in the 
presidential election of 1980 because his mother was Afghan” (p. 416).  
Another useful contribution in this area has been made by Louis Beck, a senior 
anthropologist and expert in Iranian studies. In her paper on Iran’s ethnic, religious, and tribal 
minorities, in which she focuses on the political dimensions of identity in Iran, she adopts these 
five categories of Iranian identity: languages, religions, ethnicities, national minorities, and tribes. 
While talking about ethnicity, an internal component of both the primordialism and ethno-
symbolism approaches of nationalism, she asserts that Iranian Persians are the dominating social 
group. Furthermore, Beck contends that in the eyes of the Iranian state the only valid Shia sect is 
theTwelver form of Islam. It certainly cannot be denied that both the Pahlavi dynasty and the 
post-revolution Islamic state adopted a form of Iranian nationalism that is chiefly based on a 
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sense of Persian identity. So too, Shiism is an indisputable ingredient of the Iranian national 
identity. 
The work of Louis Beck also must be taken into account here, for Beck (2013) tells us 
that the Iranian state, neighboring nation-states, and outside powers all view Iran’s national 
minorities as threats to its territorial and political integrity, the security of its neighbors, and the 
stability of the region. But while language, religion, and ethnicity impact the lives of all Iranians, 
these traits appear to be more politicized as they are seen by members of national minorities. At 
any rate Sami Zubeida (1989) asserts that there are some fundamental differences between the 
two types of nation states, the western and the Middle Eastern.  He notes that modern nation-
state emerged in Europe via the social and economic developments associated with the rise of 
capitalism. In other words, western societies, owing to certain unique processes characterizing 
their histories, learned not just how to create a state but also how to incorporate various elements 
into the structure. For Zubeida what distinguishes the Islamic realm from its western counterpart 
is that its religious and political communities have until now largely overlapped within the 
Ummah, unlike the western separation of church and state. Thus for him the failure of the nation-
state within the Islamic world countries is to be attributed to the fact that the very notion of a 
territorial state, with individualized citizenship and secular principles of sovereignty, is alien to 
the Muslim mind. The Islamic Ummah, Zubaida says, knows no territorial and national 
boundaries, but thinks and operates in terms of Darul Islam (the House of Islam). Thus one could 
argue that there is a sort of blood-incompatibility between the idea of nationalism and Islam. 
Since there are no boundaries within Darul Islam, no one would think of taking ethnic 
differences into account. Such a mindset has left the Islamic world utterly unprepared for the rise 
of nationalism that has brought ethnic differences to the surface, and largely explains why the 
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Islamic version of nation-states seems to have been less successful in creating a melting-pot of 
differences as compared to its western counterpart.   
The Iranian case, however, is by no means the typical one within the Islamic world. The 
basic features of the modern states are: the separation of peasants from the land; breakdown of 
primary communities and solidarities; individualization of labor; and the accumulation and 
concentration of resources, making possible a centralization of power. Then, following Zubaida 
(1989), as he riffs on Benedict Anderson’s notion of imagined communities, one can add some 
other more concrete elements that the very existence of the state promotes: standardized 
education systems, national networks of communication and transport, and military conscription.  
Iran fits the bill of “nation-state” in all cited regards.    
Language also lends its support to the case we are building. In Iran, that language 
officially is Persian, even though the constitution does recognize the other languages spoken by 
Iran’s many minorities.  Nonetheless, state administrators and especially the current supreme 
leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, clearly utilize their support for minority languages as a way of 
invoking national unity. In a speech made to Iranian Azeris in Tabriz, Khamenei said: 
 Bu Iran-i Islamide Fars da Turk kimin, Turk de Fars kimin, hami gardashdi, 
hami Iranidi.  
In this Islamic Republic of Iran, Persians are like Turks and the Turks are like 
Persians, they are all siblings, they are all Iranians.   
 
In this statement, the Iranian identity is presented as superseding the other identities of people 
living in Iran, uniting different ethnic groups under a common nationality.  In the last analysis, 
the truth of this matter is as follows: Iran is a nation state, predicated on the Persian ethnicity, 
Twelver Shia belief, the Persian language, and the idea of a superior Iranian identity.  
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When it comes to the question of how Iran incorporates its various ethnic groups into the 
system, the chief glue seems to be religion. Grebennikov (2013) tells us that the Iranian state, 
when confronted with the vast heterogeneity of its realm, has always resorted to the common 
religion, Shiism. Promoting and emphasizing that sole form of religious identity has allowed the 
Iranian state to fortify its unity, especially since the revolution. Also helpful in keeping Iran’s 
many ethnic groups from revolting and sometimes even in eliciting their loyalty was the Iran-
Iraq War that brought people together around a common purpose and some reformist 
administrators such as Khatami, who supported minority elements.   
 
b) A Multi-Purpose Tool: Iran’s Politicization of Islam 
	
For Denoeux (2002) “political Islam” refers to all those movements and ideologies that 
draw upon Islamic referents in order to articulate a distinctly political agenda. Thus we are 
talking about an instrumentalization of Islam undertaken by individuals, groups, and 
organizations that are pursuing political objectives. Esposito (2011) argues that what he calls 
“secular fundamentalism” is implicit in too many of the analyses of political Islam, an 
interpretation that regards the mixing of religion and politics as abnormal, irrational, dangerous, 
and extremist. Nor can it be denied that the widespread assumption that the mixing of religion 
and politics inevitably leads to extremism has fostered the attitude that all Islamic movements 
are extremist and incompatible with democracy.  In a similar vein, Asad criticizes Gellner for his 
rather simple and flawed comparison of Islam and Christianity.  
Esposito believes that political Islam has emerged in response to the perceived failure of 
such secular ideologies as nationalism, capitalism, and socialism. Islamic symbols, rhetoric, 
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actors, and organizations have become sources of legitimacy and mobilization, informing 
political and social activism.  Similarly, Ziya Onis argues that the causes of resurgence have 
been religiocultural, political, and socioeconomic. Issues of faith, politics, and social justice—
authoritarianism, repression, unemployment, housing, social services, distribution of wealth, and 
corruption—intertwine as catalysts. Political Islam, in much of the Middle East, constitutes a 
counter-hegemonic discourse that articulates primarily the interests of “losers,” individuals and 
groups debarred from sharing in the material benefits of globalization. 
At this point in our analysis we simply must go back to the roots of divergence between 
the two traditions: the Sunni and the Shia sects, generally referred to as Islam’s contrary poles. 
Perhaps the best place to begin here is with Bernard Lewis’ (2001), trenchant point that Shia 
Islam is best seen as a reappearance of the Persian national genius in an Islamic disguise. Lewis 
notes that some nineteenth-century writers went further, for they saw in the triumph of Shi’ism 
the resurgence of the Aryanism of Iran against the Semitism of Islam. He stated in a 2001 lecture 
that these ideas are discredited nowadays but that they still have their adherents. Lewis also notes 
the vast difference between the mainstream regional-Arabic view of history, intent upon 
“establishing the precedents of the Prophet, the Companions and the early “rightly-guided” rulers 
of Islam, who set the pattern of correct law and behavior” (Lewis, 2001. p. 5), and the Iranian 
view that is really the old Persian view, even including some Zoroastrian symbols survived in 
contrast to the former. Likewise, Roger Savory (1976)  believes that the advent of Islam meant 
defeat and conquest for the Persian world.  Such suggestions lead some of us to find oxymoronic 
the “mainstream Shia.” 
We also must look closely here at the traditional Sunni and Shia approaches to 
interpreting the holy Qur’an. According to Roy Mottahedeh (1985), the former adopts the 
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prophetic sayings more or less “as is” and reasons largely by analogy, while the latter, “by 
contrast, elevated ‘reason’ to the rank of a fundamental principle of law” (p. 202).  In other 
words, most Shi’ites are willing to generate their own unique interpretations, which may seem to 
challenge the dominant perspectives, as opposed to meekly obeying the generally accepted 
religious authorities. Consequently Ayatollah Khomeini, as a prominent figure of the latter 
tradition, exhibits a more conflicted and revolutionist character. To make this point clear it would 
be useful for us to briefly glance at the Wilayat al Faqih, prompted by early Shia scholars but 
advanced by Khomeini. Very briefly, Wilayat al Faqihm, which translates as the Guardianship 
of the Islamic Jurists, presents a sort of hierarchical structure within the realm of religious 
scholars.  Khomeini institutionalized this theory and eventually it was incorporated within the 
constitution of modern Iran. What came next was the declaration of himself as supreme leader of 
the Islamic Republic, and predictably the term “Mullahcracy” was coined to refer to the new 
form of government comprised of Islamic scholars. All of that allows one to conceive of 
Khomeini as having been a highly political person, struggling for power and reaching his goal in 
the end.  
 Then too, Ervand Abrahamian (1991) asserts that Ayatollah Khomeini was a populist 
contrary to the prevailing view that he was a fundamentalist. In his article, “Fundamentalism or 
populism,” Abrahamian points out that 
He rarely used the term “Mostazafin” in his early writings. When he did, it was in 
the Qoranic sense of the humble and passive “meek” believers, especially orphans, 
widows, and mentally impaired. In the 1970s, however, he used it almost every 
single speech and proclamation to depict the angry poor, the “exploited” people 
and the “downtrodden masses. (p.19)  
Clearly Khomeini was not shy about borrowing the ideas of non-Islamic thinkers such as Marx 
(Mottahedeh, 1985. p.17). Abrahamian also notes that although Khomeini praised the prophet 
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Mohammed and Caliph Ali in his early years, he later argued that both prophet and caliph were 
unable to overcome the problems of their societies. Likewise, Khomeini not only criticized the 
Shah from exile but was very harsh on him, even inviting him to resign, in his earlier life as a 
preacher living under the rule of the Shah. Mottahedeh (1985) brings our attention to a sermon 
preached by Khomeini in the Moharrem in 1963, after police had brutally targeted the class he 
taught and caused the deaths of two students. In that speech he said that the actions of the regime 
were the result of its friendship with Jews and non-Muslim Iranians. But it was Khomeini’s open 
attack on the Shah that made Ali and hundreds of others who had gathered for Khomeini’s class 
that day feel that at last the mullahs had a political leader” (Mottahedeh, 1985, p. 189).    
On the other hand, it is possible to argue that most of the strong representatives of the 
Sunni tradition such as Said Nursi, the most influential figure within the Turkish Sunni sphere, 
represent a quite opposite manner of thinking and acting. The first notable characteristic such 
men strike me as having is humility. They are always insisting that they are nothing but ordinary 
servants. Indeed according to them, being an ordinary servant of God is and should be the 
highest rank a human being can attain. The Sunni Sufists are particularly keen on the concepts of 
modesty and selflessness and altruism also looms large in their teachings.  
Furthermore, Sunni Sufists tend to have a mindset whereby politics is perceived as such 
an ugly realm that one must seek refuge from it in God. To be actively involved in politics is for 
Sufis to be too closely affiliated with the concept of power, and yet obedience to the state 
administrators is deemed a virtue. The sharpest contrast I can point to here is that although the 
Sunni type of Sufism has the reputation of advocating indulgence and tolerance, it is accused of 
laxity by some fundamentalists of the Iranian type of Shiism. I would contend that such a 
challenging and deprecatory position only serves to politicize religion. It is obvious, to this writer 
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at least, not only that Iran has wielded religion as a political tool, especially during and after the 
Islamic revolution, but that the Islamic emphasis on purveying the divine teachings and guiding 
people down the true path has had at best a secondary place for it. Thus, I can only end this 
subsection by noting the OSCE’s Baku-office discussion paper (2006), born of consultations 
with many academics and analysts. According to this document the chief characteristics of 
today’s Iran are as follows: 
• Concern over ethno-nationalist tendencies 
• Wooing of potential allies in its ongoing standoff with the West 
• Fear of challenges to its theocracy, and wish to enforce the latter by eliciting 
support for its form of Shiism 
• Controlling the borders, and consequently the drug trade to the West  
• At the nation-state level, religious leaders’ interest in influencing and recruiting 
students from Azerbaijan.  
 
c) Independence, Iranian Invasion and Education 
	
We have often noted how, after the bloody withdrawal of the Soviet Army and the 
independence gained by the Azeri Republic, the old Soviet institutions were uniformly rejected 
regardless of their utility. A bold and admirable move, perhaps, but the fact remains that the 
fledgling state was suddenly all but at the mercy of its northern neighbor, Iran. With the fall of 
borders, the Iranian influx could proceed unchecked. A considerable number of clerics came to 
Nardaran and established the education system we have looked at, one that gives promising 
young Nardaranis the opportunity to have a funded education in Iran. Out of that has come a 
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group of Nardaranis who became, as might have been expected, zealously pro-Iran and who 
provided villagers with an alternative form of education. 
All of the above is indisputable, but raises the simple question, “Why Nardaran?” One of 
my informants’ comments in this regard still makes me smile, given its witty acumen. Here is 
our exchange:  
Me: Why do you think Iranian mullahs preferred Nardaran over neighboring 
villages?  
Informant: You presumably noticed the difference between Nardaran and 
Mardakan [a neighboring village]. So did the Iranians at that time.  
 
We have noted how the mullahs’ first step was to build a madrasah in Nardaran. Since the 
financial aspect was not a concern for the Beyt-ül mâl (the treasury of the Islamic State of Iran), 
which is well fed on alms and tithes, the construction was completed expeditiously. The 
hierarchic structure of Iran’s form of Islamic jurisprudence rendered the second phase of the 
“invasion” attractive. I refer to studying in the Iranian city of Qom, the educational center of the 
Shia world, for Nardaran’s madrasah fostered a pool of scholars from which the missionaries 
could extract the most brilliant.  
  As explained by one of my informants, the combined Nardaran/Qom course of study 
lasts for five years. It begins in the Nardarani madrasah with the learning of Arabic, and 
immersion in such famous works of Arab literature as the el-Fevaid'us-Samediyye of Sheikh 
Bahai and the works of Celaleddin Suyuti. Then three years are devoted to canon law, hadith (the 
Prophet Mohammad’s sayings), reasoning, history and ethics.  Finally the students take 
certification exams and if they qualify they are given the Emmame (special turban given to the 
graduates) at an Emmame Qoyma Merasimi (a sort of hooding ceremony). Let us get the rest of 
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this story from an informant who graduated from the Nardaran madrasah and went to the city of 
Qom for his further education in 2001. 
When you first go to Qom you get registered. However, this does not mean that 
you are accepted. This initial registration is for the investigation that officials 
make, in order to make sure that you don’t have any criminal obstacles. The city 
of Qom is full of madrasahs. There were around 300,000 students at that time, but 
our school had 10,000 international students. In Qom, I had friends with whom I 
had studied at the Nardaran madrasah. Indeed, I had first contacted them and they 
helped me to get in. One week later I learned that I was accepted and I got started. 
The education in Qom is free and you are paid $60 a month as pocket money. The 
school was a boarding school, and the meals were quite delicious. Although the 
first year is conditional, which means your grades should be above the average, 
one did not have such problems the following years. We had an average of 18 
hours of classes each week, which means 120 hours a semester. We had classes 
five days a week, and the average number of courses in a semester was seven. The 
minimum number you could take is six, half of which had to be chosen from 
among the applied courses. It takes five years to finish the program. The last six 
months are reserved for finishing your paper. You have to choose your topic after 
three years of education and then work on it under the supervision of your sponsor. 
When you have finished with your paper you defend it before the faculty. My 
subject was “Shiism in the era of Imam Kazim (780-820 A.C.)”    
 
After they have been educated in Iran or by Iranians in Nardaran, these young gentlemen become 
Hüccetül Islam (Arbiters of Islam), a role equated with wisdom. The next step is for them to 
convey their wisdom, the heavenly information, to the periphery. The alternative education 
purveyed by these arbiters takes place in a number of the village’s mosques. One of the 
educators, who was also my informant, stated that religious education in Nardaran goes on year-
round, albeit divided into two periods. Each period lasts for six months, and almost thirty pupils 
of primary-school age attend each period. He estimated at over 500 the number of pupils who 
had completed their education of this type in the previous five years. In order to make this 
alternative form of education appear desirable, some prizes are offered to the winners of the 
competition that takes place at the end of each education period. A jury comprised of mullahs 
	 209	
selects the three most successful students and they are sent on a free trip to Mashhad, a city in 
Iran that looms large within the Shia belief system.  
 
d) Financial Aspect 
	
In connection with the educational aspect the financial aspect presents itself. Who pays 
for the educational expenses and the awards? Where does the money come from? The answer to 
these questions will shed further light upon the peaceful mechanisms of domination adopted by 
Iran. In order to gain a clearer picture of the financial aspects we need to begin with the religious 
roots of all monetary issues in the Shia world, namely the concepts of zakat (the one-fortieth of 
one's income distributed as alms), and the hums (half of one’s profit given as alms). During my 
fieldwork I had the opportunity to ask about these concepts and therby to recieve quite a 
thorough grounding in them from my mullah informant:  
According to the Shia belief, half of the Hums goes to Mujtahid, that is, Imam 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. And there is a fevkalade selahiyatdar numayende 
[supremely authorized representative] of Khamenei located in the capital city of 
Azerbaijan, Baku. Mostly the money goes to him and becomes Beyt-ül mâl 
[treasury of the Islamic State].  Then the money is used for the poor, education, 
and so on. 
 
Mullahs usually act as mediators in transferring money. A donor thus first contacts a mullah to 
see to it that the zakat or hums is delivered to the representative. Then the collected money either 
is sent to Iran or kept by the representative and used for a variety of purposes−perhaps to cover 
the wedding expenses of needy couples when they apply for it, or health care expenses.  
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Some of the Iranian-educated Nardarani have economic relations with the representatives 
of Ayatollah Khamenei. They are assigned to translate books from Persian into Azerbaijani, and 
they receive money in return. My informants were hesitant to tell me more about the 
representative and did not acknowledge his outright financial gifts to them. Nonetheless, the 
economic relationship between the educated elite and the representative was obvious. One of my 
informants had this to say: 
The last book I translated from Persian to Azerbaijani was a book by Ayatullah 
Syed Hashim Rasooli Mahallati, the administrator of Khamanei’s office in Iran. 
An Azeri friend who studied in Iran brought the book to me. I received 1000 
manats [$1300] for the translation job. I went on a trip to Karbala after receiving 
the money. It was in 2010 and I was able to save nearly $750 after paying for the 
trip. I made good money translating books. Every year I translate four or five 
books and I earn around $4000 from translation jobs.  
 
The reader I hope will recall an earlier reference to nezir, alms given to the shrine. In 
contradistinction to the zakat and hums, the entire amount received as nezir belongs to the shrine 
thus constituting the most significant source of income for Nardaran. In real-world terms this 
means that tens of thousands of dollars, collected in a village where poverty predominates, 
confer a great deal of power upon the leading group. Generally the money is put to the political 
use of creating followers and preserving alliances but more broadly, monetary power burnishes 
the perceived prestige of the elite. Thus thanks to the generous donations of the visitors, the 
Nardarani elite are able to organize religious celebrations and design the village environment in a 
way conductive to the hegemonic climate.  
Finally, and as briefly noted in the nationalism section, Iran financially supports Nardaran, 
especially via the leading figures of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan.  Although some of the 
informants tried to obscure this aspect, several others openly expressed the view that Iran not 
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only supported the construction of Nardaran’s monumental mosque but also financed the 
construction of the madrasah. Indeed, as I have learned from one of my informants many 
Nardarani even take a jaundiced view of the public relief provided directly by Ayatollah 
Khomeini: “Sure, we know about when Khomeini Aga sent truckloads of dates for the needy 
people, and we also know how those dates were pocketed and by whom.”         
 
e) TV, Internet and Newspaper 
	
The educated elite in Nardaran makes their influence felt through not only the alternative 
education they provide but also other means of indoctrination. They take advantage of the 
Information Age, by utilizing the Internet and other media. There is a newspaper called Islam 
Haqiqatleri (Truths of Islam), and its website is overseen by the Iranian-educated elite. A special 
section of the paper devoted to history, is replete with elements of Shia history rather than the 
history of Azerbaijan. The newspaper usually is made up of the following sections: 
1. News (religious news from both Azerbaijan and other parts of the world),  
2. History (chiefly Islamic) 
3. Articles and op-ed pieces on religious faith 
4. Interviews with leading religious figures 
5. Jaafari jurisprudence 
6. A page devoted to refuting Wahhabi doctrine 
7. Literary and religious stories 
In addition, the newspaper undertakes the mission of guiding the community’s visual-
media choices and steering it toward web sites created and overseen by Iran. Thus it comes as no 
surprise that the answers to my question “Which TV channels do you usually watch and which 
websites do you visit?” were full of such Iranian-originated TV channels and websites as Sahar 
TV, Savalan TV, Urmiye TV, Hadi TV, www.abna.ir, www.arannews.ir, and www.wilayeh.org. 
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During my research period, I had ample opportunity to note both the TV and the online 
content. Thus I can assure the reader that the prevailing Iranian official ideology was being 
propagated through all of those media modalities. An illuminating instance coincided with my 
research period in June 2012, when a Syrian missile shot down a Turkish F-4 Phantom. The 2011 
uprisings against Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria had long since turned into a civil war, as the 
UN has declared it to be. Consequently, the region’s states have adopted policies either 
denouncing or supporting Assad’s regime. Turkey placed itself on the opposition side, while Iran 
preferred to support the Assad regime in cooperation with Russia.  Immediately after the 
downing of the warplane, and without waiting to hear what the black-box recordings had to say, 
the media and website pundits began to insist that Turkish warplanes had committed boundary 
violations. Accordingly, my Nardarani informants parroted these views in both the interviews 
and their daily conversations.  
Besides delegitimization of the opposition, the cited media outlets also seek to legitimize 
Iran’s controversial policies. The reader may recall how one of my informants wanted to know 
“why the Turkish National team played a game with the Armenians, and why Turkey has close 
relations with Israel, the biggest Satan?” Also as noted earlier, the informant revealed that he 
gained this anti-Turkish view from watching the discussion programs on Sahar TV, the Iranian 
TV channel that broadcasts in Azerbaijani. Thus we see yet again how in addition to the 
prepotency of the mullahs, the media modalities also do much to facilitate and legitimize the 
Iranian hegemony over Nardaran.    
At this point, a word or two about Sahar TV seems to be called for. According to the 
official website, it was established by the governmental television and radio organization of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Its headquarters are located on Vəliəsr Avenue in Tehran and its 
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mission statement is articulated within the frequently-asked-questions section of www.sahartv.ir. 
This tells us that the primary mission of the channel is to export abroad the most magnificent and 
effective religious revolution of the last century. Its secondary mission is to provide viewers with 
a real picture of Iranian society as a way of fostering relationships between Iran and other 
Islamic communities. The third mission is to reveal and fight against the penetration efforts of 
non-Islamic civilizations into the Islamic world. Its fourth and final mission is to present, in a 
timely manner, news about any and all promising and revolutionary movements, especially 
within the Islamic world.  
I now would like to present three representative samples of Sahar TV broadcasts. The 
first of these is coverage of a speech made by the new spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hossein Jaberi Ansari. This address took place soon after 
the most recent outbreak of armed conflict took place in Nardaran in late November 2015.  
Correspondent: In his first press conference for local and foreign media 
representatives, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari 
answered my question regarding the incidents that have taken place in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan and the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s steps about those. 
Jaberi: There were some ongoing issues within the Nardaran township of 
Azerbaijan one week before this particular incident. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
and its Foreign Ministry made some efforts in order for those issues not to be 
converted into a political case. We held negotiations with the Azerbaijani 
government. These negotiations were more or less useful in terms of handling the 
issue not as a political case but as an ordinary incident. We hope that there will be 
progress in this direction. We stand for stability and peace in the region, 
especially within the neighboring countries. National solidarity between the 
societies should be strengthened, and the relationships between the states and 
communities should continue in a natural way.   
Correspondent: Jaberi Ansari also answered my question regarding the Nardaran 
incidents and his interest in the Shii community of this country. 
Jaberi: It is the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran that any kind of violation 
against the citizens or religious minorities of the neighboring countries should be 
monitored in some way. States of the region should not pave the way for religious 
conflicts and Shia-Sunni confrontation. The creation of these kinds of 
confrontations is not for the good of the Islamic countries. These processes were 
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followed in a diplomatic way, and the potential positive relationship with these 
countries has been utilized to monitor the issue.  
Correspondent: In principle, the policy of the Islamic Republic is not to interfere 
in the internal affairs of the neighboring countries. However, calling Shiism 
“radical” is not an internal affair of Azerbaijan but rather an affair that belongs to 
the Shia and Islamic world. And this issue has to be taken care of, stated the 
spokesman.   
 
    
Figure 28-Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari makes a 
statement about Nardaran on Sahar TV. 
 The second broadcast is about the surveillance cameras that were set up in Nardaran soon 
after that most recent armed conflict.  
Anchorman: Surveillance cameras were set up in Nardaran. According to the 
report, 51 video-surveillance cameras have been installed at 18 points. At 15 
points on and around the territory of Nardaran Township of Baku’s Sabunchu 
region, 45 surveillance cameras have been installed. In this regard, information 
about the 2015 activities of the Cabinet of Ministers has been reflected. Within 
the settlement, 51 surveillance cameras at 18 points including three license-plate 
detection systems have been installed. In addition, the period of some detainees 
who were arrested during the events has been extended. The detention period of 
Əhəd Qəhrəmanov, a detainee arrested in connection with the incidents, has been 
extended, the lawyer Bakhtiyar Hajiyev told APA. He said that the Nesimi district 
court decided to extend Qəhrəmanov’s detention until the 3rd of June. Hajiyev 
said there was no evidence during the judicial process. According to him 
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Qəhrəmanov was arrested two days after the incident, and he does not consider 
himself guilty at all. The detention period of several others was extended as well, 
he said.   
 
 The third broadcast on Sahar Tv was another story on Nardaran’s martyrs and a 
commemoration ceremony held for them in Ərdəbil, Iran: 
A commemoration for the martyrs of Nardaran was held in Ərdəbil. It is obvious 
in this country that if a country shows respect for its martyrs that country will be 
honored. Neither will enemies occupy a piece of its soil nor will its dignity be 
damaged. All the martyrs are ours. We are proud of our own martyrs, and it does 
not matter whether they are in Iran, in Azerbaijan, or in Iraq. Azerbaijan is a Shia 
country, and I hope the revenge of these martyrs will be taken.   
 The above-transcribed TV broadcasts provide the reader with some concrete instances of 
the interest in Nardaran taken by Sahar TV and consequently Iran. It also should be noted that 
Sahar TV correspondents frequently conduct interviews with Nardaranis. Given the channel’s 
international broadcast range and its reputation, such coverage not only allows Nardarani voices 
to be heard but also leads the villagers to follow its broadcasts, especially after its correspondents 
have come to conduct interviews. Appearing on an international TV channel is a source of both 








VII.    CONCLUSION 
	
1. Nardaran’s Relations with the Azeri State 
	
The hegemonic efforts mounted by the Azeri state call for especially sensitive evaluation, 
given the tendency for social scientists to fall into the trap of placing themselves on the 
minority’s side. My more pertinent concern, however, was with my target community’s 
rebellious reputation. Quite simply, I was curious as to whether there was any organized hostility 
directed towards Nardaran. My ultimate verdict was no, and I arrived at it by three routes. First 
of all some, although not many, Nardarani were employed by the government and working on 
several levels of the Azeri bureaucracy, from ranked military officers to customs enforcement 
officers to the security guards of military arsenals. Second, I observed no restrictions on the 
villagers’ use of the Internet and visual media.  Most of the houses in Nardaran have satellite 
dishes, and thus can easily tune into Iranian TV channels or for that matter virtually any other 
ones. Third, on a weekly basis the villagers were issuing Azerbaijan’s only religious newspaper. 
Fourth, the Azeri administration does not charge Nardaran’s mosques for electricity, despite their 
resistance to registering with the Caucasian Muslim Board. Fifth, and finally, the government’s 
extraordinarily generous land policy, which allows Nardaranis to buy land in Nardaran, be it at 
the seaside or in the interior, for just half of the listed price, thereby perhaps becoming a 
neighbor of President İlham Aliyev who has a large estate on the coastline in the bordering 
village Bilgah. This policy testifies to the government’s desire to woo Nardarani by giving them 
preferential access to their high-value seaside property.   
The theme of the formal education administered by the Education Ministry of Azerbaijan 
is worth considering separately for a moment. There are two schools in Nardaran that range from 
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the first to the eleventh grade. I made the acquaintance of three teachers, a male and two females, 
plus the director of one of the schools, all of them Nardarani natives although there were outsider 
teachers as well. The two female teachers taught history and we had an illuminating conversation 
on the curriculum and schooling in Nardaran. I would say that they possess very few 
characteristics of the Nardaran collective identity, and as civil servants of a secular state they 
were of course not wearing the hijab. One of the female teachers was living in the village, and 
the other commuting from downtown Baku. Both were familiar with the village’s social 
constraints and unwritten rules, but both were non-religious. Despite the latter difference-factor, 
they seemed to be harmonized with the Nardaran community and perceived themselves as not so 
different any of its members.  
What our conversation on the curriculum, the history being taught in the state schools, 
revealed was, first of all, that each grade has its own history text prepared by the state to fulfill 
the needs of the children on that level. Second, the texts were replete with national figures and 
symbols useful in forging a national identity. Each book has a first page that consists of the 
national hymn, the symbol of the state, a depiction of the flag, and a map of Azerbaijan. 
Given that this nation has suffered much from the manipulation of its history and 
literature, I could not help but inwardly applaud the courage shown by the Education Ministry of 
Azerbaijan in creating history books that have disturbed their southern neighbor, Iran. The map 
on the cover of the 9th grade history books includes some cities of Iran within the territory of 
Azerbaijan! According to one of my history-teacher informants, those settlements were indeed 
once Azerbaijan’s but were ceded to Iran at the signing of the Gulistan Treaty in 1813. She said, 
“It is a universally accepted fact that there are millions of ethnic Azeri in Northern Iran, and Iran 
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is shown in this book as an invader.” She then told me that Iran had warned Azerbaijan at the 
state level by issuing a diplomatic note with regard to that map. 
 
Figures -29-30- Map on the cover of 9th grade history book shows some Iran  
Cities as Azeri territory. 
 
In addition to that early historical aspect, school education in Nardaran also comprises the 
big moments of recent history: the independence period, bloody 20th January,26 the Armenian 







events are noted not just in the textbooks but also on the school’s billboards. The latter also 
depict the images and exploits of many national characters and heroes, such as Dede Qorqud28.   
 
                         Figure -31- A billboard designed for ‘Bloody 20th January’ 
     
 
Figure -32- A billboard designed for Khojaly Massacre  





Not all of the steps taken by the Azeri government have been popular, but their 
unpopularity has perhaps done more to unify Nardaran than their popularity would have. As 
these lines were being written in March 2016, in the immediate aftermath of the latest eruption  
of armed conflict that resulted in several deaths and incarcerations, some ongoing public-works 
projects are going forward, such as construction of the Mədəniyyət Evi, a cultural center 
including  a library as well as art classes and recreation facilities, and intense road construction. 
Those perhaps will have a healing effect, but I am less sanguine about the decision that the 
mayor of Nardaran himself appraised me of, to remove all the wall decorations in early 2016. 
Soon all the walls had been painted in a single color and more walls had been built in keeping 
with the government’s environmental design for Nardaran. It must be remembered that the wall 
decorations were in the villagers’ eyes among their community’s most valuable possessions. 
Decreeing their erasure certainly has not won any hearts and minds, and the memory of this 
wrong, as Nardani feel it to be, will long endure.   
 
            2.  Some thoughts on the likely future of the Iranian hegemonic momentum in 
Azerbaijan 
  
On March 20th 2013, in New York City, Mojdeh Rezaeipour, a graduate of the University 
of California at Berkeley, performed on the main stage at Moth, an acclaimed non-profit 
organization dedicated to the art and craft of storytelling. As a U.S. citizen and resident of 
Iranian origin, she told the true real story of what happened to her during the 2009 Iranian 
presidential elections that brought the Iranian Green Movement to the attention of an 
international public.  
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Mojdeh was born in Iran and raised there until the age of twelve. After briefly describing 
how she was forced to wear the veil at the age of six and how a female primary-school teacher 
questioned her closely about her parents’ personal lives, she told about the trip she took to Iran 
years after she had left it for the United States. We know that the 2009 Iranian presidential 
elections prompted claims of manipulation and that nationwide protests erupted after the official 
declaration that Ahmadinejad had won the elections. According to Mojdeh, the election process 
struck observers as being democratic at the beginning, indeed right up to the counting of votes. 
The TV reporter were saying that Mousavi was running ahead and that Ahmadinejad would not 
be able to win even if he received all the remaining votes that night. Suddenly, however, all of 
the TV coverage was replaced by music. Although Mojdeh and her grandparents went to bed that 
night feeling optimistic, still the following morning they were shocked to learn that Ahmadinejad 
had won 60 percent of the votes. Soon, the Green Movement, also known as the “Twitter 
Revolution,” was filling news headlines not just in Iran but all over the world as well.  
In her story, Mojdeh spoke about what she experienced during her visit that coincided 
with the pre-election period. Her cousins, college students in Iran at the time, were dressing in a 
conservative way during the day, but both they and their visiting cousin were far more stylishly 
garbed when they went to “underground” parties at nights. She said that a secret code was 
required to enter those parties, and once inside one saw boys and girls dancing, holding hands, 
and kissing. Although the event was underground, it infused its participants with a sense of 
freedom. There was, however, a restriction on taking photos. The attendants of the dance kept 
saying that everything would be fine if Mousavi won the elections, but the photos would get 
them into trouble if Ahmadinejad stayed in power.  
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I have relied so heavily upon Mojdeh’s tale, here in this brief rendering, simply because 
Iran’s impact on its neighbor to the north, and indeed on the whole political climate in the 
Middle East, is enormous. It can be argued that Iranian interests and activities in Azerbaijan, and 
particularly in Nardaran, are largely contingent upon the internal political climate and the 
international-relation strategies it adopts. During my research-period President Ahmadinejad was 
in office, and his attitude toward the Azerbaijan-Iran relationship was inflexibly hegemonic. 
Ahmadinejad’s successor, Hassan Rouhani, however, is a more liberal figure. The nuclear deals 
with the West and several other developments may bode well for the future developments of the 
relationship, but it must be remembered that Iran has a supreme leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, 
who outranks the president, and that despite President Khatami’s being more liberal, the 
Nardaran uprisings first broke out during his presidency. Thus while Iranian interventions and 
efforts to maintain its constituencies in Nardaran may exhibit a decline, it would be too daring to 
assert as much unequivocally.  
Given the nuclear agreement, Iran now has the opportunity to improve its economy and 
by this means to regain its leadership of the Middle East. It will most probably use the oil and 
gas trade to enhance its relations with the West and with neighboring countries. Since Azerbaijan 
is heavily dependent on oil income, and since it has to compete with Iran when it comes to 
exporting its oil to the West, continued rivalry in this area is inevitable.  
It also must be noted that thanks to such international organizations as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, the issues of freedom and political prisoners in 
Azerbaijan are always on the world’s agenda. At times the pressure becomes so intense that 
President Ilham Aliyev feels obligated to issue a decree releasing political prisoners. A decline in 
oil prices has severely affected the country, at the time when these lines were being written, with 
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Azerbaijan facing a likely devaluation of its currency. Such unwanted developments have 
boosted the unemployment rate and incited mass protests. Thus we see how the interplay of 
internal and international developments is always shaping both daily life and the Azeri state’s 
positions.  
One of the most significant signs of possibly better days ahead for Nardaran is the Azeri 
government’s announcement that a university will be established in the village. Even just rumors 
to that effect greatly excited the villagers, one of my informants told me. This project, especially 
when taken in tandem with another one, the building of a new recreation complex, can be 
considered as groundbreaking a step as has ever been taken in Nardaran. Building upon the 
advantage of not having to deal with a different ethnic group, the Azeri government may perhaps, 
by implementing such policies, prevent the formation of a new one.  
 
3. Some final thoughts 
	
In this study, I have tried to demonstrate why the people of Nardaran stand apart within 
their own country and why they are linked to Iran, a country with which the average Azeri does 
not feel comfortable. I have taken a multi-dimensional approach at the risk of departing at times 
from the problem itself. Two major points struck me as being essential to my analysis of the 
Nardaran case. First, I was dealing with a nascent nation-state, and with a group of its people that 
does not seem to be well adjusted to this newly emerging order and that is linked to another 
nation-state. My quest for an answer to the central question “Why are these people not 
harmonious with their own state, and linked to another unsuitable one?” rendered inevitable a 
probing look at the concept of identity politics. Second, and connected to that first point, since a 
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nascent nation-state and the role played by an adjoining nation-state were at the center of the 
study, the concepts of hegemony, nationalism, and ethnicity were likewise central.   
I first tried to provide my reader with a glimpse of the ethnography of Nardaran, doing so 
by examining such aspects as etymology, social and political organization, and economy and 
material culture. This village on the Absheron peninsula possesses so many distinctive 
characteristics, especially with respect to political and social organization. Regarding the latter, 
thanks to the strong kinship ties the village gives the impression of being the home of a single 
huge family; strangers can easily be recognized in the village, despite its large population. 
Owing largely to the presence of the tomb of Rahima Khanum, the daughter of the 
Seventh Imam, religion has always loomed large for the Nardarani. Many sheikhs emerged from 
Nardaran, even under the strict Soviet rule, and sustained the village’s reputation for piety. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the village caught the eye of Azerbaijan’s southern neighbor, 
Iran. Since most of the people in both countries share the same sect, Shiism, no place could have 
looked more more appropriate, to proselytizing Iranian eyes, than Nardaran, in terms of creating 
a constituency. Thus, Iranian missionaries undertook a campaign that has comprised such 
mechanisms of domination as education, media, and financial tools. It was not long before their 
endeavor had fructified, the flower in question being a young, highly educated, and pro-Iranian 
elite. The biggest advantage these missionaries had from the outset was that the Nardarani have 
always had an extraordinary for among religious scholars.  
Since the new educated elite knew a lot, their prestige was enormous. And owing to the 
many years they had spent studying in Iran, they began to import Iranian cultural elements into 
their home town. Then, when they felt the absence of resistance, they intensified their attitude 
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and began to exclude everything national and traditional. Although the Azeri government saw 
what was happening and took steps to forestall radical change, the actual hegemonic center, Iran, 
not only did not curtail its activities but sustained them in new and different ways. Even as it 
brought students into its fold, the supreme representative of Khamanei was busy having the 
major pieces of Iranian literature translated into Azerbijani.  The main argument of this study is 
that these determinants created a pro-Iranian atmosphere in Nardaran that came to seem like air 
itself, the only breathing option. In other words, by excluding all possible alternatives, the 
educated elite began to constitute a new Nardarani order.  
Another main argument of this study is that the elite had to exclude or oppress the 
alternatives owing to the strongly nationalistic sentiments that Nardaranis possess. Indeed, it still 
is not possible to regard Nardaran as being fully homogenized. Thus although Nardaran reflects 
the traits of an ethnic group when we look at the issue from an anthropological perspective, the 
only theoretical approach that can do justice to Naradaran’s nationalism appears to be ethno-
symbolism. It simply cannot be denied that Nardaranis share many of the broader society’s 
nationalistic sentiments, given their common ancestry, shared cultural history, and the like. This 
is precisely why they supported the National Front, and why the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan was 
severely weakened by governmental repression. The old passion may be ebbing a bit, however. 
One of my informants, speaking about the disappearance of the 2002 spirit from Nardaran, said 
he and many others did not feel comfortable with the government’s seemingly generous policy 
on the buying and selling of land:  “You know, this is the wild capitalism, and the money is 
warm! Its warmth is sweeping the souls of many Nardarani!” 
Now that I have reprised my explanation of the distinctive condition of Nardaran, I would 
like to say a few more things about the theories that underpin my understanding of the Nardarani 
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identity. The latter can be truly understood only when one takes a broad view that embraces both 
the hegemonic elements and the collective actions. The Darvesh Toyu, the wall paintings, and 
the alternative form of education jointly provide the best basis for our discussion. We have noted 
the importance to this study of the concepts of selves in practice, social positioning and figured 
worlds.    
Here I simply say in closing that while it is true that identities are constructed socially 
and that the Nardarani identity is no exception to that rule, the dynamic feel of the figured worlds 
conception best suits the new Nardarani identity by underscoring its novelty and its daring. 
As for the hegemony discussion, I must stress that the most prominent mechanism 
utilized by the Azeri state is that of formal education. My examination of the curricular content 
revealed some real efforts at national-identity formation, yet corruption can be seen as being the 
Achilles heel of the Azeri state. Nardaranis, like so many in the world today, are enraged by the 
unequal distribution of income.  In one of my informants’ words, “just oil income alone could 
make even twice our population prosperous.” Thus legitimacy will come, perhaps, only when 
and if corruption goes.  
With respect to Iranian hegemony, the deployment of missionaries and the religious 
intensification are its two most essential components. As one of my informants interestingly put 
it, “There were no engineers or doctors among the Iranians who came to Nardaran; only the 
mullahs came to our village.” We have here perhaps, as I suggested earlier, a sort of spiritual or 
implicit coercion, a version of Serif Mardin’s “neighborhood pressure.” Its presence, as 
evidenced by such things as nonattendance at celebrations being noted by neighbors and 
construed as misconduct by the villagers, is counterpointed by the subtle resistances offered to it. 
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For instance some villagers who want to emphasize their Nardarani identity continue to put 
graffiti on the walls of their houses located in the suburbs.   
I certainly must note, in closing, that there were and still are well planned and organized 
efforts being mounted by two nation-states, Iran and Azerbaijan, to impose their respective 
hegemonies upon the village. Although at the moment Iran seems to have the upper hand, the 
future efforts of both states will determine the destiny of Nardaran. Given that lately many 
scholars have been arguing that most of the countries of the region are being subjected to similar 
initiatives, since Iran is keen on playing a leadership role in the Middle East, this study’s 
exploration of a collective Nardarani identity as it is shaped by both internal and external factors 
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